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This dissertation consists of three self-contained papers, which are all related to
the welfare consequences of risk and uncertainty.
Chapter one studies the intergenerational effects of maternal early childhood
shocks on the human capital outcomes of children. I exploit the 1983-1985
Ethiopian famine as an exogenous source of variation to study the effects of ex-
posure to severe shocks in utero and/ or during the first three years after birth
on the cognitive, non-cognitive and health capabilities of children of mothers
who were exposed to shocks in early childhood. Using data that track children
from early childhood through adolescence, I estimate the effects of mothers’ early
childhood shock over their children’s life cycle. I find that the famine had a last-
ing intergenerational effect. Mothers’ early childhood famine exposure reduces
their children’s height-for-age z-score, schooling, locus of control and self-esteem.
These effects are persistent from age one through early adolescence. The main
inter-generational transmission channel of the shock is children’s maternal hu-
man capital endowment. Mothers who suffered the famine in early childhood
are shorter and have less schooling. I also find a critical maternal shock duration
threshold of three months. These findings point to ineffectiveness of remediation
once the damage is done to mothers as young girls. The policy implication is that
girls under the age of three with high risk of crossing the critical famine duration
threshold should be targeted for health and nutritional interventions.
In chapter two, coauthored with Christopher B. Barrett, Erin Lentz and
Birhanu Ayana, we estimate the causal effects of index insurance coverage on the
subjective well-being (SWB) of a poor population in rural southern Ethiopia. In-
surance coverage may be welfare enhancing ex ante by reducing exposure to risk.
Yet, if the insurance policy lapses without payout, but having paid a premium, the
buyer will be financially worse off and may experience buyer’s remorse ex post of
the resolution of uncertainty. The ex ante and ex post well-being effects of insurance
may therefore differ, especially in the absence of indemnity payments. We sepa-
rately identify (1) the ex ante SWB effects of current insurance coverage that arise
from reducing ex ante risk exposure to potential shocks, and (2) the ex post buyer’s
remorse effects of lapsed insurance policies that did not pay out. By exploiting
the randomization of incentives to purchase a newly introduced index-based live-
stock insurance product and three rounds of household panel data, we establish
that current coverage generates statistically significant gains in buyer’s SWB. The
ex ante gains more than offset the statistically significant buyer’s remorse effect of
having lost money on insurance that did not pay out. These results suggest that
insurance can have significant impact on SWB and illustrate that failure to control
for potential buyer’s remorse effects can bias downwards estimates of the welfare
gains from insurance coverage.
Chapter three concerns with the determinants of crop diversification in Ugan-
dan agriculture. I use three rounds of the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS)
data, which collects detailed information on land holding and characteristics, crop
production, agricultural inputs and farm management practices to examine the
prime motives for observed crop diversification practices. The findings show that
crop diversification is determined by a combination of yield and variance con-
siderations, and that these considerations vary by crop type. Among the main
crops in Uganda, inter-cropping of beans and sweet potatoes appears to be pri-
marily driven by average yield considerations while variance (risk) appears to
factor prominently in maize inter-cropping decisions. Maize and beans are best
suited for inter-cropping, whereas sorghum and matoke yield better results when
planted as mono crops. The maize-beans combination is the best crop mix. I also
find that crop yields are lower and yield variance higher on larger plots, suggest-
ing the inverse productivity-size phenomenon is present in Ugandan agriculture.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Conditions of risk and uncertainty frame the economic and social behavior of in-
dividuals and households in a profound manner. First, households may adopt
risk management strategies ex ante that they otherwise would not, to minimize
risk exposure. These may include altering the composition of their asset portfolio,
livelihood sources or agricultural activities, especially the case in rural communi-
ties. Farm households may diversify into farm vs. non-farm income sources, crop
vs. livestock or specialized vs. diversified crops. Second, households may engage
in risk mitigating strategies ex post to minimize the (negative) effects of adverse
events. These may include selling off assets, reducing consumption, withdraw-
ing children from school to raise supplementary income or reduce the burden of
educational expenses, among others [24, 116].
The prospect and experience of random, negative shocks can have consider-
able impact on the immediate and long-term welfare outcomes of households and
their members. The nature and size of the effects of such events depends on the
magnitude of the shocks themselves as well as the manner with which house-
holds respond to them. If households have sufficient liquid and non-liquid assets
to cushion against unforeseen shocks, the effects of shocks could be less than oth-
erwise. In much of the developing world, households lack this critical cushion
against shocks. Furthermore, access to credit is limited and agricultural insurance
1
is almost non-existent.1 As a result, households are forced to engage in destructive
risk mitigating strategies such as selling farm implements, consuming seedlings,
reducing consumption to preserve assets [117, 44, 147].
Poor communities in the developing world subsist on quantity and quality of
foods well below the required daily macro- and micro-nutrient intakes. Under
these circumstances, shock mitigation strategies that involve reduction of con-
sumption or, in extreme cases, radical changes in consumption patterns in re-
sponse to severe droughts (famines) can lead to adverse childhood welfare (health
and schooling), adult health and labor market outcomes, or even have intergener-
ational consequences. Shocks experienced in childhood tend to have lasting neg-
ative impact [46]. Lack of access to food in the formative period (commonly taken
as the first 1000 days – in utero and two years after birth), affects the expression of
the genome and adversely impacts cognitive development and physical health in
childhood and later in adulthood [8]. Especially in the case of women, the effects
of early exposure could transmitted to their offspring across generational lines.
Financial development plays a crucial role in smoothing welfare over time. Ac-
cess to credit would allow households to smooth consumption by shifting savings
over time – saving during periods of relative surplus and borrowing during pe-
riods of relative shortage. Likewise access to insurance would help minimize the
effects of shocks. The development of the financial sector is, however, at a very
low level in much of the developing world. The limitations associated with con-
1There have been increasing efforts in recent years to expand index insurance offerings in sev-
eral developing countries [120, 123, 57].
2
ventional insurance products – adverse selection and moral hazard – further com-
plicate the delivery of insurance to rural communities. In recent years, there has
been a growing push to expand the availability of index insurance products to fill
in this void. The evaluations of the various index insurance products introduced
in last decade or so have shown that access to insurance has been instrumental in
improving saving, nutrition and consumption [120, 123, 117].
This dissertation straddles the three dimensions of risk and uncertainty out-
lined above. The first chapter studies the intergenerational impacts of childhood
shocks on the human capital of children born to mothers who suffered severe
shocks as young girls. The second chapter studies the crop diversification deci-
sions of farm households in a risky environment. More specifically, it focuses on
the determinants of crop diversification by distinguishing between return motives
as they relate to the desire to take advantage of synergistic relationships between
different crops and risk minimization motives in which farm households trade
high return for low variability of yield. The chapter makes qualitative distinctions
between distributions with greater lower return odds and those with greater high
return odds for the same level of variance. The final chapter studies the effects
of index insurance on household wellbeing. Self reported measures of well-being
– subjective well-being – are used as outcome variables. The chapter examines
the well-being effects of an index based livestock insurance product on household
well-being. What follows, presents a more detailed introduction of each of the
three chapters that make up this dissertation.
3
1.1 Intergenerational Effects of Early Childhood Shocks on Hu-
man Capital: Evidence from Ethiopia
The frequency and intensity of extreme weather events including droughts, heat
waves, flooding and storms has increased in the last few decades due to climate
change related rises in temperature. This rise in incidence of extreme weather has
been associated with increase in the economic and social costs of natural disas-
ters [207]. The adverse effects of natural disasters are likely to be very high in
communities that are under-resourced to shoulder the burden of disasters. Rural
households in much of the developing world, who primarily depend on agricul-
ture for sustenance, fall in this category. Major shocks to agricultural activities in
these communities can have devastating consequences due to loss of productive
assets and disruptions in nutrition, health, and schooling, among others. Shocks
experienced in early childhood are especially damaging [61, 59].
Explorations of the relationship between early childhood environments and
child outcomes date back to the early epidemiological works of [18, 19] on the fe-
tal origins of disease (popularly known as the “fetal origins hypothesis”). Since,
there has been a growing interest in economics to study the effects of adverse ex-
posure on various human capital outcomes of children. The evidence so far shows
that adverse exposure during the prenatal and postnatal periods negatively affects
the health and schooling outcomes of children and their labor market outcomes as
adults [187, 62, 148, 5]. Prenatal shock exposure may delay or impair the expres-
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sion of parts of the genome that are crucial for cognitive and motor functions and
lead to a lasting impact on childhood and adulthood outcomes [169]. Epigenetic
and physiological adaptations to nutritional stress during this period and early in
the postnatal period may set growth parameters of children, especially girls, and
determine their and their offspring’s developmental trajectory [8, 166].
This chapter focuses on the intergenerational effects of childhood shocks on
human capital. Despite the flourish of interest in the links between early child-
hood environments and various child and adult outcomes over the last two
decades, there is little research on the intergenerational aspect of early childhood
shocks. Whether shocks experienced in childhood last across generations; and if
so, the transmission mechanisms are not fully understood. This paper presents
one of the first estimates of the intergenerational effects of early childhood shocks
on human capital. Other recent studies of the intergenerational transmission of
shocks include [45] and [46] who examine the intergenerational effects of natural
disasters in Latin America on human capital, and [191] who study how parents’
exposure to the 1959-1961 Chinese famine affects the cognitive outcomes of their
children.
This paper makes important contributions to this emerging literature. First, the
focus of this paper is a major drought that was the prime source of a destructive
famine in Ethiopia. Though the shock event in focus in the paper is of an extreme
nature, drought events tend to be more common. Thus, lessons from this study
may have more immediate policy relevance than some of the less frequent shocks
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(e.g., earthquakes, volcanoes) that [45] and [46] leverage as exogenous source of
variation to identify the intergenerational causal impact of early childhood shocks
on human capital. The shock used by [191] is similar to the one this paper. Yet,
there is a broad consensus that the Chinese famine was primarily a policy failure
rather than a meteorological shock. Further, the data used in this paper are panel
in nature and track children from early childhood into adolescence and, thus, per-
mit examining the life cycle effects of shocks.
Building on previous studies documenting that the impacts of natural disasters
tend to be greater for girls than boys [46, 191], this chapter focuses on the intergen-
erational effects of early childhood shocks on the human capital of children born
to mothers who suffered severe shocks as young girls. The data come from the
Ethiopia Young Lives longitudinal survey, which tracks children from the age of
6-18 months through adolescence. I combine the survey data with weather data
from Ethiopia in 1980s. Ethiopia suffered a catastrophic famine in 1983-1985 as
rains failed in successive cropping seasons between 1983 and 1985 in most parts
of the country, especially in the north. I exploit the geographic variation of the
famine and mothers’ age at the onset of the famine to explore whether shocks
in early childhood have a lasting intergenerational impact on the health, cogni-
tive and non-cognitive human capital of the children as well as identify potential
transmission mechanisms. In a previous study in the same study area, [72] find a
negative long term impact of the Ethiopian famine on the height of young adults.
They, however, do not examine the intergenerational effects of the famine.
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I find that the 1983-1985 Ethiopian famine had a negative intergenerational
effect on the human capital outcomes of children of mothers who were exposed
to the famine in utero and/or in their first three years of life after birth. The effect
is particularly strong on the health human capital of children. At the mean level
of famine intensity and duration, the famine reduces height-for-age (zhfa) by 0.07
standard deviations (about 5%) relative to the World Health Organization (WHO)
growth chart reference population. The effect on schooling is slightly smaller, but
still statistically significant. At mean famine intensity and duration, the schooling
of affected children declines by about 0.05 grades (4%) relative to their unaffected
counterparts. The key transmission channels of the shock are maternal human
capital outcomes. Mothers exposed to the famine during developmental plasticity
are shorter and have less schooling.
1.2 Insuring Wellbeing? Buyer’s Remorse and Peace of Mind Ef-
fects from Insurance
In low income communities with limited means for private risk management, risk
exposure can have dire welfare consequences. In addition to its negative effects
on contemporaneous welfare, uninsured risk can lead to poverty traps that may
bind households in poverty in perpetuity [178, 21]. There is a widespread recog-
nition that access to insurance in these environments can help preserve assets as
well as encourage efficient allocation of productive resources. However, standard
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insurance products are routinely unavailable due to moral hazard and adverse
selection problems and high transaction costs in infrastructure-poor areas [29]. In
response to the lack of standard insurance products, there have been growing ef-
forts in recent years to expand index insurance products in the developing world.
Index insurance addresses some of the key limitations of standard insurance
products that limit their expansion in poor communities. It resolves the moral
hazard and transaction cost concerns by writing contracts not on realized losses
but on an observable exogenous indicator that is believed to be strongly correlated
with actual losses. This design feature of index insurance is also the source of
its limitation. The exogenous index and actual losses at the household level are
not perfectly correlated. As a result, policy holders could experience catastrophic
losses that the index may not detect, and thus will not covered by insurance. It is
not, therefore, immediately clear whether index insurance is welfare improving.
There is little empirical work that indeed index insurance offerings lead to welfare
gains to poor rural households [57, 33]. This is further complicated by the fact
that ex ante well-being effects may differ from ex post well-being effects after the
resolution of uncertainty.
In this chapter, we use a novel approach to estimate the welfare impacts of an
index insurance product that was introduced to southern Ethiopia in 2012. We
take advantage of recent innovations in the measurement of subjective wellbeing
(SWB) [134] to examine the effects of index based livestock insurance (IBLI) on the
SWB of pastoralists in Borana zone of southern Ethiopia. The use of SWB mea-
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sures is growing in popularity owing to their potential for deeper insights beyond
the traditional asset, income and expenditure based measures [75, 89, 146]. We
exploit the experimental design features of IBLI to overcome potential selection
issues in insurance uptake. Incentives to purchase IBLI were randomized among
the target population through distribution of discount coupons and information
extension treatments. This enables us to use an instrumental variables method
to identify the causal impacts of IBLI on SWB. Moreover, the distribution of the
randomized incentives and the survey were implemented over multiple periods.
This allows us to distinguish ex ante and ex post well-being and isolate the positive
peace of mind effects of active insurance coverage from negative buyer’s remorse
effects of lapsed insurance.
We find that current IBLI coverage – represented by both a discrete measure of
uptake and by a continuous measure of purchase volume – generates statistically
significant SWB gains. These gains significantly exceed the statistically significant
adverse buyer’s remorse effects. We also show that the estimated SWB gains from
insurance would be biased downwards if one omits controls for lapsed insurance
coverage that generates buyer’s remorse. The key implication is that IBLI, which
has premiums set above actuarially fair rates, improves buyers’ SWB even over a
period when pastoralists in southern Ethiopia lose money on the policy. The ex
ante peace of mind effect dominates any ex post buyer’s remorse. In other words,
even an insurance policy that does not pay out still improves people’s perceptions
of their well-being. [12]
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1.3 Diversification and Productivity in African Agriculture: Evi-
dence from Uganda
Rainfed agriculture is the prime source of sustenance in rural communities in
much of the developing world. As much as 95% of cultivated land in Sub-Saharan
Africa and over 60% in East and South Asia and North Africa is rainfed. Un-
der these conditions, rainfall variability can impose significant challenges to rural
livelihoods. The threat of weather shocks is further compounded by lack of ac-
cess to credit and insurance for protecting consumption and assets. Faced with
these circumstances, rural households may engage in otherwise inefficient risk
management practices ex ante and risk mitigating strategies ex post. Crop diversi-
fication is one such private risk management strategy in which farm households
may trade-off lower returns for lower variance.
While there has long been much focus on the income stabilizing role of crop
diversification, its potential for increasing productivity through inter-crop syner-
gies is yet to receive similar attention. Crop rotation stabilizes soil fertility [149],
whereas inter-cropping boosts productivity by exploiting symbiotic complemen-
tarity of crops [50]. Studies of the productivity dynamics associated with crop
diversification are primarily conducted on experimental plots, with limited focus
on the potential drivers of observed diversification practices as they relate to risk
and return. Much of the relevant empirical studies has been in settings where crop
production is dominated by a few crops [129] or multiple varieties of a single crop
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[76]. In most of Sub-Saharan Africa, farming is a complex multi-crop enterprise, in
which farmers engage in the production of several crops on small plots, leading to
complex inter-crop dynamics. A fuller understanding of on-farm crop dynamics
in such environments requires an analysis of a broad range of crops.
This chapter studies the determinants of crop diversification decisions in
Uganda. The results of this paper are crucial for understanding the prime mo-
tives for crop diversification with emphasis on devising policies to maximize the
gains from diversification and minimize associated downsides. To that end, first
it examines the contributions of mean, variance and skewness in crop choice, with
a particular focus on determining whether yield and/ or risk are the primary con-
siderations in crop decisions. Second, it investigates whether inter-crop synergies
vary with crop plot area to draw implications for optimal farm size and crop mix.
I use the 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12 rounds of the Uganda National Panel
Survey (UNPS) data, which were collected by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics
(UBOS) under the Living Standards Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on
Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) project. The surveys contain detailed agriculture mod-
ules and collect information on land holding and characteristics, crop production,
agricultural inputs and farm management practices. The survey is conducted
twice a year to reflect the seasonality in Ugandan agriculture. Thus, in total, this
paper uses six rounds of data to examine the drivers of crop choice.
The main findings are: first, the determinants of crop diversification vary
by crop type. The prominence of mean and variance considerations differs by
11
crops. Average yield appears to be the key factor in beans and sweet potatoes
inter-cropping with other cereals and tubers, while variance seems to be the main
motive for maize intercropping. Second, crop productivity decreases with plot
size for all major crops in Uganda. This result is consistent with the inverse
farm productivity size relationship. Larger plots are also associated with high
yield variance, though this is mitigated by the positive skewness associated with
larger plots. Third, maize and beans are most suitable for intercropping, whereas
sorghum and matoke are least suitable. When intercropped with other crops,
maize reduces yield variance, while beans seem to increase yield. The maize-
beans combination represents the best crop mix in Uganda. On the contrary, when
intercropped with other crops, matoke and especially sorghum reduce average
yield of other crops across the board. Thus, they should be planted as mono crops.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD SHOCKS ON
HUMAN CAPITAL: EVIDENCE FROM ETHIOPIA
2.1 Introduction
Climate change-related rise in temperature has increased the frequency and in-
tensity of extreme weather events in the last few decades. The rise in incidence
of droughts, heat waves, flooding, and storms has been associated with surge
in economic and social costs of natural disasters [207]. In much of the developing
world where a significant share of household income is sourced in the agricultural
sector, such events have adverse welfare consequences due to loss of productive
assets and disruptions in nutrition, health, and schooling, among others. Within
the household unit, the effects of weather shocks may differ based on individu-
als’ characteristics. Shocks experienced in early childhood tend to have greater
negative impact on human capital and labor market outcomes [12, 148, 59, 3].
Since the early epidemiological studies by [19, 18] on the fetal origins of dis-
ease, there has been a growing body of literature in economics exploring the
effects of adverse exposure during the prenatal period [62, 6] and at various
stages in the postnatal period [187, 63] on health, schooling and labor mar-
ket outcomes. These studies typically leverage exogenous sources of variation
(natural experiments) to circumvent the potential confounding between unob-
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served individual and family characteristics and early childhood environments
[187, 35, 64, 2, 125, 3, 5].
Much of the literature on early childhood shocks focuses on the prenatal pe-
riod, which is perhaps the most sensitive period for child development. Disrup-
tions during this period may delay or impair the expression of parts of the genome
that are crucial for cognitive and motor functions and lead to a lasting impact on
childhood and adulthood outcomes [35, 62, 169, 5, 6]. Recent studies show that the
adverse effects of such shocks are greater for females [45, 46, 191, 7]. Irreversible
physiological adaptations to nutritional stress during critical prenatal and post-
natal periods may set the growth parameters of girls [8, 96], which may predeter-
mine their offspring’s developmental trajectory and later life outcomes [166]. This
intergenerational aspect of shocks is surprisingly understudied.
This paper presents one of the first estimates of the intergenerational effects of
early childhood shocks on human capital. Other recent studies of the intergener-
ational transmission of shocks include [46], who examine the effects of the 1970
Ancash earthquake in Peru on schooling and child labor. They find that maternal
in utero shock exposure negatively affects child labor and schooling. [191] study
how parents’ exposure to the 1959-1961 Chinese famine affects the cognitive out-
comes of their children. They find that the daughters of fathers who suffered the
famine as young boys perform worse in cognitive tests. In a more recent paper,
[45] explores the intergenerational effects of childhood exposure to natural disas-
ters that occurred in Latin America in the 20th century on schooling, health and
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labor market outcomes, among others. Early childhood exposure (in utero and first
two years after birth) to natural disasters is found to have the greatest impact on
human capital and adult labor market outcomes. This paper extends this emerg-
ing literature to a broad range of human capital measures over children’s life cycle
in the context of an African country where agriculture is the prime source of sus-
tenance. In such environments, weather shocks can have destructive lasting effect
on the human capital of individuals who suffer the shocks directly and their off-
spring.
Ethiopia suffered a catastrophic famine in 1983-1985 as rains failed in succes-
sive cropping seasons between 1983 and 1985 in most parts of the country, espe-
cially the northern provinces of Tigray, Wello and Eritrea.1 The central highlands
and western parts of the country were largely unaffected. I exploit the geographic
variation of the famine, parents’ age at the onset of the famine and unique data
that track children from the age of 6-18 months through early adolescence to ex-
plore whether shocks in early childhood have a lasting impact on the health, cog-
nitive and non-cognitive human capital of the children of mothers who suffered
the shocks as young girls. In a previous study, [72] find a negative longterm im-
pact of same shock on the height of young adults who were 12-36 months old
at the peak of the famine. They do not, however, examine the intergenerational
effects of the famine.
The analysis in this paper extends beyond the extensive margin and examines
1Eritrea has since become an independent state.
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variation in famine durations (in months) to determine whether shocks of cer-
tain duration are more damaging than others. Understanding the role of famine
duration is important for efficient targeting of groups with the greatest need for
assistance. The panel nature of the data permits exploring the effects of maternal
early childhood shocks on children’s human capital over their life cycle. I evalu-
ate the effect size from age 1 through age 12 in a three-year interval. This provides
evidence on whether early disadvantages are malleable through remediation ef-
forts, which is crucial for devising effective policies to reduce intergenerational
transmission of shocks.
This paper also seeks to determine the intergenerational shock transmission
mechanisms. To this end, I focus on children’s maternal human capital endow-
ment and parental investments. Maternal human capital is an essential input in
children’s human capital production. Negative shocks to mothers’ human capital
may have persistent impact through generations in a complex feedback processes
[61, 59, 108]. Likewise, early childhood shocks may impair mothers’ adulthood
earnings and investments in their children’s schooling and health.
This paper makes two important contributions. First, it contributes to the early
childhood development literature by extending the study of the impacts of ad-
verse early childhood exposure on childhood and adolescent outcomes to inter-
generational transmission of the effects of severe shocks. Second, it provides an
indirect test for the intergenerational persistence of poverty. The presence (or ab-
sence) of intergenerational persistence of the effects of childhood shocks points to
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early conditions (e.g., family income, education) as one of the potential causes (or
not) of poverty persistence across generations [30, 137, 34].
I find that the 1983-1985 Ethiopian famine had a negative intergenerational ef-
fect on the human capital outcomes of children of mothers who were exposed to
the famine in utero and/or in their first three years of life after birth. The effect
is particularly strong on the health human capabilities of children. At the mean
level of famine intensity and duration, the famine reduces height-for-age (zhfa)
by 0.07 standard deviations (about 5%) relative to the World Health Organization
(WHO) growth chart reference population. The effect on schooling is small, but
statistically significant. At mean famine intensity and duration, children’s school-
ing decreases by about 0.05 grades (4%). The key transmission channels of the
shock are maternal human capital outcomes. Mothers exposed to the famine dur-
ing developmental plasticity are shorter and have less schooling.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief
background on the Ethiopian famine. Section 3 presents the conceptual frame-
work of the paper. Section 4 discusses the data, the various famine and human
capital measures and summary statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical strat-
egy. Section 6 discusses the main results of the paper. Section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Background
The agricultural sector is the mainstay of the Ethiopian economy and accounts for
40% of GDP and 80% of employment [209]. It is dominated by subsistent rain-fed
smallholder agriculture. The production environment is characterized by increas-
ing land degradation and erratic weather conditions. Variability in the amount
and seasonal distribution of precipitation has been a major cause of crop failure
and food shortages. The frequency of irregular rainfall patterns and droughts has
increased over the recent decades [77, 200]. In some cases, the food shortages
associated with droughts have led to catastrophic famines.
In the last half century alone, there have been at least three famines in Ethiopia,
of which the 1983-1985 famine is widely considered the worst.2 Estimates of the
number of people killed range between 400,000 and over a million. [74] estimates
that between 600,000 and one million people were killed due to the famine. [70]
puts the figure closer to 400,000, though he notes that is likely to be a lower bound.
[128] argues the true figure of the casualties of the famine is 700,000. Despite the
differences in the estimates of famine casualties, the famine’s impact has been
undoubtedly devastating. In fact, [164] notes that in terms of the number of deaths
relative to population size, the 1983-1985 Ethiopian famine ranks as one of the
worst in the world in recent history.
2For a complete chronology of droughts and famines in Ethiopia, see [204].
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2.2.1 Ethiopian 1983-1985 Famine
The rainfall pattern in Ethiopia is characterized by a bi-modal distribution. In
the predominantly crop producing central and northern areas of the country, the
main rainy season (meher) is in June-September and accounts for 85-90% of annual
agricultural output nationwide. Some central and eastern highlands also receive
rainfall during a short rainy season (belg) between March and May. In the southern
parts of the country, where the primary source of livelihood is pastoralism, the
main rainy season is in March-May, followed by a short rainy season in October-
November.
The famine started 1983 when meher rains failed in Tigray and Wello. It quickly
spread to the rest of the country when the 1984 belg rains failed in belg growing
highland areas in central Ethiopia [70]. The drought condition continued in meher
1984 through belg 1985. The famine was most severe in 1984. Using historical
rainfall data for the 1961-1999 period for the meher season, [185] show that 1984
was by far the driest year.3 Low pre-meher rains were followed by early onset of
meher rains, which quickly dried up. The extended dry spell led to a very short
effective growing season and widespread crop failures throughout the country.
The famine ended with the return of normal meher rains in 1985.
The famine condition was further exacerbated by insurgencies and the govern-
3Using annual rainfall data (including both meher and belg rains) for the 1961-1987 period, [204]
report similar results. They show 1984 was the driest year for the whole of Ethiopia, as well as the
northern provinces of Wello and Tigray, and Hararghe in the east.
19
ment’s counter-insurgency strategies in northern Ethiopia. To counter the rebel
movements, the government had mobilized large military campaigns, which di-
verted resources from relief effort.4 The government had also restricted access to
relief aid in rebel controlled areas in Tigray and Eritrea [70]. There was limited
access to food and medicine to people (especially women and children) severely
weakened by the famine in a handful of relief centers in government controlled
areas. While the move to relief centers allowed access to much needed food, poor
health facilities and hygiene conditions led to the rapid spread of infectious dis-
eases in the centers and the death of thousands. Further, restrictions on the move-
ment of people and goods in the northern provinces constrained migration of able
bodied individuals to relatively less affected parts of the country in search of em-
ployment and limited commercial imports of food from surplus growing areas,
compounding the impacts of the famine.
In terms of age distribution, children under the age of 10 and adults of age
60 and above were disproportionately affected by the famine. [128] shows that
among households displaced from the two most famine-affected provinces of
Tigray and Wello, about 26% of children under the age of 5 and 14% of children
between age 5 and 9 died during the famine. For the 0-4 age group, males were
slightly more likely to die (27% vs. 24%). In the 5-9 age bracket, the female mor-
tality rate was much higher than that of males (19% vs. 9%). Likewise, 20% of
people in the 60 plus age group perished, with females most affected than males.5
4In 1984 the government had allocated 46% of the national budget to military spending [203].
5Note, however, that these are likely to be upper bound estimates of famine-related excess
death as migration often tends to be a last resort option after households exhaust their food re-
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Though it is not clear that famine was the sole driver of the high mortality, the
fact that compared to 1981, the share of 0-14 and 65+ age groups in the popula-
tion significantly decreased in 1984-1985 suggests that the famine was perhaps the
prime cause of the rise in mortality of these groups [127]. The key implication of
the high incidence of famine-related excess mortality among children in the 0-4
age group is that estimates of the impact of the famine are likely to be attenuated
downwards. The problem is further compounded by the fact that children in the
reference (control) group for the purpose of this paper (age 4-7 at the start of the
famine) were also affected, albeit less, by the famine.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
I use the dynamic model of human capital development by [61, 108] and [59]
to study the effects of maternal exposure to severe shocks (famine) on the hu-
man capital of their offspring. The starting point in this framework is the multi-
dimensional nature of human capital. At any given time t, the human capi-
tal vector is given as θt = (θc,t, θn,t, θh,t), where θc, θn, and θh are cognitive, non-
cognitive/socio-emotional, and health capabilities, respectively. The formation of
capabilities (skills) follows a multistage technology in the sense that skills at one
stage of the life cycle serve as inputs at a later stage. Investments in skills will,
therefore, have lasting effect by increasing the stock of skills, which will be used
as inputs in the formation of future skills.
serves and selling off assets [167].
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In this framework, early life adverse exposure may have persistent negative
impact on outcomes later in life for at least two reasons. First, skills are dynami-
cally self-reinforcing. High cognitive skill in one period leads to higher cognitive
skill in a later period, and a higher health capability cross fertilizes (i.e., creates
a conductive environment for acquisition of) cognitive skill. Heckman and co-
authors refer to this effect as “self-productivity”; it includes own and cross capa-
bility effects. Famines affect human capital by reducing the stock of skills available
for self-production. Second, shocks reduce the productivity of future investments
in human capital, a process called “dynamic complementarity.” Shocks to a child’s
health, for example, will have a negative effect on returns to investment on future
learning [61, 59].
There are multiple sensitive periods in a child’s life that are crucial to the de-
velopment of human capital. Some skills are more readily acquired at one stage
than another, and some skill deficits are more malleable at one stage than another.
The most important period in a child’s development is the period in utero [5]. Ad-
verse experiences at this stage are known to cause significant damages to birth
weight, cognitive ability, later life height and weight, and lead to various diseases
[177, 96, 19]. Even within the prenatal period, early exposure may have a dif-
ferent impact than exposure later during pregnancy. [177] shows that exposure
to shocks during the first two trimesters has adverse effect on cognitive ability,
whereas exposure during the third trimester reduces child height.
The fist three years after birth are also critical for the formation and shaping
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of skills that determine later life outcomes. Children who are exposed to shocks
during this period tend to perform relatively poorly in school and labor markets
[187]. [60] find similar results in a randomized evaluation of the Abecedarian pro-
gram in the US. They find significant cognitive and non-cognitive gains for chil-
dren who enrolled in the program early (4 months), but not for those who only
experienced the intervention later (age 5). Some studies document even early ado-
lescence years (age 10-12) can be crucial to the development of certain dimensions
of human capability. [162] finds a negative relationship between age of acquisition
of primary and secondary languages and language proficiency, with the relation-
ship flattening out around the age of 12. Likewise, the fact that IQ scores tend
to stabilize around age 10 [184] suggests that the critical period for acquisition of
cognitive capability is before age 10. Non-cognitive skills are malleable even after
age 20 [65]. Once critical periods are missed, remediation interventions may not
reverse the damages already done.
Following [61, 108, 59], the technology summarizing the formation of skill k ∈
{c, n, h} is given as:
θk,t+1 = fk(θt, It, θp, ηt) (2.1)
where, θk,t, It, θp, and ηt denote the stock of skill k at time t, parental investments in
children at time t, parental endowments, and shocks at time t. The skill produc-
tion function, fk, is monotonically increasing in all of its arguments, twice differ-
entiable, and concave in I. After solving recursively, (2.1) can be rewritten as:
θk,t+1 = fk(θ0; I0, I1, ..., It; θp; η0, η1, ..., ηt) (2.2)
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where θ0 is the initial skill endowment of the child and is determined by both ge-
netic and environmental factors. Equation (2.2) shows that the stock of skills at
any given time t depends on endowment as well as investments and shocks at
different stages in the life cycle. Early shocks are more destructive than shocks
in adolescence, and more so for disadvantaged children, since early disadvan-
tages persist through the self productivity and dynamic complementarity pro-
cesses [108, 60].
For ease of exposition, I divide the developmental periods of a child in two:
early childhood, including the period in utero, denoted period 0; and late child-
hood, which constitutes the rest of childhood, denoted period 1. Adulthood is
denoted period 2. Following [61], the process of human capital development can
be described by an overlapping generations model, in which each individual lives
for three periods t ∈ [0, 2] in a household consisting of an adult and a child–the
first two periods (t = 0 and t = 1) as a child and t = 2 as a parent. As shown in
Figure 2.1, the adulthood period of the parent coincides with the two childhood
periods of the child.6 In each period, θt is stock of skills at the start of time t and It
and ηt are investments and shocks between t and t + 1.
The primary interest of this paper is in childhood outcomes. Thus, I focus on
the first two periods of the life cycle. The stock of skills in late childhood can be
6The early childhood period is defined as the entire period between conception and second
birthday. This is just meant to capture the “first 1,000 days” commonly taken as the most important
period for childhood development. The definition can be relaxed as necessary.
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Figure 2.1: Intergenerational evolution of human capital
Note: Figure 2.1 shows the intergenerational human capital production function. A child’s human
capital at any period t depends on initial endowment and investments through the child’s life up
to period t.
described by7
θk,1 = fk(θ0, I0, θp, η0) (2.3)
where, θ0, I0, and η0 are vectors of skill endowment, parental investments, and
shocks on cognitive, non-cognitive, and health capabilities. Parental investments
and early childhood skills are endogenous and are affected by shocks. Parental
investment in skill k is given as:
Ik,0 = gk(θ0, θp, η0). (2.4)
Similarly, parental endowment, θp = θ
p
2 (parents’ stock of skills in adulthood),
depends on parents’ late childhood capabilities, θp1 , late childhood investments,
7I assume that investments and shocks in adulthood have little impact on human capital. Sev-
eral empirical studies find small/insignificant returns to investment in adolescence and adulthood
(see [60] for discussion).
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I p1 , parental endowment at childhood, θg, and late childhood shocks, η
p
1 .
8
θp = q(θ
p
1 , I
p
1 , θg, η
p
1). (2.5)
This framework can be used to study the effects of maternal shocks at different
stages of the life cycle on the human capital of their children. For analytical ease,
I use a compact form of the skills vector, which can easily be extended to look at
shocks to a specific skill type.9
The effect of a parent’s late childhood shock on her offspring’s human capital
can be stated as:10
∂θk,1
∂η
p
1
=
∂θk,1
∂I0
∂I0
∂θp
∂θp
∂η
p
1
+
∂θk,1
∂θp
∂θp
∂η
p
1
. (2.6)
Early childhood investments in parent’s capabilities, I p1 , is endogenous, i.e.,
I p1 = g(θ
p
1 , θg, η
p
1). Thus,
∂θp
∂η
p
1
in (2.6) can be rewritten as:
∂θp
∂η
p
1
=
∂θp
∂η
p
1
+
∂θp
∂I p1
∂I p1
∂η
p
1
. (2.7)
Substituting (2.7) in (2.6), we find a decomposable impact of parental childhood
8I follow similar indexing notation for both the child and the parent. To distinguish between
generations, I index (superscript) parent skills with p and grand parents skills with g.
9The effect of a shock to a parent’s skill m ∈ {c, n, h}, on a child’s capability k can be stated as:
∂θk,1
∂η
p
m,1
=
∑
l=c,n,h
∑
j=c,n,h
∂θk,1
∂Il,0
∂Il,0
∂θ j,p
∂θ j,p
∂η
p
m,1
+
∑
j=c,n,h
∂θk,1
∂θ j,p
∂θ j,p
∂η
p
m,1
.
10Here, I show only the effect of parents’ late childhood shocks on their children’s human capital.
See Appendix A.1, for results on parental early childhood shocks.
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shocks on child outcomes as:
∂θk,1
∂η
p
1
=
(
∂θk,1
∂I0
∂I0
∂θp
+
∂θk,1
∂θp
) (
∂θp
∂η
p
1
+
∂θp
∂I p1
∂I p1
∂η
p
1
)
=
∂θk,1
∂θp
∂θp
∂η
p
1︸    ︷︷    ︸
Self Productivity
+
∂θk,1
∂I0
∂I0
∂θp
∂θp
∂η
p
1
+
∂θk,1
∂θp
∂θp
∂I p1
∂I p1
∂η
p
1︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
Mixed channel
+
∂θk,1
∂I0
∂I0
∂θp
∂θp
∂I p1
∂I p1
∂η
p
1︸               ︷︷               ︸
Dynamic complementarity
.
(2.8)
Equation (2.8) presents a compact solution of the effects of parental shock ex-
posure on a child’s human capital k. It includes both direct (effect of a shock to a
parent’s health in childhood on her child’s health) and cross (effect of shocks to a
parent’s health in childhood on her child’s cognitive capabilities) effects. The first
term measures the pure self-productivity effect of parental exposure to adverse
shocks. Shocks experienced by a parent reduce the parent’s capabilities, which in
turn reduce a child’s human capital through the “skill begets skill” notion. It is,
therefore, expected to be negative.
The last term in (2.8) is the pure dynamic complementarity effect. Parents’
childhood shock exposure reduces the return on investments in their human capi-
tal, and hence the stock of parents’ stock of skills at adulthood. Low parental skills
(children’s parental endowment), in turn, leads to low child capabilities. The sign
of the dynamic complementarity effect is, however, not straight forward due to
competing mechanisms. Even though ∂θk,1
∂I0
and ∂θp
∂Ip1
are both positive, the signs of
∂I0
∂θp
and ∂I
p
1
∂η
p
1
are ambiguous. First, famine can have general equilibrium wage and
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relative price effects [177]. A fall in wage rates reduces the opportunity cost of
time invested in child care, and conceivably lead to increase in time investments
[187]. By contrast, a rise in the relative price of food may have a negative real
income effect and retard investments on children. Second, the income effect of
a fall in agricultural outputs during famines may reduce investments in children
for farm households. Moreover, parental remediation of adverse exposures can
compensate for the effects of a shock if parents invest more in the affected child
or reinforce the effect if, rather, investments are directed to the unaffected child
to maximize returns. These combine to generate an ambiguous dynamic comple-
mentarity effect.
The two middle terms in (2.8) constitute a mixed channel, which emanates
from the inter-generational nature of the mechanism driving the effects of shocks.
The second term measures the effect of a parent’s childhood shock exposure
on her child that is transmitted through the child’s indirect investment channel.
Though ∂θk,1
∂I0
> 0 and ∂θp
∂η
p
1
< 0, the sign of ∂I0
∂θp
is ambiguous leading to an ambiguous
sign for this term. The third term captures the effect of parental shock exposure
channeled through the child’s indirect parental endowment channel. Its sign is,
however, ambiguous since ∂I
p
1
∂η
p
1
cannot be readily signed, leaving the mixed chan-
nel effect ambiguous. Thus, the theoretical predictions of the impacts of early
parental shocks on the human capital of children are not clear.
In this paper I use exogenous exposure to famine in Ethiopia in the early 1980s
to identify the causal effects of maternal early childhood shocks on their children’s
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outcomes. I use rich panel data to estimate the net effects of the famine on cogni-
tive and health outcomes of the children of parents who were exposed. The cor-
respondence between a child’s human capital and her outcomes can be thought
to be defined by the function h(.) [26], which translates human capital stock in a
given period t into performance Y in the same period. Measured performance in
time t for some dimension j is, thus, Yt, j = h(θt). To identify mechanisms, I estimate
the effects on parental cognitive, non-cognitive (socio-emotional) and health out-
comes, and other parental inputs such as health, schooling, and food expenditure.
2.4 Data
I use information on mothers’ age to recover their birth cohort during the 1983-
1985 Ethiopian famine. I combine the birth cohort data with a plausibly exogenous
geographic variation in the intensity and duration of drought condition during
the famine to identify the causal impacts of maternal famine exposure on the hu-
man capital of children. The Ethiopia Young Lives (YL) data track children from
early childhood through early adolescence over a 12 year period. In 2002, a base-
line survey was conducted on a sample of 2,000 children born in 2001-2002 (6-18
months old) living in 20 sites across Addis Ababa, Amhara, Oromia, Southern Na-
tions and Nationalities Region (SNNPR), and Tigray regions. Follow up surveys
were conducted in 2006, 2009, and 2013.11
11I use the Rounds 1-4 Constructed Files 2002-2014, which combine sub-sets of selected variables
from Rounds 1-4 of the Young Lives survey [37].
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Survey round
Variables 1 2 3 4 Obs. Mean Sd Min Max
Child outcomes
Height-for-age z-score X X X X 3459 -1.36 1.26 -4.98 4.92
Child height (cm) X X X X 3494 108.89 26.50 55.30 178.00
Child stunted (<-2 SD) X X X X 3493 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Child severely stunted (<-3 SD) X X X X 3493 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Child schooling (year) X X 1559 2.29 1.96 0.00 8.00
PPVT score (raw) X X X 2472 46.88 37.33 0.00 196.00
Math score (raw) X 1602 8.51 6.14 0.00 28.00
Child education aspiration (year) X 851 13.88 2.53 0.00 17.00
Child locus of control X X X 2606 1.94 1.49 0.00 4.00
Child self esteem X X X 2606 1.67 1.30 0.00 4.00
Mother outcomes
Mother height(cm) X 804 158.78 5.81 133.35 178.20
Mother schooling (year) X X X X 3187 3.22 4.02 0.00 16.00
Mother’s education aspiration for child (year) X X X 2583 15.32 2.44 0.00 18.00
Mother locus of control X X X 2606 2.35 0.91 0.25 4.00
Mother self esteem X X X 2606 2.69 0.65 0.22 4.00
Child and household characteristics
Child gender (male=1) X X X X 3523 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Child age (months) X X X X 3523 78.29 49.12 6.02 154.00
Child age order X X X X 3523 1.87 1.12 1.00 9.00
Child number of siblings X X X X 3523 3.02 1.71 1.00 11.00
Household head age X X X X 3521 38.13 11.03 5.00 110.00
Household head gender (male=1) X X X X 3522 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00
Household head schooling (year) X X X X 3522 4.70 4.56 0.00 25.00
Household size X X X X 3523 5.39 1.83 2.00 15.00
Mother age X X X X 3523 28.07 5.02 18.00 47.00
Father age X X X X 2989 36.60 7.31 19.00 86.00
Father schooling (year) X X X X 2680 5.04 4.40 0.00 18.00
Other controls
Urban-rural dummy (urban=1) X X X X 3523 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Shock index X X X X 3523 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.68
Wealth index X X X 3523 0.31 0.18 0.01 0.90
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – Continued from previous page
Survey round
Variables 1 2 3 4 Obs. Mean Sd Min Max
Food expenditure per month (Birr) X X X 3484 96.92 57.50 8.38 744.66
Non-food expenditure per month (Birr) X X X 3484 73.84 130.56 0.26 4,325.19
Total expenditure per month (Birr) X X X 3484 168.07 153.27 9.70 4,280.61
Education expenditure per year (Birr) X X X 3484 493.45 1,456.56 0.00 35,558.00
Health expenditure per year (Birr) X X X 3484 249.40 2,801.31 0.00 144,000.00
Drought measures (external data)
Negative rainfall deviation (SD) 3523 0.25 1.41 -2.63 2.07
Negative rainfall deviation in early childhood (SD) 3523 0.07 0.89 -2.63 2.07
Mother’s # months of famine 3364 3.87 2.00 1.00 7.00
Mother’s # months of famine in early childhood 3514 1.10 1.89 0.00 7.00
Note: Check marks in columns 2-5 indicate whether data on a variable in column 1 were collected in survey rounds 1-4.
Food, non-food and total expenditure are measured in real 2006 Birr per capita. Education and health expenditures are
measured in nominal Birr. The drought measures are limited to growing seasons (as opposed to full year) specific to
weredas. In belg and meher growing weredas, the drought measures reflect the condition for the two seasons. For meher-only
growing areas, it covers the meher season only.
The survey has child, household, and community modules. In the household
module, data on household composition, parental background, assets, food and
non-food expenditure, social capital, child care, child health and exposure to var-
ious shocks were collected. Caregiver perceptions, attitudes and aspirations for
child and family were also covered. Data on time use of family members, child
weight and height were also collected. The child module asks children about their
attitudes to work and school, perception of how they were treated by others, as
well as their hopes and aspirations for the future. Data on children’s test scores
(language comprehension and math) has been collected beginning in round 2. The
community survey provides information on the economic, social, and environ-
mental context of each community. It asks questions on access to various services
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(such as education, health, electricity, telephone etc.), population, religion, and
ethnicity, language, political representation, crimes, environmental changes and
community networks. Table 2.1 presents a list of key variables and the survey
round in which they were collected.
The household survey data are matched with weather (rainfall) data. The
weather data are from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) AgMERRA climate dataset, which provides daily time series over the
1980-2010 period [81, 180, 181].12 The data are originally provided at 0.25 degree
(≈25km×25km) resolution. These data are converted to wereda level rainfall data
by applying weights based on the area size of the grid cell relative to the wereda,
i.e., percentage of each wereda’s area occupied by the grid cell. All grid cells that
fully fall within a wereda receive equal weights whereas intersected cells (grids
that fall between two or more weredas) receive smaller weight proportional to area
size.
12AgMERRA stands for Agricultural Modern-Era Retrospective analysis for Research and Ap-
plications. The AgMERRA dataset provides daily, high-resolution meteorological time series by
combining daily resolution data from retrospective analysis with ground level and remotely-
sensed observational datasets for temperature, precipitation and solar radiation. It gives particular
consideration to agricultural areas, and agronomic factors that affect plant growth such as mean
growing season temperature and precipitation, seasonal cycles, inter-annual variability, the fre-
quency and sequence of rainfall events, and the distribution of sub-seasonal extremes, leading to
substantial reduction in bias [181].
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2.4.1 Measuring Famine Magnitude
The main cause of the famine was an extended drought that lasted several crop-
ping seasons. Thus, the geographic and temporal variation in the drought condi-
tion is used as a proxy for the famine. I construct two measures of famine magni-
tude: the deviation of average rainfall during the 1983-1985 famine from historical
average (rdev), and the number of months with rainfall shortage of half or higher
standard deviations (SD) (mdry). While these measures are likely to be correlated,
they measure different aspects of a famine condition. Rdev measures the intensity
of famine (the extent of dryness), whereas mdry measures the duration of a dry
spell. A famine can be deep (extremely dry weather condition) but of short dura-
tion, or vise versa. The nature of interventions called for by the two dimensions
of famine may, thus, differ.
Both measures take the seasonality of agriculture in Ethiopia and the geo-
graphic variability of rainfall into account. The famine started in the meher season
of 1983 and ended by the start of meher rains of 1985. Some of the weredas covered
in the Young Lives survey receive rainfall in both meher and belg seasons, while
others get only meher rains. The famine measures are constructed to reflect these
realities. Accordingly, the rainfall deviation measure captures wereda-specific total
monthly rainfall deviations during the meher and/or belg seasons.
The rainfall deviation measure rdev is constructed as:
rdevm,w,y =
Mar−May1985∑
Jun−S ep1983
−rainw,m,y − rainw,m
sdrainw,m
(2.9)
33
where rainm,w,y is monthly precipitation in wereda w in the month of m in year y
in millimeters, (rainw,m) is historical (1980-2010) average of rainfall in wereda w for
month m, and sdrainw,m is standard deviation of monthly rainfall in wereda w in
month m over the same 1980-2010 period.13 If a wereda receives rainfall in both
meher and belg seasons, the deviation measure would cover meher 1983, belg 1984,
meher 1984 and belg 1985. If, on the other hand, a wereda gets rainfall only during
the meher season, the relevant measure would cover meher 1983 and meher 1984.
The famine measure in equation 2.9 captures the wereda level famine condi-
tions for everyone in 1983-1985 irrespective of their age. The obvious candidate
to capture the differential impacts due to exposure in early childhood is an in-
teraction term between this wereda-specific measure and a dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the famine took place during early years of childhood. The extent
of famine exposure in early childhood, however, varies depending on when the
mother was born within the famine period. Using mother’s age, I construct an
individual specific measure (“interaction term”) that better reflects the extent of
exposure. A mother born in 1981 would experience the famine at age 2 in 1983,
a mother born in 1983 would experience the full famine —in utero in 1983, at age
1 in 1984 and age 2 in 1985, whereas a mother born in 1985 would experience the
famine only in utero in 1985. This measure is essentially the sum of interactions of
famine year specific negative rainfall deviation and mother’s birth year dummies
(see panel (a) of Table 2.2 for details).
13To avoid the effect of the outlier famine years, the 1983-1985 period is excluded in computing
mean and standard deviation.
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Table 2.2: Individual specific famine measure
Age at baseline
Birth year (2002) in utero Famine exposure Famine measure
a) Famine intensity
1980 23 1980 None 0
1981 22 1981 1983 (age 2)
∑
Jun−S ep1983 − rainw,m,y−rainw,msdrainw,m
1982 21 1982 1983 (age 1) and 1984 (age 2)
∑Jun−S ep1984
Jun−S ep1983 − rainw,m,y−rainw,msdrainw,m
1983 20 1983 1983 (age 0 - in utero), 1984 (age 1) and 1985 (age 2)
∑Mar−May1985
Jun−S ep1983 − rainw,m,y−rainw,msdrainw,m
1984 19 1984 1984 (age 0 - in utero) and 1985 (age 1)
∑Mar−May1985
Jun−S ep1984 − rainw,m,y−rainw,msdrainw,m
1985 18 1985 1985 (age 0 - in utero)
∑
Mar−May1985 − rainw,m,y−rainw,msdrainw,m
1986 17 1986 None 0
b) Famine duration
1980 23 1980 None 0
1981 22 1981 1983 (age 2)
∑
Jun−S ep1983 1(
rainw,m,y−rainw,m
sdrainw,m
< −0.5)
1982 21 1982 1983 (age 1) and 1984 (age 2)
∑Jun−S ep1984
Jun−S ep1983 1(
rainw,m,y−rainw,m
sdrainw,m
< −0.5)
1983 20 1983 1983 (age 0 - in utero), 1984 (age 1) and 1985 (age 2)
∑Mar−May1985
Jun−S ep1983 1(
rainw,m,y−rainw,m
sdrainw,m
< −0.5)
1984 19 1984 1984 (age 0 - in utero) and 1985 (age 1)
∑Mar−May1985
Jun−S ep1984 1(
rainw,m,y−rainw,m
sdrainw,m
< −0.5)
1985 18 1985 1985 (age 0 - in utero)
∑
Mar−May1985 1(
rainw,m,y−rainw,m
sdrainw,m
< −0.5)
1986 17 1986 None 0
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Because rdev is defined as a negative deviation, increase in its magnitude can
readily be interpreted as worsening of the famine condition. This is essential to
maintain consistency in the definition of the famine measures used in this paper.
While this intensity measure is a good proxy for the depth of the famine, it does
not fully reflect its breadth. The number of months with significant rainfall short-
ages during the famine period, addresses this duration issue.
The famine duration measure, mdry, measures the number of months of famine
exposure during the meher and/or belg growing seasons of 1983-1985. In meher and
belg growing areas, the measure includes famine months in meher 1983, belg 1984,
meher 1984 and belg 1985. In meher-only growing areas, it includes meher 1983 and
meher 1984. The number of famine months is calculated as:
mdevw,m,y =
rainw,m,y − rainw,m
sdrainw,m
mdryw,y =
Mar−May1985∑
Jun−S ep1983
1(mdevw,m,y < −0.5)
(2.10)
where mdevw,m,y is deviation of wereda w rainfall in the month of m and year y from
historical average rainfall for the month measured in standard deviations. The
famine measure mdryw,y ∈ [0, 14] is computed by summing up the dummy vari-
ables for each month of the relevant wereda specific famine period. The dummy
variable for a given month m takes the value 1 if rainfall for the month was 0.5 or
higher standard deviations below historical average for the month over the 1980-
2010 period, excluding 1983-1985, or 0 otherwise. By adding over a maximum of
14 months of the famine, I obtain a measure of local famine duration.14
14The maximum number of famine months varies depending on whether a wereda is belg grow-
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Like rdev above, mdev varies between weredas, but not between individuals
within a wereda. It measures common wereda famine duration effects —the number
of famine months experienced by everyone in a given wereda. The actual famine
duration experienced by a mother, however, is likely to vary by the mother’s birth
year within the famine period. To capture the differential effect of maternal early
childhood exposure during the famine, I exploit mothers’ birth year and wereda-
year specific famine months. As shown in panel (b) of Table 2.2, a mother born
in 1981 would experience the famine at age 2 in 1983 for the four meher growing
months between June and September. Depending on the severity of the monthly
rainfall deficit, her famine exposure duration would be between 0 and 4. A mother
born in 1983 would experience the full famine —in utero in 1983, at age 1 in 1984
and age 2 in 1985. The individual specific rainfall deviation would depend on
whether the wereda gets rainfall in only meher or both belg and meher seasons, and
the severity of the monthly rainfall deficit. If for example, she were from a wereda
with two annual growing seasons and the wereda suffered rainfall shortage of ≥
|0.5| standard deviations for three months in meher 1984 and two months in belg
1985, the mother’s famine duration would be 5 months (see panel (b) of Table 2.2
for details).
Despite receiving average annual rainfall of over 700 mm, Ethiopia is ex-
tremely vulnerable to weather shocks.15 This is mainly due to the uneven geo-
ing or not. In meher and belg growing areas, the maximum number of famine months is 14, whereas
is meher-only growing areas, it is 8 months.
15The average rainfall for years between 1901 and 2012 is 736 mm, and for the period covered in
this study (1980-2010) it stands at 711 mm per annum [210].
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Figure 2.2: Patterns of annual rainfall in 1980-1990
Note: The bars measure the annual rainfall in millimeters for each year. The bar for 1984 is colored
in red. The green horizontal line over the bars shows the historical average rainfall for the 1981-
2010 period.
graphic distribution of rainfall and its considerable variation over time. Agricul-
tural households who depend on rainfall for their livelihood, and with little means
for self-insurance, find it difficult to adapt to drought conditions, especially dur-
ing consecutive drought years as in the mid 1980s, leading to catastrophic crises.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the 1983-1985 Ethiopian famine was associated with an-
nual precipitation falling below historical average for four years in a row. The
drop in annual rainfall was especially high in 1984, with rainfall levels of less than
80% of historical average for the whole country.
The geographic variation of rainfall is shown in Figure 2.3. Among the four
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Figure 2.3: Patterns of annual rainfall in 1980-1990 by Region
Note: The bars measure annual rainfall for each year. For clarity, the bar for 1984 is colored in
red. The green horizontal line over the bars shows the historical average rainfall for the 1981-2010
period.
largest regions of Ethiopia, Oromia and SNNPR receive the highest amount of
precipitation, whereas Tigray receives the least amount. The average annual pre-
cipitation was lowest in 1984 in all four regions. Low rainfall, however, does not
necessarily translate into worse outcomes to the extent endogenous adaptation of
farming practices and livelihood diversification is possible as a response to histor-
ical experiences of rainfall shortages. But, volatility of rainfall in areas with low
rainfall, thus, little leverage in terms of minimum water requirements for plant
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growth, has been a cause of recurrent disasters. The SNNPR also displays consid-
erable rainfall volatility in the 1980-1990 period.16
Figure 2.4 presents the deviation of the average annual rainfall during the
famine (1983-1985) from historical average rainfall (1980-2010). The intensity
of the famine was greater in the northeastern, southern, and western parts of
Ethiopia, which saw rainfall drop of up to 5 standard deviations, on average. The
northwestern and central parts of the country were largely spared, with some ar-
eas recording higher than normal rainfall. The northern, southern and east-central
parts of the country were already getting low rainfall before the famine. The sharp
decline in rainfall during the famine in these areas, therefore, had significant ef-
fect on peoples’ livelihoods. Crop production is the main source of sustenance
in most of Ethiopia. Crop failure due to insufficient rains, thus, can have severe
lasting consequences. During the 1983-1985 period, repeat exposure of adverse
rainfall events led to livelihood collapse in many parts of Ethiopia.17
Figure 2.5 reports the number of months with over one standard deviation
rainfall shortfall during the famine period. It shows that in most of Ethiopia, rain-
fall was below historical averages for at least three months in the 1983-85 famine
period. Particularly, western and southwestern parts of the country suffered rain-
fall shortage for up to 16 months. The dry spell (of ≥ |1| SD) had relatively short
16Like [185] and [203], Appendix Figures A1 and A3, show that the year 1984 had the worst
meher and belg rains. The month of August and April, during which meher and belg rains peak,
respectively, had the worst rainfall in recent history (Appendix Figures A2 and A4).
17This, along with other political reasons, prompted the government into the now infamous
resettlement program which led to the death of tens of thousands of people [94].
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Deviation of 1983-1985 annual rainfall from historical average
Rainfall deviation in SD
-5.0 - -2.5
-2.5 - -1.3
-1.4 - -0.1
-0.1 - 1.5
1.5 - 4.6
No data
Figure 2.4: Deviation of annual 1983-1985 annual rainfall from historical
averages in SD
Note: The figure shows rainfall anomaly during the 1983-1985 famine. The reference period is 1980-
2010, excluding the famine years. The blank cells are woredas for which rainfall data is missing.
duration in the central and northern parts of the country. Note, however, that be-
cause the northern parts were already receiving low rainfall prior to the famine,
the effect of an additional month of dry weather might be more damaging in the
north than in the central and western Ethiopia.
The Young Lives study sites are located in geographic areas with varying de-
grees of famine exposure during the 1983-1985 period . Two sites are located in
severely affected weredas and six sites are in moderately affected weredas. Seven
study sites are in weredas with no considerable change in rainfall during the
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Number of months with low (>1 SD) rainfall in 1983-1985
Number of months
1 - 4
5 - 6
7 - 8
9 - 12
13 - 16
No data
Figure 2.5: Number of months with low rainfall (< −1 SD) in 1983-1985
Note: The figure shows the number of months of rainfall anomaly during the 1983-1985 famine.
The reference period is 1980-2010, excluding the famine years. The blank cells are woredas for
which rainfall data is missing.
famine period, and the remaining fives sites are in weredas with positive rainfall
deviations. I exploit this significant variation in famine intensity and duration to
identify the causal impacts of childhood famine exposure of mothers on human
capital outcomes of their children.
2.4.2 Measuring Human Capital
In line with the multidimensional nature of human capital [108], I use several mea-
sures of cognitive, non-cognitive, and health capabilities of children as outcome
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variables. The cognitive capability of children is measured by grade achievement
(years of schooling completed) and standardized scholastic aptitude test scores.
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) is used to measure the receptive vo-
cabulary of children and standardized Math test is used to measure the analytical
ability of children. The PPVT measures scholastic (cognitive) ability, not reading
ability [80]. The Ethiopia Young Lives PPVT test consists of 204 stimulus words
of increasing difficulty and corresponding 204 image plates each containing four
black-and-white images. The interviewer reads a stimulus word from a list, and
respondents are asked to select one of the four pictures that best describes the
word. The starting point (and the level of difficulty) of the test is determined
based on the respondent’s age.18 The PPVT raw score is the total number of cor-
rect answers by the respondent. Like the PPVT, the Math test is structured in an
increasing order of difficulty for different age groups. The raw math score is the
total number of correct answers by the respondent.
Since the starting point of the tests and the corresponding level of difficulty
varies by age of respondents, raw PPVT and Math scores are not readily com-
parable across children of different ages. Thus, they do not accurately measure
cognitive ability. By accounting for item difficulty, Rasch (logit) transformation of
the raw scores provides linearly comparable measures of cognitive ability. This
paper uses Rasch PPVT and Math test scores.
Children’s non-cognitive human capital is measured by educational aspira-
18See [80] for details on how PPVT tests are administered.
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tion, locus of control and self-esteem. Educational aspiration is children’s stated
desired level of schooling if they faced no constraints and could study for as
long as they liked, measured at age 12. The locus of control and self-esteem
measures are constructed from four-scale responses (0=strongly disagree, 1=dis-
agree, 2=agree, and 3=strongly agree) to various questions on perceptions and
attitudes.19 They are computed as θnc =
∑n
j=1 S j
n , where θnc is non-cognitive hu-
man capital, S j is the reported score on question j, and n is the total number of
questions included in computing each measure. To make the non-cognitive hu-
man capital measures comparable across survey rounds, only responses to ques-
tions asked consistently in all rounds are included (three questions for locus of
control and six for self-esteem). Health human capital is measured by the con-
ventional height-for-age z-score computed based on World Health Organization
(WHO) growth charts.
The mechanisms of mother-to-child transmission of famine impacts explored
in this paper are child maternal skill endowment, measured by mothers’ school-
ing (cognitive human capital), educational aspirations for child, locus of control
and self-esteem (non-cognitive human capital) and height (health human capital)
and parental investments. As described by the multidimensional human capi-
tal production function in section 3, a mother’s early childhood famine exposure
is expected to impact negatively her adult human capital and labor market out-
comes. These being inputs in her child’s human capital production, they may
19These scales apply to positively coded questions such as “If I try hard I can improve my situ-
ation in life.” If a question is rather negatively coded (such as “My teachers treat me worse than
other children”), the order of the scores is reversed.
44
have adverse consequences for the child’s human capital. The effect on moth-
ers’ labor market outcomes of the famine, if any, may lead to reduced parental
investments in children, measured by real total expenditure, and expenditures on
schooling and health, all measured in per capita adult equivalent scale. The fo-
cus on maternal outcomes is due to previous findings that early childhood shocks
affect the adult outcomes of girls more than that of boys, which suggests that ma-
ternal channels are likely to be the prime mechanisms of parent-to-child shocks
transmission [7, 148, 153].
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for key variables used in the analysis sample.
The sample covers the children of mothers born between 1978 and 1988, which en-
compasses mothers born in the three years before the famine (1978-1980), mothers
born during the famine (1981-1985) and those born in the three years after the
famine (1986-1988). Data on most of the key variables were collected in all four
rounds. Data on some variables (e.g. mother’s height), however, are available
only in some rounds. Columns 2-5 indicate the round(s) in which data on specific
variables were collected.
About 42% of the sample households are from urban areas and 81% of house-
holds are male headed. The average household head is about 38 years old and
has 4.7 years of schooling, while the YL child’s mother is 28 years old, 159 cm tall
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and has 3.2 years of schooling. The average household size and number of chil-
dren are 5.4 and 3, respectively. There are slightly more boys in the sample (53%).
The average age of children is 78 months and the average child is about 109 cm
tall. He/she is typically a second child.20 The average height-for-age z-score is
1.4 standard deviations below WHO’s reference distribution, which indicates the
high rate of stunting prevalent in the data. Thirty percent of children are stunted
(<-2 SD) of which 10% are severely stunted (<-3 SD).
The average PPVT and Math scores are 47 and 8.5, respectively. The average
desired level of schooling (child’s educational aspiration) by children is about 14
years, which is equivalent to a diploma post high school completion. The locus of
control variable measures the degree to which one feels he/she has control over
happenings in one’s own life. A high locus of control score represents greater
control. The self-esteem variable measures one’s overall sense of self-worth. A
high self-esteem score indicates greater sense of self-worth. In the sample, the
average locus of control and self-esteem scores are 1.9 and 1.7, respectively, with
considerable variation across children. Mother’s locus of control and self-esteem
are similarly measured. The average scores are higher and variance much lower
for mothers than children. Mothers’ desired level of schooling (educational aspi-
ration) for their children is about 15 years, which amounts to an undergraduate
degree.
The average monthly real expenditure per adult equivalent is Birr 155, of
20In the baseline, the YL child is a first child. However, over the course of the panel (12 years)
sample households had an additional child, on average.
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which Birr 90 is spent on food items and rest on non-food items. The average
expenditure on education and health per household is Birr 41 and Birr 21, respec-
tively. About 22% of cases (25% of households in round 3 and 19% of households
in round 4 participated in the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP).21
2.5 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy employed is as follows. First, I estimate the effects of moth-
ers’ early childhood famine exposure on the cognitive, non-cognitive and health
human capital of their children. Findings of negative impacts point to intergen-
erational persistence of early childhood conditions. Second, to identify parent-to-
child famine transmission mechanisms, I estimate the effects of the famine on the
cognitive, non-cognitive and health human capital of mothers who suffered the
famine during their developmental plasticity. Negative and statistically signifi-
cant effects of the famine on mothers’ human capital would suggest that children’s
maternal skill endowment is a key parent-to-child shock transmission channel.
To establish this is indeed the case, I re-estimate the children human capital re-
gressions above by including mother human capital outcomes as a regressors. If
the child intergenerational famine effects become statistically insignificant with
21PSNP is a large nationwide program that provides assistance to food insecure households to
mitigate the effects of transitory shocks, while also building resilience to shocks through sustain-
able community development. It consists of conditional transfers through public works in climate-
resilience building activities and unconditional transfers to households lacking in able bodies to
engage in public works.
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the introduction of the mother’s human capital into the child human capital re-
gressions, it confirms that the mother-to-child channel is the prime mechanism of
intergenerational shock transmission.
Third, mothers’ early childhood shock exposure may also affect child human
capital outcomes by reducing the mothers’ adult income, which limits the amount
they can invest in their children as parents. I use total household expenditure
and expenditures on education and health to estimate whether and the extent to
which child investments are affected by maternal early childhood shocks. Unless
the adulthood earnings of mothers who suffered the famine in early childhood are
systematically altered by marriage market outcomes, household expenditures are
expected to reflect early childhood experiences of mothers. In this case, parental
child investments mediate the parent-to-child famine transmission.
Fourth, to study whether, conditional on famine intensity, the effect of mater-
nal early childhood famine exposure on their children varies by famine duration
and to identify critical famine duration thresholds, the child human capital re-
gressions are re-estimated by including dummy variables for each level (month)
of famine duration.
Finally, the life cycle effects of maternal early childhood famine exposure on
their children’s human capital are explored by estimating the child human capi-
tal regressions by interacting the birth year specific wereda famine duration mea-
sure with survey round dummy. The estimates on this interaction term indicate
whether the effect of the famine decays over the child’s life cycle or not.
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The famine event took place prior to survey data collection. The famine mea-
sures, thus, do not vary over the survey rounds, which precludes the application
of standard fixed effects models to account for time invariant variables that are po-
tentially correlated with regressors. To circumvent this constraint that is imposed
by the nature of the data, I employ alternative estimators. The baseline model uses
the standard pooled OLS method. This fails to take into account the temporal cor-
relation of observations due to the panel nature of the data. This is addressed
using the random effects model. The random effects model, however, relies on
the strong assumption that fixed effects are uncorrelated with regressors. To deal
with the potential bias due to correlation between regressors and error terms con-
taining time invariant child, parent and wereda fixed effects, among others, I turn
to Mundlak’s fixed effects approach [158] and the Hausman-Taylor random effects
estimator [105].
2.5.1 Child Outcomes
To estimate the impacts of mothers’ exposure to the 1983-1985 famine on the hu-
man capital outcomes of their children, I estimate:
θkiwvt = β0+β1rdevw+β2mom rdeviwt+β3mdryw+β4mom mdryiwt+Γ
′Xiwv+pi+λw+τv+εiwvt
(2.11)
where θki,w,v,t is the human capital outcome k ∈ {c, n, h} of child i in wereda w,
survey round v and mother birth year t within the famine cohort. A mother is
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considered to be in the famine cohort if she suffered the famine in utero and/or
in the first three years of life after birth —born 1981-1985. The famine intensity
measure rdevw,t is the total monthly rainfall deviation during meher and/or belg
seasons in 1983-1985 from historical monthly averages, in SD. Higher rdev repre-
sents exposure to more severe famine. It varies between weredas but not between
children within each wereda. The variable mom rdev is the total rainfall deviation
experienced by a mother during her early childhood period in meher and/or belg
seasons in 1983-1985. It is similar in construction to an interaction term between
rdev and the famine cohort dummy pi (=1 if born 1983-1985), but it is a more precise
measure as it reflects the birth year of the mother during the famine.
Likewise, mdry is the total number of months during meher and/or belg seasons
of the famine years with rainfall half or greater SD below the historical monthly
average in a wereda. It varies across weredas, but is constant within each wereda.
Higher mdry means longer famine duration in a wereda. Mom mdry is the number
of months a mother was exposed to rainfall deviation of half or greater SD below
the historical monthly average in utero and/or during her first three years after
birth. It varies across children depending on mother’s birth year and wereda of
residence. Its construction is similar to an interaction term between mdry and pi,
but since it reflects mother’s birth year, it offers a more precise birth year-specific
measure of early childhood famine exposure duration.
Xi,w,v is a vector of child, parent and household characteristics. It includes
household size, household head age, gender and schooling, wealth, income,
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shocks, child age, gender, age order, number of siblings, language, ethnicity, re-
ligion, and urban-rural dummy.22 The wereda fixed effect, λw, controls for time
invariant characteristics that are common to all children in the same wereda. In
empirical estimation, however, I include region controls rather than wereda con-
trols as standard errors are cluster bootstrapped at the wereda level (see discussion
below). The survey round fixed effect τv controls for factors that are common to
children surveyed in a given round; pi is a famine cohort fixed effect and captures
common shocks to all children born to parents of the famine cohort and εi,w,v,t is a
random error term.
β1 measures the average wereda level effect of a one standard deviation increase
in famine intensity that is common to all children whose mothers were alive dur-
ing the famine. Similarly, β3 measures the average wereda level effect of an addi-
tional month of famine that is common to all children whose mothers were alive
during the 1983-1985 famine. Both β1 and β3 are expected to be negative.
The primary coefficients of interest are β2 and β4, which measure the net differ-
ential effects of maternal famine exposure during the early periods of childhood
on the human capital outcomes of children and are given as
β j =
∂θk,1
∂η
p
1, j
, j = 2, 4 (2.12)
in equation (2.8), where j ∈ (mom rdev,mom mdry) stands for the famine measure
22The wealth and shocks measures are composite indices constructed from a series of asset and
shock indicators, respectively. Wealth index is a simple average of housing quality, consumer
durables and access to services, which are all simple indices (mean) of component indicator dum-
mies. The shock index is a simple average of crime, regulations, economic, environmental and
family shocks, each of which being a composite measure of indicator dummies of components.
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used. The coefficient on mom rdev, β2, measures the average effect of an increase
in negative rainfall deviation; it is expected to be negative. A negative β2 indi-
cates that higher shortfall in rainfall during the mothers’ early childhood is as-
sociated with worse human capital outcomes for their children. The coefficient
on mom mdry, β4, measures the average effect on child outcomes of an additional
month of maternal famine exposure in early childhood; it too is expected to be
negative.23 To address the potential spatial correlation of famine due to the co-
variate nature of weather conditions, standard errors are clustered at the wereda
level. To deal with the small number of clusters (weredas) problem in the data, I
use the wild cluster bootstrap approach suggested by [40].
Previous studies show that the intergenerational effects of famine are not the
same for males and females. Children born to mothers who experienced the
famine in utero are likely to suffer more than those born to famine-affected fathers
[7, 153, 51]. Moreover, data on fathers are missing for several key variables for
a significant number of children. Thus, the intergenerational effects of parental
shock exposure on child outcomes are estimated using maternal experiences of
the famine.
The key identifying assumption required for consistent estimation of the
causal effects of parents’ early life famine exposure on the later life outcomes of
their children is independence between measures of famine exposure (rdev and
23Too much rainfall is not desirable for agricultural production. As a robustness check I include
a quadratic famine severity term to test if excluding it causes upward bias on β2. The coefficient
on the quadratic famine severity term is statistically insignificant.
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mdry) and the error term, after controlling for wereda, survey round, and cohort
fixed effects, and various child, parent and household characteristics. As long
as there were no systematic differences in the growth rates of cognitive, non-
cognitive, and health capabilities between villages affected more severely by the
1983-1985 famine and those that were less affected, the parameter estimates β2 and
β4 are consistent.
2.5.2 Mechanisms
To identify the mechanisms through which maternal early childhood famine ex-
posure affects the human capital of children, I investigate 1) the impact on child
maternal endowment —mother’s cognitive (years of schooling), non-cognitive
(aspirations for child schooling, locus of control and self-esteem) and health hu-
man capital (height); 2) parental child investments measured by total expenditure
and expenditures on schooling and health. Mothers’ human capital serves as an
input in child human capital production. Shocks experienced by the mother in
early childhood may be transmitted to her child by reducing the parental skill en-
dowment available to the child for skill production. The first set of mechanisms
capture this effect. Maternal early childhood shocks may also affect child human
capital outcomes by reducing parent’s child investments. These, if any, will be
reflected in the second set of mechanisms.
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Mother Human Capital
I identify the effects of the famine on maternal skill endowment of the child by
estimating the equation
θ
p,k
iwvt = α0+α1rdevw+α2mom rdeviwt+α3mdryw+α4mom mdryiwt+Ψ
′Xiwv+φ+δw+κv+iwvt
(2.13)
where θp,kiwvt is mother i’s human capital k (k ∈ {c, n, h}) in wereda w, survey round v
and birth year t. The rest of the variables are as defined before. α1 measures wereda
level common effects of famine intensity, i.e., the average effect of an increase in
negative monthly rainfall deviation in a wereda on maternal adult human capital
outcomes. Similarly, α3 measures common wereda effects of an increase in famine
duration on maternal adult human capital outcomes. φ is famine cohort dummy
taking value 1 if a mother is born during the famine and 0 otherwise, and δw and
κv, capture wereda and survey round fixed effects.24
The average common wereda level effects of a one standard deviation increase
in the intensity of the famine and a one month increase in the duration of the
famine on the human capital outcomes of mothers who were alive during the
famine are given by α1 and α3, respectively. Both coefficients are expected to be
negative.
The key parameters of interest are α2 and α4, which measure the effect of a
one standard deviation increase in negative monthly rainfall deviation suffered
24Standard errors are wild cluster bootstrapped at the wereda level. As a result, in empirical
estimation, the wereda fixed effects are replaced by region fixed effects.
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by the mother in early childhood during the famine on her adult human capital
outcomes and the average effect of an additional month of mother’s early child-
hood famine exposure on her adult human capital outcomes, respectively.
The differential effects of mother’s early childhood famine exposure captured
by α2 and α4 are given in equation 2.7 as:
α j =
∂θp
∂η
p
1, j
, j = 2, 4 (2.14)
where j ∈ (mom rdev,mom mdry) stands for the famine measure used.
Parent Investments
The effects of the famine on parents’ child investments are estimated in a similar
fashion as
Yiwvt = σ0+σ1rdevw+σ2mom rdeviwt+σ3mdryw+σ4mom mdryiwt+Ω′Xiwv+µ+ϕw+ρv+eiwvt
(2.15)
where, Ymiwvt, m ∈(total expenditure, education expenditure, health expenditure) is
child i’s household expenditure m in wereda w, survey round v for mother’s born
in year t of the famine period. µ, ϕw and ρv are mother famine cohort dummy (=1 if
mother was born in 1983-1985), wereda fixed effects and survey round fixed effects,
respectively.25
25Wereda fixed effects are replaced by region fixed effects in empirical estimation as standard
errors are wild cluster bootstrapped at the wereda level.
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Coefficients σ1 and σ3 measure the average common wereda level effects of a
one standard deviation increase in famine intensity and a one month increase in
famine duration suffered by mothers who were alive during the famine, respec-
tively. The differential average effects of maternal exposure in early childhood on
parental child investments are given by σ2 and σ4. The coefficient σ2 measures
the effects of a 1 standard deviation increase in negative rainfall deviation expe-
rienced by the mother as a child on child investments. Similarly, σ4 measures the
effects of an additional month of maternal famine exposure in early childhood on
parental child investments. Both σ2 and σ4 are expected to be negative.
2.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects
The effects of maternal early childhood shocks on child human capital outcomes
may be non-linear in the sense that famine exposures of certain duration are more
harmful than others. If so, identifying critical ranges of maternal early childhood
famine duration is essential for optimal targeting of vulnerable groups. To this
end, the child human capital regressions are estimated as
θkiwvt = β˜0 + β˜1rdevw + β˜2mom rdeviwt + β˜3mdryw +
7∑
g=1
β˜4gDigwt + Γ˜′Xiwv + p˜i+ λ˜w + τ˜v + ε˜iwvt
(2.16)
where, Dg = 1{mom mdry = g}, g ∈ {1, ..., 7} is a dummy variable taking value
1 if the mother suffered famine duration of g months in early childhood, and 0
otherwise. The number of months of mothers’ early childhood famine exposure
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during the growing seasons of 1983-1985 ranges between 0 and 7. The cohort with
no famine exposure, D0, is the reference group and omitted in the regression. The
rest of the variables are as defined before.
The coefficients β˜4g measure the effects of maternal early childhood exposure
of famine duration of g months on the human capital outcomes of children. These
coefficient estimates are expected to vary non-linearly as the duration of famine
exposure changes. The patterns of famine effects measured by β˜4g will be essential
for efficient delivery of interventions aiming at minimizing the risk of irreversible
intergenerational shock effects. If, for example, the effect of maternal early child-
hood famine exposure on child outcomes steadily rises for famine durations repre-
sented by D1 through Dg, but accelerates past durations of g+1 months, preventing
girls’ childhood famine exposure duration of g + 1 or higher is crucial.
The life cycle effects of maternal early childhood exposure on child human
capital outcomes are estimated as
θkiwvt = βˆ0+βˆ1rdevw+βˆ2mom rdeviwt+βˆ3mdryw+βˆ4vmom mdryiwt×τv+Γˆ′Xiwv+pi+λˆw+τˆv+εˆiwvt.
(2.17)
The coefficients on the interaction term mommdry × τv, βˆ4v where v ∈ {1, ..., 4},
measure the effects of mothers’ early childhood famine exposure on the human
capital outcomes of their children at various stages in the life cycle. βˆ41 measures
the effect of the famine when the children were 6-18 months old, and βˆ44 measures
the effect of the famine on children at age 12. The estimates provide evidence on
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the malleability (or lack of) of the different skill types over time to intergenera-
tional shocks.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Child Outcomes
This section presents estimates of the intergenerational effects of mother’s early
childhood exposure to the 1983-1985 Ethiopian famine on three dimensions of
children’s human capital: health, cognitive and non-cognitive (socio-emotional).
Table 2.3 presents regression results for children’s health capability as mea-
sured by height-for-age z-score (zhfa). The choice of zhfa as a measure of child
health is due to the established literature showing that height-for-age is a good
summary measure of childhood nutrition and environmental factors [101, 47, 48].
Estimates from pooled OLS (POLS), random effects (RE), Mundlak’s pseudo fixed
effects (MFE) and Hausman-Taylor random effects (HT) estimators are presented.
In all models, controls for household characteristics including household size,
household head age, gender and schooling, wealth, income (expenditure), shocks,
and urban-rural dummy; child characteristics including age, gender, birth order,
number of siblings, language, ethnicity and religion; mother birth cohort dummy
(=1 if famine cohort) and survey round dummy variables are included. Standard
errors are wild cluster bootstrapped at the wereda level.
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Table 2.3: Effects of maternal famine exposure on children’s health
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hausman-
Dependent variable: zhfa POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) -0.015 -0.011 -0.011 0.005
(0.067) (0.099) (0.089) (0.062)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.083*** -0.087** -0.080** -0.096*
(0.032) (0.043) (0.040) (0.053)
Famine months (#) 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.057
(0.043) (0.094) (0.072) (0.038)
Famine months × famine cohort -0.040*** -0.042 -0.038 -0.047*
(0.015) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 0.047 0.017 0.043 0.025
(0.060) (0.084) (0.082) (0.087)
Household size 0.019 0.008 -0.000 0.012
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015)
Age of household head 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.033 0.118** 0.123** 0.169**
(0.061) (0.049) (0.057) (0.072)
Household head schooling 0.005 -0.003 -0.010 -0.018
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.257** -0.148 -0.366 -0.013
(0.111) (0.239) (0.235) (0.111)
Shock index -0.150 -0.128 -0.101 -0.110
(0.236) (0.167) (0.200) (0.237)
Wealth index 1.092*** 0.714*** 0.251 0.337
(0.215) (0.244) (0.295) (0.218)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.211*** -0.223*** -0.231*** -0.206***
(0.045) (0.056) (0.061) (0.064)
Age of child (months) -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.026** -0.022***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008)
Child birth order -0.052* -0.034 -0.016 -0.032*
(0.028) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018)
Number of siblings of child -0.011 -0.032 -0.058 -0.037*
Continued on next page
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Table 2.3 – Continued from previous page
Hausman-
Dependent variable: zhfa POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
(0.022) (0.020) (0.038) (0.022)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,259 3,259 3,259 3,259
R-squared 0.110 0.108 0.118
Number of children 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses in (1)-(3) and bootstrap standard
errors in (4): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” stand for negative rainfall deviation
during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother was exposed to
the famine, respectively. POLS and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects,
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) present results using Mundlak (1978) estimator
and Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator, respectively. Ethnicity, religion, region and
survey round are all vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in these
results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988
(three years after the famine).
Column (1) shows POLS regression results. Both the intensity of the famine
experienced by mothers in early childhood and the number of months of famine
exposure during the mothers’ developmental plasticity are statistically significant
at the 1% significance level. These findings show that maternal severe shocks
exposure during sensitive developmental periods leaves lasting adverse health
impacts on her children. The estimated coefficients indicate that a one standard
deviation increase in famine intensity reduces child zhfa by 0.08, while an extra
month of famine exposure reduces child zhfa by about 0.04. To put this in con-
text, at the average negative rainfall deviation of 0.25 standard deviations and 1.1
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months of famine duration, the effect of the famine on child zhfa is about 0.07 (ap-
proximately 5%) decrease in zhfa. As expected, the wereda level famine intensity
measure shows that the children of mothers who were alive during the famine
have lower zhfa. Yet, the effect is not statistically significant. Similarly, the com-
mon wereda level famine duration is statistically insignificant. Once the common
wereda level, and mother birth year-specific famine intensity and duration mea-
sures are controlled for, whether a mother was born during the 1983-1985 famine
period or not appears to have no discernible impact on children’s health human
capital. The consistency of the these estimates depends on the strong assumption
of independence of observations, which is unlikely to hold in a panel data setting.
Column (2) presents RE estimates of the same model. The mother birth year-
specific famine intensity and duration estimates are comparable to the POLS esti-
mates. The famine intensity measure is statistically significant while the duration
measure is not. As in the POLS model, the common wereda famine intensity and
duration effects as well as mother famine cohort dummy are statistically insignif-
icant. RE estimates are, however, inconsistent if the individual effects in the error
term are correlated with regressors. The coefficient estimates will be biased if,
for example, mothers’ location of birth, which is associated with the intensity of
famine she was exposed to, is correlated with grandparents’ economic status. That
is, if the mother’s place of birth was pre-determined by grandparents location
choice where poor households self-select into disease (e.g. malaria) vulnerable or
food insecure areas, omitting these location specific factors in the regression will
bias the estimated effects of the famine on child zhfa.
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Table 2.4: Effects of maternal famine exposure on children’s schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hausman-
Dependent variable: child grade POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) 0.187 0.213 0.197* 0.275***
(0.188) (0.135) (0.115) (0.081)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.020 -0.023 0.000 -0.037
(0.039) (0.038) (0.031) (0.061)
Famine months (#) 0.270* 0.287* 0.249* 0.345***
(0.157) (0.156) (0.136) (0.055)
Famine months × famine cohort -0.042** -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.051*
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.027)
Famine cohort (famine=1) -0.038 -0.032 -0.030 -0.009
(0.052) (0.050) (0.054) (0.106)
Household size 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.004
(0.028) (0.024) (0.036) (0.029)
Age of household head -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.293*** 0.281*** 0.284*** 0.263**
(0.084) (0.101) (0.097) (0.116)
Household head schooling 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.028
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.028)
Urban/rural (urban=1) 0.082 0.133 -0.097 0.304*
(0.317) (0.452) (0.409) (0.181)
Shock index 0.333 0.800* 1.298** 2.078***
(0.601) (0.439) (0.518) (0.516)
Wealth index 1.037*** 1.015*** -0.008 0.836*
(0.282) (0.268) (0.504) (0.451)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.169** -0.174** -0.179** -0.165**
(0.075) (0.070) (0.080) (0.068)
Age of child (months) 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.031 0.076***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.026) (0.022)
Child birth order 0.027 0.021 0.005 0.013
(0.021) (0.016) (0.024) (0.033)
Number of siblings of child -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.148*** -0.112***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 – Continued from previous page
Hausman-
Dependent variable: child grade POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
(0.031) (0.034) (0.057) (0.038)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,501 1,501 1,501 1,501
R-squared 0.679 0.678 0.679
Number of children 829 829 829 829
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in (1)-(3) and bootstrap standard errors in (4) in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” stand for negative rainfall deviation
during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother was exposed to
the famine, respectively. POLS and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects,
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) present results using Mundlak (1978) estimator
and Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator, respectively. Ethnicity, religion, region and
survey round are all vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in these
results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988
(three years after the famine).
Columns (3) and (4) report results from MFE and HT estimators, both of which
address the limitations of the RE results above. The MFE addresses the potential
bias resulting from correlation between regressors and the error term by control-
ling for the averages of time varying variables in the regression [158], whereas the
HT estimator employs step-wise generalized least squares [105]. The coefficient
of mother birth year-specific famine intensity is negative and statistically signif-
icant under both estimators. The mother birth year-specific famine duration has
a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient in the MFE model. The effect
sizes are comparable to the of POLS and RE estimates. The stability of the coeffi-
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cients across estimators gives confidence as to the reliability of the estimates of the
effects of early childhood maternal famine exposure on children’s health capabil-
ity. The common wereda famine intensity and duration effects, and mother famine
cohort dummy are statistically insignificant under both estimators.
Table 2.4 shows the effects of maternal early childhood famine exposure on the
cognitive capabilities of children–child schooling. Column (1) reports POLS re-
sults. RE, MFE and HT results are reported in columns (2)-(4). Both the intensity
of the famine mothers suffered in early childhood and the duration of the famine
have the expected signs (the only exception is famine intensity in MFE). The co-
efficients of famine intensity are negative, but statistically insignificant. Maternal
famine exposure duration has a negative and statistically significant effect on chil-
dren’s grade achievement in all models. The POLS results show that an additional
month of maternal early childhood famine exposure reduces child schooling by
about 0.04 grades. At the average duration of 1.1 months, this translates to about
0.05 less child years of schooling. The estimated effects are comparable across the
various estimators.
The common wereda level famine intensity and duration measures have posi-
tive and statistically significant coefficients in the MFE and HT models. The re-
sults are inconsistent with the hypothesized impacts of famine intensity and du-
ration. These seemingly puzzling results may partly be explained by a range of
post-famine emergency development activities. The coefficient of mother famine
cohort dummy is negative in all models suggesting that children of mothers born
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during the famine have less schooling. Yet, the effects are statistically insignifi-
cant.26
Table 2.5 provides estimates of the effects of maternal early childhood famine
exposure on children’s non-cognitive human capital. Column (1) reports results
for children’s educational aspirations using OLS. The estimated coefficients on
maternal early childhood famine intensity and duration as well as wereda famine
intensity and duration have the expected negative sign. All of the estimates, how-
ever, are statistically insignificant. Columns (2)-(5) present estimates of the effects
of maternal famine exposure on children’s locus of control. The duration of ma-
ternal early childhood famine exposure has negative and statistically significant
effect on locus of control, whereas the coefficients on famine intensity are statis-
tically indistinguishable from zero. These findings suggest that forward looking
attitude of children is shaped more by experiences of long episodes of adverse
events than short but deep shock events to parents in their early childhood.These
results are consistent with the theory of learned helplessness, in which mothers’
early experiences of adverse shocks leads to increased probability of interpreting
events as beyond one’s control [53]. Mothers’ diminished locus of control could
then be passed on to their children [157]. Columns (6)-(9) report the effects of early
childhood maternal shocks on child self esteem. The results show that the famine
had no statistically significant effect on children’s self esteem.
26Maternal early childhood famine exposure does not appear to have statistically significant
effect on child test scores (see Table A1). The estimates from POLS, RE, MFE and HT models
of the intergenerational effects of the famine using on child PPVT and Math test scores show no
discernible impact.
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Table 2.5: Effects of maternal famine exposure on children’s non-cognitive
human capital
aspirations locus of control self esteem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var.: education aspirations, Hausman- Hausman-
locus of control & self esteem OLS POLS RE Mundlak Taylor POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.014
(0.299) (0.038) (0.033) (0.030) (0.022) (0.047) (0.043) (0.048) (0.021)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.138 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017
(0.120) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017)
Famine months (#) -0.263 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.008 -0.024 -0.022 -0.021 -0.024*
(0.306) (0.026) (0.040) (0.034) (0.016) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.014)
Famine months × famine cohort -0.043 -0.013** -0.013** -0.012** -0.014* -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.051) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 0.143 0.047 0.047** 0.037* 0.050 0.032 0.033 0.030 0.037
(0.223) (0.031) (0.022) (0.021) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Household size 0.073 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.008
(0.058) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010)
Age of household head -0.011** 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.345* 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.042 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.060*
(0.185) (0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.039) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.034)
Household head schooling -0.037** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.007
(0.017) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Urban/rural (urban=1) 0.874* -0.033 -0.033 -0.078 0.019 0.084 0.081 0.041 0.104**
(0.454) (0.059) (0.108) (0.099) (0.050) (0.073) (0.076) (0.087) (0.052)
Shock index -1.343 -0.162 -0.163 -0.166 -0.167 -0.256 -0.252* -0.235 -0.308
Continued on next page
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Dep. var.: education aspirations, Hausman- Hausman-
locus of control & self esteem OLS POLS RE Mundlak Taylor POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
(1.852) (0.222) (0.183) (0.187) (0.180) (0.231) (0.135) (0.163) (0.194)
Wealth index 1.769*** 0.072 0.073 -0.222 -0.156 0.372*** 0.369*** 0.059 0.157
(0.686) (0.117) (0.110) (0.153) (0.138) (0.115) (0.131) (0.133) (0.138)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.024 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.030 -0.042* -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.042**
(0.142) (0.026) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
Age of child (months) 0.062*** -0.001 -0.001 0.006** 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.006* 0.002
(0.022) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Child birth order -0.022 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.013
(0.062) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of siblings of child 0.018 0.015 0.015* 0.049** 0.014 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.003
(0.096) (0.013) (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.013)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 813 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
R-squared 0.164 0.879 0.880 0.880 0.862 0.861 0.863
Number of children 813 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in (1)-(4), (6)-(8) and bootstrap standard errors in (5) & (8) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” stand for negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother was
exposed to the famine, respectively. POLS and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects, respectively. PPVT is a short-form for Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test. Columns (3) and (7) present results using Mundlak (1978) estimator, while columns (4) and (8) presents results of the Hausman-Taylor
(1981) estimator. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are all vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in these results excludes mothers
born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three years after the famine).
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The results presented in Tables 2.3-2.5 show that mother’s early childhood ex-
posure to the 1983-1985 Ethiopian famine has had a lasting negative impact on
children’s health, cognitive and non-cognitive human capital. The results also
show that the duration of mother’s early childhood famine exposure matters more
to child human capital outcomes than famine intensity. This is understandable in
the context of the study area. In many parts of Ethiopia the pre-famine conditions
were such that rural households were already food insecure for parts of the year.
In these settings, exposure to extended period of famine chips away at any chance
of recovery from early disadvantages during the narrow critical developmental
period, absent outside relief aid or assistance through informal social networks.
The results are robust to model specification and estimation strategy, which gives
credence to the estimated effects.
2.6.2 Mechanisms
Maternal Human Capital Outcomes
Table 2.6 presents estimates of the effects of the 1983-1985 famine on the health and
cognitive human capital outcomes of mothers who suffered the famine in early
childhood. Column (1) reports OLS estimates of maternal health (as measured by
mothers’ adult height) impacts. Both the intensity of famine experienced in early
childhood and its duration have statistically significant effect on mothers’ adult
height. A one standard deviation increase in famine intensity reduces mothers’
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height by about 0.6 centimeters, while an extra month of famine exposure leads to
0.25 centimeters decrease in height. These results indicate that at the mean famine
intensity and duration, mothers who experienced the famine in early childhood
are about 0.43 centimeters shorter than those that experienced it later. The ma-
ternal height effect found in this paper is less than that reported by [72], who use
self-reported binary drought measure to identify the effect of the famine on the
height of survivors of the famine.27 The wereda level famine intensity and dura-
tion effects are positive but statistically insignificant, whereas the famine dummy
has the expected sign but is statistically insignificant.
Columns (2)-(5) report the effects of the famine on mothers’ schooling using
POLS, RE, MFE and HT estimators. The POLS estimates of maternal early child-
hood famine intensity and duration measures as well as the wereda famine inten-
sity and duration measure have the expected negative sign. Increase in the inten-
sity of famine suffered before age three by one standard deviation leads to a 0.44
grades drop in mothers’ schooling. Early childhood famine exposure duration
and wereda famine intensity and duration are statistically insignificant. Mothers
in the famine cohort have less schooling compared to their non-famine counter-
parts. Disruptions caused by the famine appear to have left irreparable impact on
mothers’ schooling. The RE, MFE and HT model results in column (3)-(5) show
comparable early childhood famine intensity impacts on mothers’ schooling.
27[72] report that people who suffered the famine between the age of 12-36 months are 5.3 cen-
timeters shorter than the reference group. This is an estimate of “average treatment effect on
treated”, and not “average treatment effect”. The corresponding figure in this paper is about 1.1
centimeters, which is still less than the [72] estimates.
69
Table 2.6: Effects of maternal famine exposure on maternal health and
schooling
Health Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.: mother height & Hausman-
schooling OLS POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) 0.391 -0.187 0.026 -0.032 0.078
(3.565) (0.129) (0.314) (0.196) (0.171)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.614*** -0.437*** -0.512*** -0.451*** -0.537***
(0.168) (0.080) (0.133) (0.127) (0.163)
Famine months (#) 0.639 -0.003 -0.041 -0.033 -0.045
(7.048) (0.099) (0.406) (0.309) (0.106)
Famine months × famine cohort -0.230* -0.028 -0.068 -0.012 -0.069
(0.122) (0.043) (0.074) (0.072) (0.095)
Famine cohort (famine=1) -0.094 -0.677*** -0.350 -0.810*** -0.316
(0.517) (0.180) (0.233) (0.270) (0.320)
Household size -0.130 -0.116*** -0.030 -0.029 -0.031*
(0.098) (0.044) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016)
Age of mother 0.019 -0.099*** -0.037* -0.028 -0.033*
(0.117) (0.030) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Gender of household head (male=1) -0.738* 0.109 -0.007 -0.024 -0.003
(0.434) (0.162) (0.052) (0.052) (0.073)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.033 1.295*** 3.510*** 0.319 3.766***
(9.958) (0.447) (1.003) (0.859) (0.439)
Shock index 3.663 0.755 0.363*** 0.389** 0.376**
(3.249) (0.652) (0.133) (0.156) (0.187)
Wealth index 2.924 8.940*** 0.917*** 0.423*** 0.453**
(1.945) (0.702) (0.208) (0.158) (0.219)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 766 2,995 2,995 2,995 2,995
R-squared 0.078 0.473 0.408 0.523
Continued on next page
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Dep. var.: mother height & Hausman-
schooling OLS POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Number of mothers 766 835 835 835 835
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in (1)-(4) and bootstrap standard errors in (5) in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” stand for negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-
1985 famine and the number of months a mother was exposed to the famine, respectively. POLS
and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) present results
using Mundlak (1978) estimator and Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator, respectively. Ethnicity,
religion, region and survey round are all vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in
these results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three
years after the famine).
Estimates of the effects of early childhood famine exposure on the non-
cognitive human capital of mothers are given in Table 2.7. Columns (1)-(4) re-
port locus of control results, whereas columns (5)-(8) report self-esteem results.
The locus of control regression results show that the wereda level famine inten-
sity and duration effects are negative and statistically significant, which indicates
that mothers who were alive during the famine in more severely affected areas
report lower locus of control as adults. There is, however, no especial effect due
to exposure in early childhood (as opposed to later in life). These effects are fairly
consistent across the four estimators. The coefficient of famine cohort dummy is
negative, but statistically insignificant.
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Table 2.7: Effects of famine exposure on mother’s non-cognitive human
capital
locus of control self-esteem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var.: mothers’ Hausman- Hausman-
locus of control & self esteem POLS RE Mundlak Taylor POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) -0.083* -0.083*** -0.075*** -0.093*** 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.043*
(0.043) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.024)
Rain shortage × famine cohort 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.017 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
Famine months (#) -0.056* -0.056*** -0.047*** -0.061*** 0.035 0.036 0.031 0.042***
(0.033) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030) (0.035) (0.050) (0.014)
Famine months × famine cohort -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Famine cohort (famine=1) -0.019 -0.019 -0.025 -0.045 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.047
(0.051) (0.047) (0.047) (0.060) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043)
Household size 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.029* 0.042*** 0.016* 0.017** 0.026** 0.022**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)
Age of mother -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Age of household head -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002 -0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.136*** 0.163*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.181*** 0.206***
(0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.049) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.041)
Household head schooling 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.000 0.004 0.004* 0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.074 -0.074 -0.084 -0.023 -0.123 -0.122 -0.156 -0.065
Continued on next page
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Dep. var.: mothers’ Hausman- Hausman-
locus of control & self esteem POLS RE Mundlak Taylor POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
(0.095) (0.051) (0.054) (0.070) (0.080) (0.107) (0.123) (0.057)
Shock index -0.315 -0.314* -0.485** -0.494** -0.324 -0.315*** -0.189 -0.180
(0.305) (0.188) (0.209) (0.228) (0.201) (0.114) (0.136) (0.171)
Wealth index 0.185 0.185 -0.005 0.112 0.540*** 0.536*** 0.325** 0.375**
(0.125) (0.120) (0.201) (0.198) (0.110) (0.092) (0.152) (0.148)
Household expenditure (real) 0.00002 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 0.00005*** 0.00005** 0.00003 0.00003*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of children -0.012 -0.012 -0.031 -0.018 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.027) (0.014)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
R-squared 0.501 0.500 0.504 0.426 0.426 0.429
Number of mothers 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in (1)-(3) and bootstrap standard errors in (4) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” stand for negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother
was exposed to the famine, respectively. POLS and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) present results
using Mundlak (1978) estimator and Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator, respectively. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are all vectors of
dummy variables. The sample included in these results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three years
after the famine).
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The self-esteem regressions, on the other hand, produce no statistically signif-
icant causal relationship between maternal shock exposure and adult self-esteem
under POLS, RE and MFE. The wereda level HT results are slightly inconsistent
with expectations in that they are positive and statistically significant.28
To ascertain that mothers’ adult human capital is indeed the main parent-to-
child shock transmission channel, the effects on child human capital in Table 2.3
are re-estimated after partialling out the direct famine effects on mothers’ human
capital. To that end, I include mothers’ health, cognitive and non-cognitive hu-
man capital in the child human capital regressions. Table 2.8 reports the new
POLS estimates. The negative effects of maternal early childhood shocks on child
zhfa reported in Table 2.3 become much smaller and statistically insignificant once
mothers’ human capital outcomes are controlled for. The coefficients on mothers’
health (adult height) and schooling are positive and statistically significant. This
points to maternal human capital, especially maternal health, being the prime
parent-to-child health shock transmission pathway.
The results for the other human capital dimensions, however, rather suggest
that maternal human capital does not play significant role in the intergenerational
transmission of shocks to cognitive and non-cognitive human capital. The esti-
mates in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 change little due to the inclusion of maternal human
capital in the child human capital regressions. These results seem to suggest the
28Regression results of the effects of maternal early childhood famine exposure on mothers’
educational aspirations for their children produced no statistically significant impacts. The use of
alternative estimators makes no discernible difference to the estimated impacts. These results are
given in Table A2.
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main intergenerational transmission channels of the effects of the famine on child
cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes are perhaps parental child investments.
The next section explores these potential channels.
In terms of policy, the implication is that prevention of early childhood shock
exposure of girls needs to be given the utmost attention to minimize lasting in-
tergenerational impacts. A large body of evidence lends support to interventions
of this nature. This is due childhood zhfa (height) being a good predictor of not
only adult health but also of cognitive, non-cognitive and labor market outcomes
[151, 148, 111, 47, 3]. The targeting of girls for early intervention, however, poses
an ethical dilemma about gender fairness. Practical implementation will require
finding the right balance between efficiency and fairness.
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Table 2.8: Effects of maternal famine exposure on child human capital after
controlling for direct mother human capital effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years of Educational Locus of
Zhfa Schooling PPVT Math aspirations control Self-esteem
Rain shortage (SD) -0.023 0.255 1.432 -0.026 0.164 0.015 0.003
(0.079) (0.192) (2.971) (0.480) (0.260) (0.039) (0.045)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.036 -0.033 -1.334 0.042 -0.108 0.006 0.010
(0.032) (0.043) (0.954) (0.277) (0.119) (0.016) (0.015)
Famine months (#) 0.044 0.352** 0.770 -0.190 -0.111 0.016 -0.025
(0.046) (0.158) (1.975) (0.424) (0.312) (0.027) (0.034)
Famine months × famine cohort -0.018 -0.049** 0.223 0.039 0.025 -0.023*** -0.016*
(0.016) (0.020) (0.524) (0.126) (0.077) (0.008) (0.009)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 0.051 -0.040 -2.440 -0.366 -0.067 0.100*** 0.050
(0.061) (0.070) (1.822) (0.416) (0.250) (0.033) (0.033)
Household size 0.002 0.026 -0.006 0.150 0.131* -0.005 -0.007
(0.019) (0.035) (0.418) (0.116) (0.076) (0.011) (0.009)
Age of household head age 0.002 -0.004 0.069 0.015 0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.068) (0.020) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.003 0.280*** -0.059 0.526 -0.039 0.049 0.073**
(0.054) (0.089) (1.141) (0.346) (0.212) (0.031) (0.032)
Household head schooling -0.000 0.035*** 0.478** 0.186*** -0.028 -0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.212) (0.041) (0.024) (0.004) (0.003)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.319** -0.081 3.722 3.161*** 0.732 -0.004 0.124
(0.126) (0.273) (4.108) (0.900) (0.539) (0.075) (0.080)
Shock index -0.305 0.499 -23.600** -2.975** -0.186 -0.142 -0.237
Continued on next page
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(0.284) (0.593) (11.390) (1.430) (1.370) (0.214) (0.213)
Wealth index 0.665*** 1.186*** 14.040** 4.891*** 1.751** 0.039 0.161
(0.214) (0.335) (6.712) (1.151) (0.825) (0.131) (0.118)
Household expenditure (real) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.160*** -0.174** -1.093 0.042 0.031 -0.038 -0.044*
(0.041) (0.080) (0.925) (0.237) (0.149) (0.028) (0.022)
Age of child (months) -0.011* 0.064*** 1.191*** 0.188*** 0.048** 0.001 0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.215) (0.032) (0.024) (0.003) (0.002)
Child birth order -0.036 0.021 -1.413** -0.261* -0.030 0.002 0.014
(0.025) (0.020) (0.590) (0.137) (0.064) (0.014) (0.013)
Number of siblings of child 0.002 -0.126*** -0.435 -0.231 -0.011 0.019 -0.007
(0.022) (0.032) (0.548) (0.147) (0.094) (0.013) (0.012)
Mother height (cm) 0.040*** -0.002 0.005 -0.008 -0.027 0.000 -0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.089) (0.020) (0.019) (0.002) (0.001)
Mother schooling 0.016** -0.007 0.326 0.068 0.003 0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.209) (0.047) (0.029) (0.004) (0.004)
Mother’s child schooling aspiration -0.012 0.063*** 0.688** 0.180*** 0.273*** 0.000 -0.000
(0.010) (0.024) (0.268) (0.065) (0.036) (0.008) (0.005)
Mother locus of control 0.042 0.053 2.119** 0.554*** 0.335** 0.026 -0.009
(0.035) (0.056) (1.065) (0.209) (0.158) (0.028) (0.019)
Mother self-esteem 0.004 -0.127** 2.744** -0.187 0.268** 0.075** 0.216***
(0.041) (0.064) (1.186) (0.253) (0.122) (0.035) (0.032)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continued on next page
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Table 2.8 – Continued from previous page
Years of Educational Locus of
Zhfa Schooling PPVT Math aspirations control Self-esteem
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,085 1,225 2,013 1,260 645 2,090 2,090
R-squared 0.169 0.699 0.594 0.507 0.238 0.890 0.875
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: This table presents pooled OLS estimates of the effects of maternal famine exposure on child human capital
outcomes after direct maternal human capital effects are controlled for. “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” are
total negative monthly rainfall deviation during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother was
exposed to the famine, respectively. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are all vectors of dummy variables.
The sample included in these results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988
(three years after the famine).78
Parental Investments
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 present the effects of maternal early childhood famine expo-
sure on parental child investments. Table 2.9 reports the results of household
expenditure regressions using alternative estimators. The results show that the
1983-1985 famine had no statistically discernible impact on the household expen-
diture of mothers who were affected as young girls. This may be because mothers
are not the main income earners in the majority of households in the data. In 86%
of households, males are household heads and tend to be the main breadwinners
of the family.
The effects of maternal early famine exposure on education and health expen-
ditures are reported in Table 2.10. The results are similar to the total expenditure
regressions above. Maternal early childhood famine exposure has no statistically
significant effect on the amount of money households spend on education and
health. The common wereda level famine intensity and duration measures are pos-
itive and weakly statistically significant in the health regressions using HT model,
however. These results suggest that parental investments are unlikely to be key
parent-to-child famine transmission channel.
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Table 2.9: Effects of maternal famine exposure on household expenditure
Hausman-
Dependent variable: real expenditure POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) 27.002 45.278 38.683 126.842
(69.804) (388.766) (426.076) (143.395)
Rain shortage × famine cohort 7.448 5.502 10.875 6.246
(28.382) (36.237) (39.477) (77.606)
Famine months (#) 7.736 12.773 -0.853 14.993
(36.612) (232.486) (250.203) (118.103)
Famine months × famine cohort 3.808 5.121 4.084 13.161
(8.824) (11.419) (10.516) (35.035)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 13.917 3.572 12.876 -50.645
(36.446) (46.311) (48.369) (140.578)
Household size 113.177*** 103.321*** 79.836*** 83.488***
(15.187) (18.657) (17.167) (18.782)
Age of household head 3.357 4.321 6.499 6.227
(2.316) (3.206) (5.894) (5.749)
Gender of household head (male=1) 86.449* 115.270* 108.056* 166.509***
(48.646) (63.884) (63.019) (57.446)
Household head schooling 39.100*** 39.666*** 33.141* 41.038*
(6.870) (10.315) (20.080) (22.115)
Urban/rural (urban=1) 427.142*** 452.334 423.727 573.010
(110.720) (342.440) (364.689) (434.739)
Shock index -277.371 -71.435 114.352 272.732**
(227.579) (207.091) (203.111) (132.515)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
R-squared 0.208 0.206 0.212
Number of children 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in (1)-(3) and bootstrap standard errors in (4) in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Table 2.9 presents the effects of maternal famine exposure on real total expenditure. “Rain
shortage” and “Famine months” are total monthly negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-
1985 famine and the number of months a mother was exposed to the famine, respectively. POLS
and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) present
Mundlak (1978) pseudo fixed effects and Hausman-Taylor (1981) results, respectively. Ethnicity,
religion, region and survey round are vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in these
results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three years
after the famine).
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Table 2.10: Effects of maternal famine exposure on household education
expenditure
Education expenditure Health expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hausman- Hausman-
Dependent variable: education expenditure POLS RE Mundlak Taylor POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) 140.370 145.772 139.465 126.841 277.650 277.650 282.006 293.584*
(90.446) (330.682) (342.798) (143.395) (203.787) (188.302) (176.055) (177.777)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -12.412 -13.777 -0.209 6.246 -11.280 -11.280 -9.062 -13.858
(30.204) (45.940) (49.616) (77.606) (40.364) (43.813) (48.342) (40.230)
Famine months (#) 6.275 8.967 -6.907 14.993 160.111 160.111 154.517* 174.168*
(54.815) (185.996) (184.379) (118.103) (119.340) (115.072) (81.252) (103.400)
Famine months × famine cohort 16.992 16.802 18.810 13.161 -25.468 -25.468 -24.644 -26.056
(15.243) (20.510) (20.589) (35.035) (42.291) (32.658) (32.328) (36.797)
Famine cohort (famine=1) -91.652* -95.571 -79.241 -50.645 -78.052 -78.052 -30.855 -73.767
(54.850) (87.335) (94.632) (140.578) (74.125) (68.853) (75.744) (107.934)
Household size 106.723*** 102.509** 58.889 83.488*** -21.963 -21.963 -176.780 -26.568
(37.755) (45.015) (70.694) (18.782) (39.909) (48.146) (195.239) (61.155)
Age of household head 1.013 0.592 -4.509 6.227 8.565 8.565 7.096 9.074
(3.358) (3.847) (5.298) (5.749) (8.532) (7.717) (8.414) (5.820)
Gender of household head (male=1) 2.486 4.210 24.557 166.509*** -32.220 -32.220 -20.689 -59.599
(57.262) (73.421) (79.982) (57.446) (131.730) (130.496) (133.546) (357.166)
Household head schooling 67.629*** 67.020*** 30.844 41.038* 51.958 51.958 45.610 59.271
(12.708) (16.241) (18.937) (22.115) (40.425) (36.026) (32.040) (63.097)
Urban/rural (urban=1) 377.814** 390.176 335.266 573.010 364.510 364.510 346.457 346.965
(156.169) (347.026) (349.357) (434.739) (292.867) (281.229) (276.970) (452.655)
Shock index -203.551 -45.706 346.682 272.732** 1,246.987** 1,246.987** 1,457.608** 1,705.817**
Continued on next page
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Table 2.10 – Continued from previous page
Hausman- Hausman-
Dependent variable: education expenditure POLS RE Mundlak Taylor POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
(306.470) (364.737) (376.441) (132.514) (537.269) (585.130) (694.513) (750.214)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
R-squared 0.189 0.189 0.194 0.016 0.016 0.02
Number of children 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) and bootstrap standard errors in (4) and (8) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Table 2.10 presents the effects of maternal famine exposure on annual household education and health expenditures. “Rain shortage” and “Famine
months” are total monthly negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother was exposed to the famine,
respectively. POLS and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects, respectively. The results under “Mundlak” and “Hausman-Taylor” columns
obtained using Mundlak (1978) pseudo fixed effects and Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimators, respectively. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are
vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in these results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three
years after the famine).
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2.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects
While exposure to extended famine periods is expected to be more damaging, it is
not obvious whether increase in famine duration leads to increasing or decreasing
effects on child human capital outcomes, at the margin. Critical shifts in famine
effect regimes, if any, provide crucial input in the design of efficient interventions.
To this effect, each additional month of maternal early childhood famine exposure
is allowed to have a unique effect. Results for health, cognitive and non-cognitive
human capital of children using POLS are reported in Table 2.11.29
The estimates in column (1) show that the effects of maternal early childhood
famine exposure on children’s height-for-age z-score depends non-linearly on the
duration of exposure. Famine impacts are generally increasing in famine dura-
tion. The effects of the famine become worse for famine durations of four months
and higher. Similar results are obtained for child schooling. As shown in col-
umn (2), the maternal early childhood famine exposure effects increase with the
length of famine duration. The estimated coefficients jump at famine duration of
four months. To test the statistical significance of the difference in coefficient size
between famine durations less than four months and four months and higher,
I re-estimate the model by including a dummy variable that takes value 1 for
famine duration of four months and higher. The results confirm that the differ-
ences the coefficients are indeed statistically significant (-0.193(**) for height-for-
29Estimates from RE, MFE and HT models are given in Table A3 in the Appendix. The findings
are consistent with POLS estimates.
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age z-score and -0.289(***) for child schooling).30 The effects on test scores (PPVT
and Math) and non-cognitive human capital are, however, statistically insignifi-
cant. These results point to a critical maternal famine exposure threshold of about
three months, beyond which the effects of the famine become severe.
Table 2.12 reports the life cycle effects of maternal early childhood famine ex-
posure on the human capital outcomes of children using POLS.31 Column (1) re-
ports results for height-for-age z-score. Height-for-age is measured in the data
from age one through age 12 in about three year intervals. The results show that
the effects of maternal childhood shocks are greater (and statistically significant)
in early childhood (age one) and early adolescence (age 12). While the effect is
negative throughout, it is statistically insignificant at ages five and eight. The esti-
mated effect size drops off after year one, but gradually rises though age 12. These
findings suggest that the effect of early intergenerational disadvantages on health
does not decay but worsen over the child’s life cycle, which points to the likely
ineffectiveness of remediation efforts in late childhood.
30These results can be obtained upon request.
31See Table A4 in the Appendix for RE, MFE and HT model estimates.
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Table 2.11: Heterogeneous effects of maternal famine exposure duration
on child human capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
child locus of self-
Dependent variables zhfa schooling PPVT Math control esteem
Rain shortage (SD) -0.023 0.178 0.834 -0.456 0.020 0.019
(0.069) (0.191) (2.878) (0.421) (0.037) (0.047)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.088** -0.062 -0.231 0.156 0.002 0.021
(0.041) (0.041) (0.877) (0.239) (0.020) (0.019)
Famine months (#) 0.037 0.266* 0.402 -0.440 0.008 -0.024
(0.044) (0.158) (1.785) (0.311) (0.024) (0.034)
1 Famine month × famine cohort 0.016 0.050 -2.490 -0.089 0.002 -0.032
(0.110) (0.105) (1.751) (0.580) (0.036) (0.043)
2 Famine months × famine cohort -0.143 -0.050 1.406 -0.640 -0.024 -0.023
(0.090) (0.133) (1.841) (0.395) (0.038) (0.045)
3 Famine months × famine cohort -0.055 -0.039 2.375 0.946 -0.057 -0.001
(0.083) (0.146) (3.749) (0.641) (0.043) (0.054)
4 Famine months × famine cohort -0.234* -0.340** 0.506 1.904*** -0.068 -0.098
(0.133) (0.146) (2.990) (0.581) (0.058) (0.066)
5 Famine months × famine cohort -0.022 -0.509*** 6.053 0.236 -0.087 0.019
(0.171) (0.191) (3.687) (0.878) (0.078) (0.053)
6 Famine months × famine cohort -0.251* -0.129 4.770 0.829 0.015 0.061
(0.151) (0.266) (4.842) (0.607) (0.065) (0.119)
7 Famine months × famine cohort -0.312*** -0.310 0.649 -0.176 -0.115** -0.078
(0.107) (0.225) (4.179) (0.703) (0.055) (0.071)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 0.045 -0.057 -1.857 -0.780** 0.047 0.033
(0.064) (0.057) (1.251) (0.318) (0.032) (0.031)
Household size 0.018 0.011 0.159 0.143* -0.010 -0.008
(0.021) (0.028) (0.418) (0.082) (0.010) (0.009)
Age of household head 0.000 -0.003 0.027 -0.007 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.059) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.044 0.377*** 2.024 1.111*** 0.025 0.067***
(0.059) (0.084) (1.339) (0.307) (0.026) (0.024)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.245** 0.133 4.558 3.367*** -0.032 0.088
(0.110) (0.342) (4.437) (0.711) (0.057) (0.072)
Shock index -0.174 0.253 -34.256*** -5.366*** -0.168 -0.276
(0.237) (0.605) (11.729) (1.579) (0.219) (0.223)
Wealth index 1.145*** 1.402*** 26.610*** 7.790*** 0.064 0.384***
(0.201) (0.304) (6.111) (0.910) (0.101) (0.103)
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Gender of child (male=1) -0.212*** -0.172** -0.944 -0.005 -0.032 -0.044**
(0.043) (0.075) (0.919) (0.234) (0.025) (0.022)
Age of child (months) -0.030*** 0.056*** 1.167*** 0.184*** -0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.203) (0.029) (0.003) (0.002)
Child birth order -0.054* 0.025 -1.444** -0.278** 0.000 0.013
(0.028) (0.020) (0.610) (0.116) (0.013) (0.015)
Number of siblings of child -0.010 -0.108*** -0.475 -0.263** 0.015 -0.005
(0.022) (0.030) (0.598) (0.114) (0.013) (0.012)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,259 1,501 2,394 1,541 2,484 2,484
R-squared 0.111 0.675 0.590 0.476 0.879 0.862
Number of children 838 838 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Table 2.11 presents the heterogeneous effects of maternal famine exposure duration on child human capital
using POLS. “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” are total monthly negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-
1985 famine and the number of months a mother was exposed to the famine, respectively. “# Famine month
× famine cohort” represents the effects of maternal early childhood famine exposure duration of # months on
children’s human capital. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are vectors of dummy variables. The
sample included in these results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988
(three years after the famine).
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Table 2.12: Child life-cycle effects of maternal early childhood famine ex-
posure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
child locus of self-
Dependent variables zhfa schooling PPVT Math control esteem
Rain shortage (SD) -0.018 0.166 0.384 -0.401 0.016 0.012
(0.066) (0.185) (2.811) (0.414) (0.038) (0.048)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.084** -0.024 -0.663 -0.002 0.002 0.016
(0.033) (0.038) (0.717) (0.221) (0.016) (0.014)
Famine months (#) 0.042 0.263* 0.325 -0.420 0.006 -0.024
(0.043) (0.158) (1.770) (0.311) (0.026) (0.035)
Famine month × famine cohort × round 1 -0.075** - - - - -
(0.033) - - - - -
Famine month × famine cohort × round 2 -0.016 - 0.004 - -0.009 0.002
(0.021) - (0.531) - (0.007) (-0.026)
Famine month × famine cohort × round 3 -0.031 -0.025 1.029 0.062 -0.021** -0.026**
(0.021) (0.278) (1.137) (0.117) (0.010) (0.011)
Famine month × famine cohort × round 4 -0.040** -0.055* -0.140 0.065 -0.009 0.001
(0.020) (0.031) (0.459) (0.137) (0.011) (0.012)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 0.045 -0.062 -1.652 -0.718** 0.047 0.032
(0.061) (0.052) (1.304) (0.323) (0.030) (0.029)
Household size 0.018 0.010 0.116 0.127 -0.010 -0.009
(0.021) (0.028) (0.413) (0.079) (0.010) (0.009)
Age of household head 0.000 -0.003 0.028 -0.006 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.061) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.048 0.381*** 2.031 1.092*** 0.025 0.068***
(0.058) (0.083) (1.354) (0.302) (0.026) (0.024)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.254** 0.128 4.286 3.291*** -0.033 0.083
(0.111) (0.342) (4.438) (0.714) (0.057) (0.073)
Shock index -0.183 0.310 -33.366*** -5.275*** -0.163 -0.265
(0.233) (0.620) (11.654) (1.552) (0.219) (0.224)
Wealth index 1.143*** 1.406*** 27.243*** 8.130*** 0.063 0.381***
(0.202) (0.298) (6.151) (0.889) (0.100) (0.104)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.210*** -0.163** -0.982 -0.060 -0.031 -0.041*
(0.045) (0.076) (0.909) (0.234) (0.025) (0.022)
Age of child (months) -0.030*** 0.056*** 1.174*** 0.177*** -0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.203) (0.029) (0.003) (0.002)
Child birth order -0.054* 0.022 -1.460** -0.272** 0.001 0.013
(0.028) (0.020) (0.620) (0.115) (0.013) (0.015)
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Number of siblings of child -0.011 -0.110*** -0.377 -0.271** 0.015 -0.004
(0.022) (0.030) (0.589) (0.108) (0.013) (0.012)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,259 1,501 2,394 1,541 2,484 2,484
R-squared 0.111 0.675 0.590 0.476 0.879 0.862
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Table 2.12 shows the evolution of the life cycle effects of maternal early childhood famine exposure on the
child human capital. “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” are total monthly negative rainfall deviation during
the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother was exposed to the famine, respectively. “Famine
month × famine cohort × round #” represents the effects of the famine on child human capital measured in survey
round #. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in
these results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three years after the
famine).
The evolution of the effects of the famine on children’s schooling displays a
similar pattern. However, data on child schooling were collected only in rounds
3 and 4 as the Young Lives children were too young to enroll in school in rounds
1 and 2. The results shown in column (2) indicate that the famine effect worsens
over time. The life cycle effects on test scores are statistically insignificant, how-
ever. In the locus of control and self-esteem regressions, on the other hand, the
famine effect is statistically significant at age eight.
The results presented thus far point to the limited malleability of health and
cognitive (grade completed) human capital through late remediation once the
damage is done to mothers in early childhood. This effect is especially greater for
children born to mothers who were exposed to the famine as young girls for over
three months. This has a crucial policy implication to the timing and targeting of
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interventions. To maximize the impacts of interventions in communities that are
vulnerable to severe shocks, emphasis should be placed on reaching young girls
before they are exposed to shocks of three months or longer.
2.6.4 Selective Migration
Migration is one of the traditional risk coping strategies during periods of crisis
in rural Ethiopia [82, 83]. Migration decisions are usually made at the household
level, with household members moving in search of alternative income sources
such as wage labor to supplement agricultural incomes or to live with better off
close relatives to relieve food shortages in the original household [92]. In rare
cases, whole households leave their villages after exhausting other options, which
may include consuming seedling stocks, selling off livestock and other assets in-
cluding farm implements. During the 1983-1985 famine, there were both volun-
tary and involuntary household relocations. Some households saw no future in
their villages and voluntarily relocated to start afresh in remote settlement camps
organized by the government. The number of voluntary settlers were short of the
government’s plan. As a result, it resorted to involuntary resettlement measures
to move households from the famine areas to fertile remote areas in the south and
western Ethiopia [92].
These movements pose serious identification challenges, as they are almost
certainly not random. In fact, [83] show that rural out-migration between 1984
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and 1994 was higher among vulnerable communities. If the nature of migra-
tion during the famine was such that the poorest and most vulnerable stayed in
their villages, the estimated coefficients would overestimate the true impact of the
famine. This would be the case if the poor cannot access the capital required for
costly migration. In previous studies, [98] find that internal migration decreased
in Ecuador during droughts, perhaps due to the relative poverty of internal mi-
grants. Likewise, [109] find that the rural-urban migration of women in Burkina
Faso decreased during droughts. On the contrary, if out-migration is a last resort
option such that the very desperate who can no longer make ends meet at their
place of origin leave, the true impact of the famine would be underestimated. In
what follows, I address the potential selective migration problem by 1) reviewing
results from previous studies, 2) providing the institutional and environmental
context during and after the famine and 3) conducting a robustness check using
retrospective data on mother’s history of village residence.
The data used in this study does not track mothers’ place of birth. As a result,
the unbiasedness of the famine impact estimates depends on the assumption that
there was no systematic relocation of mothers from their village of birth. That is,
there was no statistically significant difference in the baseline migration history
of the mothers born during and before/ after the famine as observed in the 2002
baseline. As noted above, however, drought is one of the prime disruptive events
in much of the developing world, and tends to affect the most vulnerable more.
Moreover, in addition to migrations during the famine, migrations that happen
in the intervening period between the famine and the baseline can also bias esti-
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mates of the famine impacts if they were systematic (non-random) in nature. It is
also feasible that a mother may have moved during the famine or in the period
after, but had returned to the place of origin by the time the baseline survey was
conducted. The survey includes a question on the duration of stay at the place
where the household was first interviewed. I address the identification issues due
to potential selective migration by limiting the estimation sample to mothers who
have lived at the interview location since, at least, the famine period.
Relative to the scale of the crisis, out-migration during the famine was mod-
est. [92] reports that only a third of the famine affected population moved out
of their villages while two-thirds stayed at home. Several factors contributed to
restrict the movement of people from the famine areas to the rest of the country.
First, due to insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray in the north, the government had
imposed restrictions on the movement of people. People leaving their villages
were required to get permits from their Peasants’ Association, making migration
prohibitively difficult [27]. Second, availability of emergency food aid in some of
the most affected villages encouraged people to stay in their villages. Though the
delivery food aid in the famine affected areas was delayed due to logistical and
political reasons and the number of beneficiaries was low, relief aid played a cru-
cial role in retaining people in their villages. The bulk of food aid began to arrive
in late 1984. In total, there were 195 food distribution posts, 20 large shelters and
41 intensive feeding centers for malnourished children and mothers by November
1984 [1].
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Third, after coming to power in 1974, the military government (Derg) abol-
ished the old feudalistic land tenure system and in February 1975 issued a land
reform proclamation that nationalized all rural land and prohibited private own-
ership of land and the hiring of labor for agricultural activities. The proclamation
bestows upon landholders usufruct rights with no rights to sell, lease, sharecrop
or transfer the land [124]. To carry out the provisions of the proclamation, Peas-
ant Associations were formed at the locality (chika) level within a minimum area
of 800 hectares. The rights over rural land were tied to membership in Peasant
Associations and residence within the area. This is believed to have restricted
the movement of households from the famine ravaged areas [54]. There were
no major changes in land policy following the fall of the Derg in 1991. Land is
still owned by the state with landholders entitled to usufruct rights. Some of the
restrictions on leasing and mortgaging rural land have been relaxed. However,
these are unlikely to have had appreciable impact on mobility of rural households
[27, 67].
Much of the rural out-migration in Ethiopia takes place for economic or mar-
riage reasons. Men tend to move for economic reasons more, while women pri-
marily move for marriage reasons. During periods of crisis economic migration
increases with able bodied men moving in search of opportunities to supplement
rural incomes [83]. The potential selective migration due to economic reasons,
thus, is lower for women [99]. Marriage related movement of women, however,
poses a major challenge. If the famine altered the composition of the women who
leave their parents’ homes for marriage, the estimated famine impacts could be
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biased. To test if there is a systematic difference in the likelihood of migration
between mothers in the famine cohort and non-famine cohort, I regress a migra-
tion dummy variable on famine cohort dummy and a range of control variables
including mother’s age, husband’s age, region, religion, ethnicity and urban-rural
dummy. The result shows that there was no statistically significant difference in
likelihood of migration between mothers affected by the famine as young girls
and those who were not.32 Moreover, under the 1975 land proclamation women
and other minority groups were for the first time given the right for access to
land. This combined with the requirement of residence in the community where
the farm is located may have limited the distance women move for marriage rea-
sons.
The evidence thus far suggests that potential selective migration concerns are
likely very low in the setting I study. To further corroborate this, I conduct robust-
ness checks using data on mothers who have not moved from their community.
Table A5 in the appendix presents the pooled OLS regression results of the effects
of early childhood maternal famine exposure on the human capital outcomes of
their children for a sub-sample of mothers who have lived in the study for at least
15 years by the 2002 baseline. This ensures that the mothers included in the sam-
ple had reached reproductive age by the baseline. Like the rest of the analysis
sample used in the rest of the paper, the sample was further trimmed to include
only mothers born between 1978 (three years before the famine) and 1988 (three
years after the famine).
32These regression results could be obtained upon request.
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The results are consistent with the main results reported in Tables 2.3-2.5.
Overall, both the intensity and duration of famine experienced by mother in early
childhood have negative impact on their children’s human capital. The impact
is particularly strong for zhfa and children’s grade achievement. Increase in the
duration of maternal famine exposure reduces children’s non-cognitive human
capital, though the effects are statistically insignificant. Likewise, the effect of the
famine on children’s schooling aspirations and self locus of control is negative,
but statistically insignificant.
2.6.5 Selective Fertility and Mortality
Selective fertility could be an identification challenge if the mothers in the sample
were affected as young girls by selective fertility behavior due to the famine. That
is, if grandparents of the Young Lives children had changed their fertility behavior
in response to, for example, increase in child mortality and morbidity, scarcity of
food and other resources or slack labor due to limited agricultural activities. If
fertility increases, competition for food and medication would rise and expose the
Young Lives children’s mothers to greater scarcity in utero and as young girls than
they otherwise face. In this case the estimated famine impacts may overestimate
the true impact of the famine. On the contrary, if fertility declines as grandparents
seek to increase food intake per household members or to avoid the trauma of
losing children, the Young Lives mothers would be exposed to lesser shocks as
young girls than they otherwise would. This would lead to underestimation of
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the true impact of the famine.
The empirical strategy used in this paper accounts for the potential selective
fertility problems outlined above. The effects of changes in fertility behavior due
to the famine, if any, would be observed on the famine cohort (mothers born be-
tween 1981 and 1985) and not the non-famine cohort. The cohort dummy included
in all of the regression equations, thus, would control for the effect of such changes
in fertility behavior. If, rather, the fertility changes are not limited to the 1981-1985
cohort but vary over time, the effects of these changes on the human capital out-
comes of children would be absorbed by parents’ age which is also included in all
of the regression equations.
Previous studies of the effects of the famine on fertility find no change or tem-
porary decline in fertility. [82] shows that the fertility rate of ever-married women
remained stable between 1975 and 1989 for 15-49 years old cohorts of women.
There was a sharp decline in fertility in the 1990s, but this is unlikely to have
any effect on the cohorts of mothers in Young Lives baseline in 2002. [144] find
that probabilities of conception temporarily decline during the famine (1985) but
rebound afterwards. Likewise, [127] shows that fertility declined in 1984-1985
among famine victims compared to the pre-famine (1981) fertility rate in one of
the famine affected areas (Wello). These results appear to suggest that the famine
impacts estimated in this paper may be underestimated.
Selective mortality causes another identification challenge. Granted the very
high mortality rates associated with the famine, the mothers who survived the
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famine as young girls and were observed in the baseline are likely to have expe-
rienced less severe famine or have greater tolerance to the hazards related to the
famine. In this sense, selective mortality may underestimate the true impact of
the famine on the human capital outcomes of children. [127] finds that the likeli-
hood of childhood (ages 0-4) mortality during the famine was uncorrelated with
observable household and village characteristics, which suggests perhaps that the
likelihood of mothers’ being observed in the Young Lives baseline in 2002 may not
be correlated with grandparent characteristics. Despite the potential downward
bias, the statistically significant findings of negative intergenerational impact of
the famine gives greater credence to the findings in this paper.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper investigates the intergenerational effects of maternal early childhood
famine exposure on the human capital outcomes of children. The 1983-1985
Ethiopian famine is used as an exogenous source of variation to identify the effects
of exposure to severe shocks during developmental plasticity on the health, cog-
nitive and non-cognitive human capital of children whose mothers suffered the
famine as young girls. There is paucity of empirical work in this area. This is one
of the first papers to look at the intergenerational effects of severe shocks [46, 191].
The paper explores the potential parent-to-child shock transmission channels. In
particular, it determines whether the effects of a mother’s famine exposure on the
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human capital of her offspring decay over time. It also identifies critical famine
duration thresholds.
I find that maternal early childhood famine exposure has a negative effect on
children’s health (height-for-age z-score), cognitive (number of years of schooling)
and non-cognitive (locus of control) human capital. At the sample average famine
intensity and duration, the 1983-1985 famine led to a 5% decrease in height-for-
age z-score and a 0.05 grades decrease in the number of years of schooling of
children born to mothers affected by the famine in utero and/ or before age three.
The main parent-to-child shock transmission channel is found to be children’s
maternal human capital endowment. Mothers who were exposed to the famine
early in childhood are about 0.5 centimeters shorter. This estimate is considerably
less than that obtained by [72] for Ethiopia. Mothers’ schooling decreases by about
0.5 grades due to the famine.
The effect of the famine on children’s height-for-age z-score and schooling de-
pends non-linearly on maternal famine exposure duration. While the adverse
impacts of the famine worsen with increase in famine duration, it sharply rises
after three months of famine. This suggests existence of a critical maternal famine
duration threshold at about three months of famine exposure. The effects of the
famine on height-for-age z-score and schooling persist through children’s life cy-
cle from age one through early adolescence (age 12). In fact, the negative effect
sizes become greater over time. This seems to suggest remediation may not be
effective in mitigating the impacts of maternal early childhood famine exposure
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on child human capital.
The findings of the paper point to a few policy implications. First, shocks ex-
perienced early in childhood have impacts that last through generations. To min-
imize the adverse effects of shocks, health and nutritional interventions to chil-
dren in the developmental plasticity is crucial. Since the effects of the famine are
primarily channeled through maternal outcomes ([46, 191] find similar results),
young girls should be targeted for intervention during natural disasters. This is
further reinforced by the persistence of the effects of shocks through children’s
life cycle. Second, for optimum intervention, the focus should be on girls under
three years old with the highest likelihood of crossing the critical famine duration
threshold of three months. That is, primacy should be given to girls who have
suffered just under three months of severe shock in the delivery of assistance.
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CHAPTER 3
INSURING WELLBEING? BUYER’S REMORSE AND PEACE OF MIND
EFFECTS FROM INSURANCE
3.1 Introduction
Uninsured risk exposure in low-income rural communities is widely believed to
cause serious welfare losses and to distort behaviors, potentially even resulting in
poverty traps [178, 156, 44, 71, 21, 183]. However, standard insurance products are
routinely unavailable due to moral hazard and adverse selection problems and
high transaction costs in infrastructure-poor areas [29]. In response to the lack
of affordable standard insurance products, there has been a significant push to
expand index insurance offerings in the developing world over the past decade.1
Index insurance attempts to mitigate adverse selection, moral hazard and
high transaction cost concerns by writing contracts not on policyholders’ realized
losses but, instead, on a low-cost, observable indicator – the ‘index’ – believed to
be strongly correlated with actual losses. There is, however, little empirical evi-
dence demonstrating that index insurance generates welfare gains for poor, rural
households.2 Indeed, the low uptake of index insurance products in a range of
countries suggests that perhaps many prospective buyers believe index insurance
1See [49] for an extensive discussion of these issues as they apply to a setting very similar to
the one we study, and [154, 188] and [119] for broader reviews.
2[117, 123] and [120, 121] are notable recent exceptions.
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does not deliver welfare gains [95, 33, 57].3 Index insurance uptake may even
cause welfare losses for buyers for at least two reasons. First, high commercial
loadings by insurers can drive premium rates above actuarially fair levels. Sec-
ond, when the index does not closely track policyholders’ actual losses, the im-
perfect correlation creates “basis risk” that can result in uninsured losses despite
the purchase of insurance. This can lead to uninsured catastrophic loss despite a
premium payment; as a result, index insurance will not stochastically dominate
remaining uninsured [120].
Estimating the welfare effects of insurance coverage is complicated because in-
surance produces two potentially opposite effects on the welfare of buyers. Hold-
ing insurance before the resolution of uncertainty generates ex ante well-being ef-
fects. Insurance may increase ex ante welfare for risk averse agents prior to the re-
alization of stochastic events that may otherwise impose substantial losses. These
ex ante well-being effects of insurance may differ from, and be partly offset by, the
ex post well-being effects of lapsed insurance that did not pay any indemnity. Ex
post effects arise after the resolution of uncertainty. The same insurance that is
ex ante welfare improving may prove ex post welfare reducing, in a later period,
once the risk has passed and a purchaser realizes with perfect hindsight that she
3[95] report that take-up rate of a rainfall insurance product in Andhra Pradesh, India was very
low, at just 4.6 percent. They argue this might reflect the short history of the product. Similarly,
Cole et al. (2013) find that the take-up rate of livestock insurance among the untreated general
population in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, India, is close to zero. [33] argues that there is low
demand for index insurance because better-off farmers have already self-insured through diversi-
fication of their portfolios and informal social networks, while the poor face liquidity constraints
that limit their participation. [123], on the contrary, find that at an actuarially fair price, almost
half of the farmers in their sample from northern Ghana demand index insurance and purchase
coverage for more than 60 percent of their acreage.
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could have foregone the premium payment without consequence. In this case,
the buyer has “lost” her premium and would have been unambiguously better
off financially had she not bought insurance coverage after all. If insurance pur-
chase is positively correlated over time, this then raises the possibility that buyer’s
remorse can confound valuation of insurance coverage, biasing downwards esti-
mates of the value of current insurance coverage following periods without in-
demnity payments, when insurance purchase lost the insuree money.
In this paper we take a novel approach to estimating the welfare impact of in-
surance on a poor, rural population, exploring whether index insurance coverage
improves subjective well-being (SWB) and disentangling the potentially distinct
effects of current and lapsed insurance coverage. The analysis of gains from in-
surance coverage has typically relied on either relatively weak tests of stochastic
dominance or strong assumptions about utility functions [206, 88, 102, 69]. Re-
cent innovations in SWB measurement, however, permit relaxation of many of
the strong assumptions on which such analyses rely. Further, measures of SWB
often yield deeper insights beyond the traditional income and expenditure based
well-being measures [173, 134]. Indeed, conventional measures of well-being may
underestimate the true value of a program. A program can have significant ef-
fects on SWB even if it does not generate observable material or physical impacts
[75, 89, 146]. As a result, SWB measures have become increasingly popular in
welfare assessment [91, 55, 84, 97, 174, 122, 134].
Several features of our data enable us to estimate the ex ante and ex post SWB
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effects of index insurance. First, the project’s experimental design enables us to
use an instrumental variables method to overcome potential selection issues in
index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) uptake. We exploit the randomization of
incentives to purchase IBLI, newly introduced in southern Ethiopia by a commer-
cial underwriter in August 2012. The novelty of the product obviates the potential
confounding of past, unobserved experience with IBLI on buyers’ reported SWB.
Second, three-round panel data enable us to control for time-invariant household
unobservable characteristics that might affect both SWB and IBLI uptake. Third,
no indemnity payouts occurred during this period.4 Without indemnity pay-
ments, we exploit the considerable intertemporal variation in households’ IBLI
uptake to isolate the causal effect of IBLI on SWB. We use coverage active during
a survey round to capture ex ante welfare effects and coverage that had lapsed
by the time of the survey to capture ex post impacts. These data offer an unprece-
dented opportunity to estimate the SWB effects of insurance that arise purely from
ex ante risk reduction and to disentangle them from ex post buyer’s remorse effects.
We find that current IBLI coverage improves SWB. Lapsed IBLI contracts that
did not pay indemnities have a negative effect on SWB, consistent with the buyer’s
remorse hypothesis. Although both effects are statistically significant, the welfare
gains of current coverage significantly exceed the adverse buyer’s remorse effects.
Our results are robust to a range of alternative estimators, corrections to address
concerns on the measurement of SWB, variable definitions, model specifications
4The first IBLI indemnity payments – on 509 contracts yielding total payments of ETB 526,000
(approximately $26,225) – occurred in October-November 2014, after the period covered by our
data.
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and variations in the relevant panel sub-samples analyzed. Further, we show that
the estimated SWB gains from insurance are downwardly biased if one omits con-
trol for lapsed insurance coverage that generates buyer’s remorse.
The implication is that, despite premiums set above actuarially fair rates, IBLI
improves buyers’ SWB even over a period when pastoralists in southern Ethiopia
lose money on the policy. The ex ante peace of mind effect dominates any ex post
buyer’s remorse. In other words, even an insurance policy that does not pay out
still improves people’s perceptions of their well-being.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the study setting and discusses IBLI and its contract design. Section 3 discusses
the sampling and experimental design. Section 4 reports summary statistics of the
data. Section 5 introduces our estimation strategy. Section 6 details our vignette
correction strategy, following best current practice in the SWB literature. Section 7
reports our main results. Section 8 presents a range of robustness checks. Section
9 concludes.
3.2 Study Setting
The study area is Borana zone of Oromia region in southern Ethiopia. It is a
vast pastoralist land mass consisting mainly of arid and semi-arid agro-ecological
zones with a bimodal rainfall pattern and four distinct seasons: long rainy (March-
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May), long dry (June-September), short rainy (October-November), and short
dry (December-February) seasons. Mobile pastoralism is the primary source of
income and sustenance, with limited cereals cultivation for own consumption.
Cyclical movement of livestock in search of forage and water characterizes the
livestock production system in the zone [58, 28].
There are widespread concerns that more frequent droughts, perhaps asso-
ciated with climate change, are making pastoralism more tenuous (Barrett and
Santos 2014). Catastrophic droughts in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in herd losses
of over 35% [73, 147]. These catastrophic droughts, which are covariate within
a community, also put pressure on informal social insurance mechanisms, such
as iqub (rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs)) membership. Infor-
mal community networks facing high and widespread herd losses can no longer
sufficiently mitigate the effects of shocks and are in decline [147, 182]. Formal
insurance might effectively transfer drought risk out of the pastoral system to un-
derwriters, thereby cushioning pastoralists against catastrophic herd loss shocks.
However, conventional indemnity insurance can be prohibitively costly to es-
tablish and sustain in this environment. Droughts that trigger payouts could
bankrupt under-diversified insurers. Moral hazard and adverse selection prob-
lems and associated high monitoring costs, as well as high transaction costs in
infrastructure-poor areas compound the challenges of delivering standard insur-
ance products [29].
IBLI was developed for precisely such an environment. Originally designed
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for and successfully piloted in the neighboring region of northern Kenya begin-
ning in January 2010, IBLI makes indemnity payouts based on an observable,
exogenous index of rangeland conditions, as reflected in Normalized Difference
Vegetation Index (NDVI) measures generated by remote sensors on satellite plat-
forms. An IBLI policy provides indemnity payouts when pasture vegetation falls
below a contractually stipulated threshold level that reflects the onset of drought
conditions that typically lead to excess livestock mortality [49].
IBLI was piloted in 2012 in eight woredas5 of Borana zone located directly across
the border from the Kenyan region where IBLI first piloted. The index for IBLI Bo-
rana is calculated at the woreda level as a cumulative deviation of periodic NDVI
readings for each IBLI sales period.6 Accordingly, the IBLI premium rate differs
across woredas and by livestock species but is the same for all buyers insuring the
same livestock species within a woreda, irrespective of individual loss experience.
The woreda specific premium rates are applied to the value of herd that an IBLI
buyer chooses to insure to establish the total amount that must paid for IBLI cov-
erage.
5Woreda is a third-level administrative division in Ethiopia, below region and zone. The eight
woredas of Borana zone covered in our sample are Arero, Dhas, Dillo, Dire, Miyo, Moyale, Teltele,
and Yabello.
6For a more detailed discussion of the construction of the IBLI Borana index, see [114].
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Announce SRSD NDVI value. If below contract strike value, make 
indemnity payments.
1 year contract coverage
Sales period for LRLD 
season Period of NDVI observation for LRLD season
Sales period for SRSD 
season Period of NDVI observation for SRSD season
LRLD season coverage SRSD season coverage
Announce LRLD NDVI value. If below contract strike value, make 
indemnity payments.
Dry season
Rainy season
Figure 3.1: Temporal structure of IBLI contracts
Note: IBLI contracts are sold in two sales periods in January-February and August-September prior
to the long rains, long dry season (LRLD) and short rains, short dry (SRSD) seasons, respectively.
LRLD indicates the long rains, long dry season. The contracts cover a full year from March to
February (January-February contracts) or October to September (August-September contracts).
IBLI contracts are sold in two sales periods prior to the start of the short and
long rainy seasons. The first IBLI contracts were sold in August-September 2012
(sales period 1). Contract sales were repeated in January-February 2013 (sales pe-
riod 2), August-September 2013 (sales period 3) and January-February 2014 (sales
period 4). The duration of contract coverage is 12 months. A contract sold in
January 2014 covers March 2014-February 2015, while one sold in August 2013
covers October 2013-September 2014. Households can augment their coverage
by acquiring new contracts in subsequent sales periods. Index readings for each
sales period are announced and indemnity payments made to policyholders, if the
contractually stipulated strike rate is triggered, at the end the season (See Figure
3.1).
As with all index insurance products, the substantial basis risk associated with
IBLI could leave livestock loss uninsured due to imperfect correlation between
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the drought predicted by the index and losses experienced at the household level
[120]. Animal losses due to covariate shocks that are not covered by IBLI, such as
animal disease unrelated to rangeland conditions, as well as idiosyncratic shocks
such as wildlife predation or injury, are common.
Nonetheless, recent impact evaluations of the original IBLI pilot in northern
Kenya find income and productivity gains, on average, for IBLI policyholders
[120, 121]. But in that setting, significant indemnity payouts had occurred in the
second year in which contracts were sold following the catastrophic 2011 regional
drought, so average indemnity payouts substantially exceeded average premium
expenses. Those results could, therefore, be purely the result of stochastic order-
ing of loss events and associated indemnity payments. Those indemnity payouts
had sizable behavioral and welfare effects [117]. Because there were no indemnity
payments in southern Ethiopia, our study isolates the welfare effects of insurance
that arise purely from reduced ex ante risk exposure, that is, just the peace of mind
effects that arise from buyers’ risk aversion, abstracted from the complication of
indemnity payments. The Ethiopia IBLI pilot and associated data enable us to
get at these important issues in a novel way that sheds considerable light more
generally on the value of insurance coverage.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Research Design
A baseline survey (R1) was designed and fielded in February-March 2012 before
IBLI was developed or announced. Data on a broad range of household char-
acteristics, livestock and other assets, livelihood activities, consumption, social
networks, expectations and subjective well-being were collected. A year later,
following sales period 2, a follow-up survey round (R2) of the original sample
households was fielded in March-April 2013. Following sales period 4, a third
round (R3) of survey data was then conducted in March 2014 from the same re-
spondents as the first two survey rounds. We therefore have pre-experiment base-
line data (R1), followed by two survey rounds (R2 and R3) with the same respon-
dents. In R2, IBLI contracts purchased in sales periods 1 and 2 were in force. In
R3 contracts from sales period 1 and 2 had lapsed but contracts purchased in sales
periods 3 and 4 were in force (Figure 3.2).
The sampling was clustered at the reera level.7 Reeras were purposively se-
lected based on geographic distribution, variation in market access, and agro-
ecological variation across the eight woredas of Borana zone in our sample. Inac-
cessible reeras were excluded for logistical reasons. In each reera, households were
grouped into three livestock holding classes (high, medium and low), measured
7Reera is the fourth level administrative division in Oromia region below zone, woreda, and
kebele.
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Figure 3.2: Timeline of IBLI survey and sales periods
Note: Figure 3.2 shows active and lapsed contracts through the three survey rounds used in this
study. IBLI contracts cover a full year. The August-September contracts lapse after 12 months at
the end of September. Likewise, January-February contracts lapse at the end of February.
in tropical livestock units (TLU).8 Fifteen percent of households were randomly
selected in each reera such that a minimum of 25 households were selected with a
balanced representation of the three TLU classes (terciles). In the event 15 percent
of households in a reera yields less than 25 households, neighboring reeras were
combined to form a bigger study site, resulting in a total of 17 study sites [113].
The baseline sample included 515 households. In R2, 476 of the original (base-
line) households were re-interviewed. Households that had dropped out were
replaced by households from the same study site and TLU class. If replacements
could not be found in the same TLU class, households in the adjacent TLU class
were picked. Thus, 32 new replacement households were surveyed from the orig-
8TLU is a measure used to aggregate livestock across species in relation to a common average
metabolic weight such that 1 TLU = 1 cattle = 0.7 camels = 10 goats or sheep, collectively called
‘shoats’.
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inal population lists for a total of 508 households in R2. In R3, 500 R2 households
and 14 replacement households were surveyed. In selecting replacements in R3
priority was given to original households (those sampled in R1 but missed in R2).
Of the 14 R3 replacements, 10 were original households and 4 were new house-
holds.
Seven households had missing SWB measures or key independent variables
and were dropped from the sample. The final estimation sample includes 550
unique households and 1,530 observations (515 in R1, 504 in R2 and 511 in R3),
of which 465 households were surveyed in all three rounds, 50 households were
surveyed in two rounds (8 in R1 and R2, 12 in R1 and R3, and 30 in R2 and R3),
and 35 households were surveyed only once. A detailed treatment of potential
attrition bias in the data and relevant corrections is presented in the Appendix.
To encourage IBLI uptake, various combinations of premium discount
coupons and information interventions through audio tapes of a poem or comic
books were randomly implemented in each of IBLI sales period (Table 3.1). In-
formation was delivered via caricature representation of IBLI in comic books or
audio tapes of a poem about IBLI recited in the local language, Oromifa, to sub-
samples of respondents in sales period 1 and 2.9 The encouragement design in
9In the comic book information treatment, a randomly selected sub-sample of respondents was
provided with a caricature representation of the IBLI product prepared by the underwriter, Oro-
mia Insurance Company (OIC). The contents of the material were first read to the sample house-
holds, then they were encouraged to look/read through it as many times as they wished. In the
audio tape information treatment, development agents (DAs) were asked to play a tape that ex-
plains IBLI in Oromifa to a randomly selected sub-sample of respondents (for more details on the
information interventions see [113].
110
sales periods 3 and 4 did not include information intervention. All four sales pe-
riods included randomized distribution of premium discount coupons.
Prior to each sales period, all communities received a basic briefing that de-
scribed the IBLI product. In each study site, 80 percent of respondents were ran-
domly selected to receive discount coupons that would allow them to purchase
IBLI at a discounted price for up to 15 TLUs. Discount coupon recipients were
evenly distributed across discount levels of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 per-
cent. The remaining 20 percent of respondents did not receive discount coupons.10
The two information treatments – comic book and audio tape – were random-
ized in six sites each (in 12 of the 17 study sites, overall), with no overlap in as-
signment. Within the sites selected for information treatment, about 50 percent of
respondents were randomly selected for treatment. In total, 20 percent of respon-
dents received information treatment. The randomized assignment of respon-
dents into information treatments and discount coupons with varying discount
levels was implemented independently for each sales period. By creating exoge-
nous variation in IBLI uptake and in the effective premium faced by prospective
buyers, IBLI’s randomized encouragement design allows a rigorous analysis of
the causal impacts of IBLI on SWB.
All sample households in our study sites had opportunities to insure against
drought-related livestock loss. Yet, only 22 percent and 21 percent of households
10As part of a separate project, however, 10 respondents received IBLI coverage for up to 15
TLUs free of charge (100 percent discount) in each sales period.
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surveyed in R2 and R3, respectively, reported buying IBLI coverage. In both R2
and R3, IBLI purchases were lower in the January-February sales period than in
the August-September sales period. Of the 504 households surveyed in R2, 130
purchased IBLI in sales period 1 and 94 in sales period 2. Similarly, of the 514
households surveyed in R3, 150 purchased IBLI in sales period 3, but only 62
in sales period 4. This difference might arise due to seasonality in household
liquidity.11 Or this may simply reflect the seasonality arising due to the initial
launch of IBLI in August-September 2012, combined with the contracts’ 12 month
duration.
Because IBLI contracts cover a full year but policies are sold in two sales peri-
ods each year, households can augment their coverage or allow contracts to lapse.
Of the 130 IBLI buyers in sales period 1, 23 buyers augmented coverage further by
buying additional policies in sales period 2, 53 allowed their policy to lapse after
a year, and 77 extended their coverage in sales period 3. The remaining 71 buyers
in sales period 2 were first time buyers. Likewise, 73 of the 94 IBLI buyers in sales
period 2 allowed their contracts to lapse and 21 renewed their contract in sales
period 4. Among the 150 households who bought IBLI policies in sales period
3, 33 households bought additional coverage in sales period 4. The considerable
intertemporal variation in households’ IBLI coverage, combined with the experi-
mental design behind the IBLI pilot, enable us to disentangle the causal effects of
current and lapsed insurance policies on respondents’ SWB.
11Extended dry conditions often lead to stress sales and collapse of livestock markets, which in
turn limits ability to raise the necessary liquidity to insure against shocks [22, 147].
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3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 reports baseline treatment-control covariate balance tests on assignment
to premium discount coupon in sales periods 1 and 2. There is very little pre-
treatment difference in subjective well-being, wealth, expected livestock loss, var-
ious household characteristics, and group membership between those who pur-
chased insurance and those who did not, confirming that the randomization was
successful.12 Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table B2.
To complement these results, we also conducted formal joint orthogonal-
ity tests and found that selection into treatment is uncorrelated with observ-
able household characteristics (Appendix Table B3). Joint significance tests from
pooled OLS (linear probability model) regression of treatment dummies (discount
coupon, audio tape and comic book) for the August-September and January-
February sales periods on household income, livestock and non-livestock assets,
expectations of future rangeland conditions, and various individual and house-
hold characteristics suggest that treatments are randomly assigned. We cannot
reject the joint null of zero partial correlation of all covariates in these regressions.
Apart from the discount coupon regression in the August-September sales period,
pre-treatment differences in covariates between treatment and control households
are statistically insignificant in almost all cases.
12Covariate balance tests on comic book and poet audio tape information treatments and dis-
count coupon receipts in sales periods 3 and 4 also show that treatment assignment was indeed
random. Findings are available upon request.
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Table 3.1: Test of treatment-control covariate balance at baseline
Sales period 1 assignments Sales period 2 assignments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Difference Difference
Discount No Discount (Discount– Discount No Discount (Discount–
Coupon Coupon No Discount) Coupon Coupon No Discount)
Subjective well-being (SWB) 2.869 2.924 -0.055 2.878 2.887 -0.010
(0.058) (0.102) (0.126) (0.057) (0.112) (0.125)
SWB relative to Borana pastoralists 2.855 2.866 -0.012 2.886 2.746 0.140
(0.047) (0.088) (0.103) (0.046) (0.096) (0.102)
Vignette corrected SWB 3.570 3.741 -0.172 3.556 3.793 -0.238
(0.076) (0.145) (0.167) (0.075) (0.146) (0.165)
Vignette corrected SWB relative to
Borana pastoralists 3.628 3.760 -0.132 3.626 3.765 -0.139
(0.072) (0.139) (0.159) (0.073) (0.132) (0.158)
Number of TLUs owned 14.197 17.048 -2.851 14.058 17.529 -3.471
(1.097) (2.104) (2.424) (0.942) (3.027) (2.405)
Non-livestock assets (’000 Birr) 2.672 3.034 -0.363 2.761 2.684 0.078
(0.197) (0.495) (0.464) (0.204) (0.448) (0.461)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 20.357 20.106 0.251 19.734 22.512 -2.778
(2.322) (2.087) (4.736) (1.846) (5.888) (4.701)
Expected TLU loss (max=52) 15.252 17.019 -1.767* 15.784 14.933 0.852
(0.448) (0.888) (0.996) (0.443) (0.935) (0.991)
Gender of household head (Male=1) 0.774 0.818 -0.044 0.773 0.821 -0.049
(0.021) (0.039) (0.046) (0.021) (0.038) (0.045)
Age of household head (years) 49.850 49.500 0.350 49.607 50.444 -0.838
(0.902) (1.75) (1.997) (0.914) (1.658) (1.983)
Household size (#) 6.324 5.895 0.430 6.189 6.425 -0.237
(0.126) (0.205) (0.271) (0.120) (0.257) (0.269)
Non-working age hh members (#) 3.567 3.231 0.337* 3.480 3.576 -0.097
(0.091) (0.163) (0.198) (0.087) (0.197) (0.197)
Female hh members (#) 3.122 3.010 0.113 3.064 3.236 -0.173
(0.078) (0.135) (0.169) (0.075) (0.162) (0.168)
Iqub (ROSCAs) membership (%) 0.095 0.058 0.037 0.092 0.064 0.028
(0.015) (0.023) (0.031) (0.015) (0.025) (0.032)
Observations 411 104 515 409 106 515
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.2 reports summary statistics on key dependent and independent vari-
ables by insurance status.13 The top four rows show that households who had IBLI
coverage in R2 and/or R3 report higher SWB – by any of the four different mea-
sures discussed in the next section – compared to their counterparts who have had
no IBLI coverage in any of the survey rounds. Rows 5-9 show that IBLI purchase
is strongly positively correlated with the discount coupon and information treat-
ments. In each sales period, about 93 percent of IBLI contract holders had received
discount coupons.14 Similarly, households who received information treatments
(comic book or audio tape) were more likely to buy IBLI. As expected, higher
discount rates are strongly correlated with IBLI uptake. These simple descriptive
statistics suggest that the random, exogenous assignment of discount coupons
and information treatments are suitable predictors of IBLI adoption.
13Table 3.2 presents the averages of the variables in R2 and R3, during which IBLI was available
for purchase.
14Since survey rounds 2 and 3 were preceded by two sales periods each, a household who pur-
chased IBLI in sales period 2 but had received discount coupon in sales period 1 is reported to
have received discount coupon for the survey round, hence the slightly higher figures in Table 2.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics - round 2 and 3 values (pooled), by insurance
status
(1) (2) (3)
Difference
Insured Uninsured (Insured - Uninsured)
Subjective well-being (SWB) 3.192 3.049 0.143**
(0.041) (0.036) (0.056)
SWB relative to Borana pastoralists 3.250 3.138 0.112**
(0.038) (0.034) (0.053)
Vignette corrected SWB 4.079 3.714 0.365***
(0.068) (0.058) (0.092)
Vignette corrected SWB relative to 4.100 3.792 0.308***
Borana pastoralists
(0.065) (0.057) (0.089)
Encouragement design
Discount coupon 0.932 0.524 0.408***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.027)
Audio tape 0.110 0.039 0.071***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.016)
Cartoon 0.165 0.085 0.081***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.020)
Value of discount coupon (%) SP1 0.353 0.164 0.188***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.018)
Value of discount coupon (%) SP2 0.278 0.171 0.107***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.082)
Number of TLUs owned 20.592 17.323 3.269*
(1.671) (1.050) (1.874)
Non-livestock assets (’000 Birr) 4.975 4.630 0.344
(0.480) (0.460) (0.702)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 20.932 19.180 1.753
(2.048) (1.168) (2.188)
Expected TLU loss (max=52) 13.077 12.989 -0.089
(0.410) (0.362) (0.566)
Gender of household head (Male=1) 0.774 0.807 -0.033
(0.021) (0.016) (0.026)
Age of household head (years) 50.341 51.884 -1.542
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(0.915) (0.726) (1.176)
Household size (#) 6.561 6.745 0.183
(0.125) (0.105) (0.167)
Non-working age hh members (#) 3.619 3.754 0.134
(0.090) (0.071) (0.115)
Female hh members (#) 3.276 3.330 0.055
(0.074) (0.065) (0.101)
Iqub (ROSCAs) membership (%) 0.058 0.053 0.005
(0.012) (0.009) (0.015)
Observations 381 639 1020
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Insured and uninsured households are not distinguishable by observable char-
acteristics, apart from number of TLU owned, which is weakly statistically signif-
icant. The value of non-livestock assets, annual income, expected livestock loss,
gender and age of household head, household size and composition, and mem-
bership in iqub groups vary insignificantly between those that purchased insur-
ance and those who did not. These findings on observable characteristics do not
rule out potential differences based on unobservable characteristics. However, so
long as such unobservable differences are time invariant, we can control for them
using a fixed effects estimator. Concerns that time varying characteristics may de-
termine IBLI adoption nonetheless remain. We exploit the random assignment of
discount coupon and information treatments, each strongly correlated with IBLI
uptake, to address these concerns.
117
3.4 Estimation strategy
A key challenge in evaluating policy interventions where respondents can volun-
tarily “opt-in” is that selection into the program may not be random. Rather, par-
ticipation could be systematically correlated with respondents observable and un-
observable characteristics. Peoples’ SWB is likely correlated with their subjective
assessment of risk, their planning horizons, and other unobserved factors that in-
fluence insurance uptake. The experimental design features of IBLI’s impact eval-
uation, including randomized exposure to various information treatments and
randomized distribution of premium discount coupons, allow us to address the
selection bias associated with insurance uptake choices. We first estimate selec-
tion into IBLI using randomized encouragement treatments as instruments. We
then estimate the effect of instrumented IBLI on SWB. This approach allows us to
derive unbiased and consistent causal estimates of IBLI’s impact on SWB.
IBLI uptake by household i in village v, sales period s, and survey round t is
estimated using the linear probability model (LPM)15 as:
Pr(IBLIivt = 1) = ω + γsDivst + φsAivst + µsCivst + ηsPivst + ζXivt + κt + τi + εivt (3.1)
The randomly assigned treatments include dummy variables for receiving
a randomly assigned premium discount coupon (D) in the first sales period
(August-September 2012), the second sales period (January-February 2013), or
15To avoid the “forbidden regression” problem associated with non-linear models such as logit
or probit, we use an LPM to predict an endogenous dichotomous variable in the first stage of an
instrumental variables (IV) regression [14, 208].
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both; dummy variables for receiving randomly assigned extension treatments in
either audio tape (A) or comic book (C) form in the first, the second or both sales
periods, and a woreda specific continuous measure of the randomly discounted
IBLI premium rate (P) in the first and second sales periods. These are all ran-
domly assigned to households and should have no direct effect on SWB, only an
indirect effect through their impact on inducing IBLI uptake. The lone possible
exception is P, since price variation has a (very modest) real income effect con-
ditional on someone purchasing IBLI and thus could plausibly have some direct
effect on SWB. A series of covariates, X, that may influence the uptake of IBLI are
included as controls, including household herd size and income, expectation of
livestock death, gender, age and educational attainment of household head and
household composition. Household fixed effects (FE), τ, which control for, among
other things, time invariant optimism or pessimism of individual respondents and
survey round fixed effects, κ, are also included.
We use the randomized coupon distribution and information treatments to in-
strument for the purchase of IBLI coverage in the first stage estimation. When
applied to R2 data, equation (3.1) predicts current uptake, ÎBLIiv2, based on pur-
chases in sales periods 1 and 2. There were no lapsed contracts in R2. When
applied to R3 data, it predicts current uptake, ÎBLIiv3, based on purchases in sales
periods 3 and 4. We use the ÎBLIiv2 predicted value to capture lapsed contracts in
R3.
In the second stage of our estimation, the predicted IBLI coverage is used to
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estimate the causal effect of IBLI on SWB in the second stage of our estimation.
SWB includes ordinal responses to the question “on which step do you place your
current economic condition,” ranging from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). The
construction of our SWB measure and related robustness checks are discussed in
more detail below. The second stage ordered logit regression includes predicted
IBLI uptake, number of TLUs owned (TLUO), predicted lapsed IBLI uptake the
probability of having acquired an IBLI contract that has lapsed (IBLIL), a series of
controls X, household fixed effects χ, and survey round fixed effect λ.
SWBivt = α + βÎBLIivt + θTLUOivt + σ̂IBLILivt + δXivt + λt + χi + ivt (3.2)
The coefficient estimate on predicted IBLI uptake, β̂ measures the effect of IBLI
coverage on the extensive margin – the ordered log-odds estimate of possessing
IBLI contract(s) on SWB. We expect that effect to be positive, reflecting the welfare
gains from insurance in a risky setting. The coefficient estimate on ̂IBLILivt, σ
measures the effect on SWB of an IBLI contract that was in force in R2 but had
lapsed in R3. Since contracts in force are controlled for, this coefficient estimate
isolates the ex post SWB effect of insurance that did not pay, i.e., buyer’s remorse,
and it is expected to be negative (σˆ < 0).
A finding that βˆ > |σˆ| indicates that even if insurance does not pay out, in
expectation, the positive peace of mind effect exceeds the negative buyer’s re-
morse effect, and hence IBLI improves expected welfare. If policy purchases –
and therefore current and lapsed policies – are correlated over time, failure to in-
clude lapsed contracts in equation (3.2) would lead to omitted relevant variable
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bias of the β estimate, presumably downwards due to negative buyer’s remorse
effects.
To capture the intensive margin of IBLI coverage, i.e., the marginal effect of
increasing the volume of IBLI uptake by a unit, we re-estimate equation (3.1) re-
placing the IBLI uptake dummy variable with volume of TLUs insured (TLUI).
The first stage equation for the negative censored continuous variable TLUI is es-
timated using Tobit as:
TLUIivt = ω˜ + γ˜sDivst + φ˜sAivst + µ˜sCivst + η˜sPivst + ζ˜Xivt + κ˜t + τ˜i + ε˜ivt (3.3)
We construct predicted values for current and lapsed IBLI coverage using the
same approach as we did for the discrete uptake variable earlier. The second
stage ordered logit regression then includes predicted TLU insured and predicted
lapsed TLU insured instead of predicted IBLI uptake to identify the causal effect
of buying an additional TLU of IBLI coverage on SWB.
SWBivt = α˜ + β˜T̂ LUIivt + θ˜TLUOivt + σ˜T̂ LULivt + δ˜Xivt + λ˜t + χ˜i + ˜ivt (3.4)
The second stage regression equations of both IBLI uptake (equation 3.2) and
quantity of TLU insured (equation 3.4) include generated regressors. Conven-
tional standard errors of the estimated coefficients would be biased downwards.
To account for the lower variation in the predicted uptake and volume of TLUs
insured, we estimate the standard errors using a bootstrapping method where
both the first and second stage are included for every bootstrap sample. Further,
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to account for spatial correlation of observations estimated standard errors are
clustered at the village (reera) level in all regressions.
There are at least two possible mechanisms through which IBLI coverage could
influence SWB. The first effect is the gross non-monetary benefits or costs associ-
ated with coverage, represented by the coefficient estimate on the instrumented
IBLI, βˆ, net of instrumented lapsed IBLI, σˆ, (βˆ + σˆ), or the coefficient estimate on
instrumented TLU insured, ˆ˜β, multiplied by the number of TLUs insured net of
the coefficient on instrumented lapsed TLU insured, ˆ˜σ, multiplied by the number
of lapsed TLUs insured, ( ˆ˜β×T̂ LUIt+ ˆ˜σ×T̂ LULt). Purchasing insurance may reduce
stress about possible adverse outcomes, which could lead to higher levels of SWB
(βˆ > 0), while greater coverage may lead to higher SWB ( ˆ˜β > 0). Conversely, if the
basis risk on the product is high such that IBLI uptake is more like a lottery ticket
than a conventional indemnity insurance policy, IBLI uptake could increase stress
and reduce SWB (βˆ < 0). For the same reason, greater IBLI coverage may cause
higher stress and lower SWB ( ˆ˜β < 0).
The second influence on SWB arises from the net monetary benefit or cost of
IBLI coverage on SWB. If net income or wealth influences SWB, as many stud-
ies suggest [91, 97], then IBLI will also affect SWB through the premium amount
paid for IBLI, which reduces net income or wealth, and any indemnity payment
received in the event that the IBLI policy pays out, which increases net income
or wealth, ceteris paribus. This effect is captured by the coefficient estimate on the
number of TLUs owned, ˆ˜θ, multiplied by the net flow of funds associated with
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the period-specific net indemnity payments (indemnity receipts minus premium
payments) associated with the predicted IBLI uptake volume, converted into TLU
units at prevailing livestock prices, NI.16
We therefore estimate the aggregate effect of IBLI on SWB as:
∆ŜWBivt = ˆ˜β/s × T̂ LUIivt + ˆ˜σ/s × T̂ LULivt + ˆ˜θ/s × NIivt (3.5)
The point estimate ˆ˜β in equation (3.5) reflects the SWB benefit of a unit of free
IBLI with no indemnity payment. Likewise, the coefficient estimate ˆ˜σ measures
the SWB loss due to a unit of free IBLI that has expired without payout. Note,
however, that ˆ˜β, ˆ˜σ and ˆ˜θ measure effects on SWB in log-odds scales while SWB is
measured in ordinal Likert scale. It is necessary to harmonize the units in which
these coefficients and SWB are measured before one can calculate the overall effect
of IBLI on SWB. We use the fact that the logistic and Normal distributions are
similar, except at the tails of the distribution, to convert the coefficients from log-
odds units to Normal equivalent deviates. The effects measured in log-odds and
their corresponding standard errors can be converted to approximate effects in
Normal equivalent deviates by dividing by the standard deviation of the logistic
distribution s = pi/
√
3 [104, 52].
Given that during R2 and R3 there were no indemnity payments but respon-
dents paid for IBLI, our estimates provide a lower bound, reflecting the SWB
16NI =
Indemnity per TLU−Premium per TLU
Price per TLU × T̂ LUI is the TLU equivalent wealth gained or
lost due to IBLI purchase.
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associated with insurance coverage in the absence of any payout, i.e., a period
in which insurance represents an unambiguous financial loss. A finding that
∆ŜWBivt > 0|NIivt < 0 would therefore represent a strong finding with respect
to the welfare effects of index insurance in this setting.17
3.5 SWB and vignette correction
Subjective measures of welfare are becoming increasingly popular but pose
methodological challenges [133, 173]. Respondents may have different reference
points when answering a subjective question, making interpersonal comparisons
problematic. To address any latent heterogeneity problems that might hinder in-
terpersonal comparisons of subjective welfare, we adjust the subjective measures
of well-being using hypothetical vignettes that provide an explicitly standardized
reference point for all respondents’ comparisons in order to bring objective and
subjective assessments into alignment [198, 134].18
Interpersonal comparisons using SWB data can be challenging due to potential
unobserved heterogeneity in respondents’ reference points, which may depend
17Estimates for ∆ŜWB are obtained by evaluating equation (5) at the average TLUs insured and
NI. The price per TLU is obtained by weighting livestock prices from Haro Bake livestock market
(the largest livestock market in Borana zone) with the TLU conversion units of each species (Table
B1).
18As discussed further below, we test the robustness of our core results by re-estimating our
model for direct (unadjusted) SWB responses and for responses to a similar SWB question that
asks people about their well-being relative to other Borana pastoralists. The core findings prove
stable.
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on socio-economic conditions, and other observable and unobservable character-
istics. Such latent heterogeneity in subjective well-being measures may render
interpersonal comparisons meaningless and invalidate inference from subjective
welfare regressions [131, 198, 25, 174].
[131], [132], [198] and [25] suggest an approach for correcting latent hetero-
geneity problems that involves measuring the interpersonal incomparability of
responses itself. Respondents are asked to assess their own circumstances relative
to a set of hypothetical individuals described by short vignettes on the same scale.
Responses to the hypothetical vignettes are then used to construct an interper-
sonally comparable welfare measure as respondents’ reference points have been
exogenously standardized. The validity of this approach relies on two key as-
sumptions: response consistency, and vignette equivalence. Response consistency
requires that each respondent use response categories for a particular concept in
the same way when self-assessing as when assessing hypothetical individuals.
Vignette equivalence is the assumption that each respondent perceives the level
of the variable represented by a particular vignette on the same unidimensional
scale. That is, the variable being measured by vignettes should have a consistent
meaning among respondents [131].
Following [131], the reported SWB measures are corrected using a simple non-
parametric approach. For notational ease, we momentarily suppress the village
and time dimensions of the data. Suppose SWBi is the categorical self-assessment
for respondent i(i = 1, ..., n), and Vi j is the categorical survey response for respon-
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dent i on vignette j( j = 1, ..., J). For respondents with identical vignette ordering
(i.e. Vi, j−1 < Vi j) the vignette adjusted measure of subjective well-being is given
as:19
VSWBi =

1 if SWBi < Vi1
2 if SWBi = Vi1
3 if Vi1 < SWBi < Vi2
. .
. .
2J + 1 if SWBi > ViJ
(3.6)
The hypothetical vignettes used in this study involve households that fall in
one of three well-being rungs: low, middle and high, which were constructed
in consultation with local field researchers knowledgeable about the local socio-
economic conditions in the study area. The lowest (poor), middle, and highest
(rich) rungs were represented by a family that “has no livestock and does not eat meat
except on special occasions,” a family that “has a dozen of shoats [goat and sheep],
but no camel or cattle and can eat meat only once a month,” and a family that“has
a lot of shoats and several camels and cattle and can eat meat whenever they choose,”
respectively.
The cross tabulation of SWB measures and vignette corrected SWB measures
19In our data, rescaling of self-assessments relative to vignettes does not generate vector re-
sponses, which are associated with inconsistent vignette ordering or correspondence of self-
assessment with more than one vignette responses. As a result, the standard class of econometric
methods for ordered dependent variables is suitable for our analysis.
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in Appendix Table B4 shows that vignette corrected SWB measures largely mirror
SWB, particularly at the lower end of the scale. For example, in panel (a), out
of the 120 observations with SWB score of one (very bad), 27 are rescaled to one
and 93 to two on the vignette adjusted SWB. Similarly, of the 88 observations with
SWB scores of five (very good), none is rescaled one, and only five to two on the
vignette adjusted SWB. We observe similar correspondence between SWB relative
to Borana pastoralists and its vignette corrected equivalence in panel (b).
To test the robustness of our results to potentially unstable responses, we re-
estimate the model using alternative SWB measures vignette corrected SWB rela-
tive to Borana pastoralists and SWB relative to Borana pastoralists. The SWB rela-
tive to Borana pastoralists variable is similar to the SWB measure, but respondents
are asked to gauge their life relative to other Borana pastoralists. The anchoring of
subjective well-being questions reduces the likelihood that respondents may have
different reference groups in mind when responding [173].
3.6 Results
We first discuss the estimated vignette-corrected SWB effects of IBLI on the ex-
tensive margin, followed by discussion of results on the intensive margin. Ta-
ble 3.3 presents the first stage panel fixed effects LPM estimates of equation
(3.1) (columns 1-2) and panel random-effects (RE) Tobit model of equation (3.3)
(columns 3-4). Column 1 shows results from a basic model with just random-
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ized discount coupon and audio tape and comic book information extension treat-
ments in sales periods 1 and 2. In column 2, in addition to the randomized dis-
count coupon and information treatments in column 1, we include a broad range
of household characteristics, wealth measures, IBLI knowledge, expectations of
livestock loss, membership in iqub, and survey round fixed effects.
The parameter estimates of both models show that randomized treatments had
positive effects on IBLI uptake and, thus, can serve as suitable instruments. Re-
ceiving a discount coupon and the amount of the discount were especially strong
predictors of IBLI uptake. Receiving a discount coupon in sales period 1 increases
the probability of buying IBLI policy by over 20 percent. This effect is even greater
for the discount coupon in sales period 2 – it increases the odds of buying IBLI by
about 24 percent. Moreover, having received discount coupons in sales period 1
increases the probability of buying coverage for recipients of discount coupons
in sales period 2. Besides the price effect of discount coupons, which is captured
by the coefficient estimates on discount values, the discount coupon had infor-
mational value, offering holders a physical reminder of the insurance product.
Conditional on the amount of discount received and other covariates, receiving a
discount coupon had an independent positive effect on IBLI uptake.
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Table 3.3: First stage estimates of IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured
LPM estimates of Tobit estimates of
IBLI uptake volume of TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Discount: SP1 only 0.103** 0.108** 3.124*** 2.731***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.764) (0.773)
Discount: SP2 only 0.165*** 0.173*** 2.988*** 2.931***
(0.046) (0.044) (0.765) (0.768)
Discount: SP1 & SP2 0.084* 0.085* 2.402*** 2.036**
(0.046) (0.043) (0.823) (0.824)
Value of discount (%) SP1 0.183*** 0.181*** 3.737*** 4.050***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.892) (0.892)
Value of discount (%) SP2 -0.007 -0.011 3.296*** 2.957***
(0.065) (0.061) (0.908) (0.912)
Poet tape: SP1 only 0.043 0.063 0.363 0.963
(0.092) (0.087) (1.031) (1.041)
Poet tape: SP2 only 0.114 0.131* 2.823*** 2.803***
(0.073) (0.070) (0.977) (0.979)
Poet tape: SP1 & SP2 0.129** 0.098 0.836 0.553
(0.063) (0.065) (1.256) (1.268)
Comic book: SP1 only 0.078 0.063 0.945 0.820
(0.059) (0.061) (0.891) (0.896)
Comic book: SP2 only 0.068 0.079 1.586* 1.231
(0.061) (0.064) (0.923) (0.926)
Comic book: SP1 & SP2 0.200*** 0.217*** 2.632*** 2.522***
(0.073) (0.071) (0.787) (0.812)
IBLI premium: SP1 - - 0.286 -3.236
(4.189) (18.438)
IBLI premium: SP2 0.243 0.017 2.425 4.598
(0.211) (1.014) (2.947) (20.238)
IBLI knowledge 0.007 0.508***
(0.006) (0.129)
Expected TLUs loss -0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.023)
Number of TLUs owned 0.002* 0.019**
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – Continued from previous page
LPM estimates of Tobit estimates of
IBLI uptake volume of TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.001) (0.008)
Asset index 0.131 0.303
(0.128) (0.253)
Annual income (’000 Birr) -0.0001 -0.005
(0.0002) (0.005)
Household head gender (Male=1) -0.241* 0.592
(0.136) (0.638)
Household head age 0.002 -0.041
(0.016) (0.081)
Household age squared -0.0001 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.001)
Household size 0.075*** -0.009
(0.027) (0.193)
Household head schooling -0.003 -0.176
(0.008) (0.124)
Iqub membership -0.070 -1.353*
(0.049) (0.748)
Household composition No Yes No Yes
Round dummy No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.086 0.482 -8.403*** -8.332***
(0.132) (0.902) (2.280) (3.488)
Wald test for joint significance 72.4 197.7 58.6 255.9
of instruments (χ2)
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,015 1,015 1,015 1,015
Number of households 520 520 520 520
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – Continued from previous page
LPM estimates of Tobit estimates of
IBLI uptake volume of TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: SP1 stands for sales period 1 and SP2 stands for sales period 2. Columns
(1) and (2) show LPM estimates of IBLI uptake. The dependent variable IBLI up-
take is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a household buys IBLI and 0 oth-
erwise. Standard errors are clustered at the panel-Reera level. Columns (3) and
(4) show Tobit model estimates of volume of TLUs insured. The dependent vari-
able TLUs insured is a non-negative continues variable. IBLI premium for SP1 did
not vary between R2 and R3. Thus, it is dropped in the FE LPM regression results
in columns (1) and (2). The controls for household composition include number
of household members by age group and gender: all/male/female #members≤5,
#mem>5&≤15,#mem>15&≤64, and #mem≥65.
Randomized provision of audio tape and comic book information treatments
also had a positive, albeit weaker, effect on IBLI uptake. The audio tape treat-
ment had a positive and statistically significant effect in sales period 2. The comic
book treatment, however, had an effect on IBLI uptake only when offered in both
sales periods, suggesting the effectiveness of repeated exposure to this informa-
tional approach. Both Sargan (χ2(24) = 75.36, prob > χ2 = 0.000) and Basmann
(χ2(24) = 79.17, prob > χ2 = 0.000) over-identification tests fail to reject the null
hypothesis that our instruments are valid. The Wald test for joint significance of
all instruments also strongly rejects the null of jointly insignificant instruments
(χ2(9) = 137.8, prob > χ2 = 0.000). Thus, this first stage appears to successfully
instrument for endogenous IBLI uptake.
IBLI uptake relates to our control variables in the expected ways. Uptake is
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positively correlated with knowledge about IBLI and wealth (livestock and non-
livestock assets), but only number of TLUs owned is statistically significant. In-
come and iqub membership are negatively but statistically insignificantly corre-
lated with IBLI uptake. The later suggests that iqub may crowd out IBLI. We also
find that male headed households are less likely to buy IBLI and that larger house-
holds are more likely to buy IBLI.20
We find similar results when estimating a Tobit model for volume of TLUs
insured to study IBLI uptake at the intensive margin (columns 3-4, Table 3.3).
Receiving discount coupons and the size of the discount carried by the coupon
are strong predictors of the volume of TLUs insured. The audio and comic book
information treatments were also found to be positively, but relatively weakly,
related to the volume of IBLI coverage. The number of TLUs owned is positively
related to volume of coverage. In line with the IBLI uptake results in columns 1
and 2, we find that IBLI knowledge influences the volume of uptake. Respondents
with more correct answers to questions about the particulars of the IBLI contract
are more likely to buy IBLI, a result consistent with ambiguity aversion [93]. Iqub
membership reduces the volume of TLUs insured, as such traditional institutions
lower the demand for other forms of insurance.
20As a robustness check, we also estimate a probit selection model. The results are strongly
consistent with the LPM (Table B5).
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Table 3.4: Ordered logit regression: Vignette adjusted SWB estimates using
IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured
IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: SWB panel (a)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured 0.816*** 0.713*** 0.859*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.144***
(0.264) (0.256) (0.290) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Predicted lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured -0.454** -0.439** -0.442** -0.077** -0.071** -0.074**
(0.191) (0.197) (0.198) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Number of TLUs owned 0.015** 0.012* 0.012* 0.015** 0.012* 0.012*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Asset Index 0.283** 0.239** 0.325*** 0.289***
(0.114) (0.120) (0.102) (0.101)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Household head gender (Male=1) 0.733** 0.617*
(0.358) (0.334)
Household head age -0.042 -0.037
(0.040) (0.038)
Household head age squared 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Household size -0.224** -0.193**
(0.090) (0.085)
Household head schooling 0.055 0.058
(0.051) (0.053)
panel (b)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.044*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=2) -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=3) -0.025*** -0.021** -0.026*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=4) 0.005** 0.005* 0.007* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=5) 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.055*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – Continued from previous page
IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
prob(SWB=6) 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=7) 0.015*** 0.013** 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Predicted lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) 0.024** 0.023** 0.023** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=2) 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=3) 0.014** 0.013** 0.013** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=4) -0.003* -0.003 -0.003* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
prob(SWB=5) -0.029** -0.028** -0.028** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=6) -0.015** -0.014** -0.014** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=7) -0.009** -0.008** -0.008** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of TLUs owned
prob(SWB=1) -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
prob(SWB=2) -0.001** -0.0005* -0.0005* -0.001** -0.0005* -0.0005*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=3) -0.0004** -0.0004* -0.0004 -0.0005** -0.0004* -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
prob(SWB=4) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
prob(SWB=5) 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
prob(SWB=6) 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
prob(SWB=7) 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Household composition No No Yes No No Yes
Continued on next page
134
Table 3.4 – Continued from previous page
IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Round dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
Number of households 550 550 550 550 550 550
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Panel (a) reports the effects of IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured on vignette adjusted SWB in log-
odds units. Panel (b) reports the marginal effects for the main results in panel (a) – IBLI/ TLUs insured, lapsed
IBLI/ TLUs insured and number of TLUs owned. The marginal effects estimates in panel (b) show the effects of
these variables on the probability of reporting one of the seven unique scales of SWB. In column 3 for example,
IBLI uptake reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1 by 4.4% and increases the probability of reporting SWB=7
by 1.6%. A unit increase in TLUs owned reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1 by 0.1% and increases the
probability of reporting SWB=7 by 0.02%.
Table 3.4 reports second stage ordered logit regression results of the effects of
IBLI on vignette corrected SWB. Panel (a) shows the effects of IBLI in log-odds
units. While these results are concise and more convenient for presentation pur-
poses, their interpretation may not be straight forward. In panel (b), we present
the corresponding marginal effects of the main results in panel (a). Columns 1-
3 show the extensive margin effects of IBLI uptake on SWB. Since randomized
discount coupon and information treatments were used as instruments for the
potentially endogenous IBLI uptake in stage one, the coefficient on ÎBLI measures
the causal effect of IBLI on SWB. We find that IBLI has a strong positive effect
on SWB, presumably because insurance coverage reduces risk exposure for risk
averse buyers. The full model in column 3 shows that IBLI uptake increases the
log-odds of reporting higher SWB by 0.86. That is, IBLI buyers are 2.4 (≈ e0.86)
times more likely to report higher SWB than lower SWB. The probability esti-
mates in panel (b) make this point more clear. IBLI reduces the probability of
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reporting lower SWB (SWB ≤ 3) by 11 percent and increases the probability of
reporting higher SWB (SWB ≥ 5) by 11 percent. Our results are robust to the in-
clusion of income, wealth, a range of demographic and household characteristics,
and household composition variables.
At the time of the R3 survey implementation, IBLI policies from sales period
1 and sales period 2 had already lapsed without payout. Thus, the coefficient
estimate on ̂IBLIL captures the negative ex post SWB effect of having bought an
insurance policy that did not pay out. Indeed, the negative and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient estimate on ̂IBLIL indicates buyer’s remorse. Having bought
an IBLI contract that lapsed without pay out reduces the log-odds of reporting
high SWB by 0.42, which indicates that buyers of lapsed IBLI contracts are 1.5
(≈ 1/e−0.44) times more likely to report lower SWB than higher SWB. In probability
units, having bought a lapsed IBLI contract increases the probability of reporting
low SWB (SWB ≤ 3) by 5 percent and decreases the probability of reporting high
SWB (SWB ≥ 5) by 5 percent. More importantly, the magnitude of the ̂IBLIL co-
efficient is statistically significantly smaller than that of ÎBLI. This suggests that
people are comforted by insurance coverage, and the positive ex ante effect trumps
the negative ex post regret they feel once they realize that they paid for insurance
that, in retrospect, they did not ultimately need.
As expected, SWB is positively correlated with various wealth measures. Both
livestock and non-livestock assets are positively related to SWB. Male headed
households are more likely to report higher SWB than their female headed coun-
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terparts. Household size is negatively correlated with SWB.
We find similar results for the volume of TLUs insured (columns 4-6). Vignette
corrected SWB is increasing in the predicted number of TLUs insured. In the full
model in column 6, a unit increase in the volume of TLUs insured increases the
log-odds of reporting higher SWB by 0.14, which translates to 1.15 times more
likelihood of reporting higher SWB than lower SWB. The corresponding column
in panel (b) shows that an additional unit of TLUs insured reduces the probabil-
ity of reporting low SWB (SWB ≤ 3) by 2 percent and increases the probability
of reporting high SWB (SWB ≥ 5) by 2 percent. Yet, as IBLI policies lapse with-
out paying, the more TLUs one had insured, the greater the buyer’s remorse one
experiences. A unit increase in lapsed TLUs insured reduces the log-odds of re-
porting higher SWB by 0.07. An IBLI buyer with a unit more lapsed TLUs insured
is 1.08 times more likely to report lower SWB than higher SWB. That is, an ad-
ditional unit of lapsed TLUs insured increases the probability of reporting low
SWB (SWB ≤ 3) by 0.9 percent and reduces the probability of reporting high SWB
(SWB ≥ 5) by 0.8 percent. As is the case with IBLI uptake, the positive effect of
greater volume of TLUs insured statistically significantly exceeds the negative re-
morse it causes when the contract fails to pay out. We also find that livestock and
non-livestock wealth are positively correlated with SWB, while household size is
negatively correlated with SWB.
Appendix Table B9 presents the regression results from estimating equations
(3.2) and (3.4) using only currently active IBLI policies. Omission of ̂IBLIL leads
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to a considerably smaller, yet still statistically significant, point estimate on ÎBLI.
This finding underscores the prospective omitted relevant variable bias on the ex
ante SWB impact estimate that arises due to autocorrelation in insurance demand
if one does not separately control for lapsed policies. In other words, econometric
estimates of the gains from insurance will likely underreport the welfare effects
of insurance coverage if the research design does not permit the researcher to
disentangle the ex ante and ex post effects of insurance.
The net aggregate SWB effect of IBLI is presented in Table 3.5. The estimated
∆ŜWB is positive and statistically significant in the number of TLU insured. The
point estimate suggests that insuring an extra TLU increases vignette corrected
SWB by 0.2 points, although these units have no specific informational content
given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. But this magnitude indicates
that, assuming a constant marginal SWB effect of IBLI, insuring about five TLUs
bumps a household up by one rung on the SWB Likert scale, from, for example,
“very bad” to “bad” or “good” to “very good”, on average. So, even insurance
policies that did not pay out generate SWB gains. Given the actual financial losses
experienced by households that purchased insurance policies in these poor com-
munities in southern Ethiopia, this finding is important and reassuring.
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Table 3.5: The aggregate effect of IBLI on SWB
Variables (1) (2) (3)
∆SWBivt 0.197*** 0.202*** 0.213***
(0.072) (0.071) (0.073)
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.7 Robustness checks
We complete several robustness checks to test whether our findings are sensitive
to various specifications and variable definitions. First, we re-estimate our model
for vignette corrected SWB relative to Borana pastoralists, a refinement of our de-
pendent variable (Appendix Table B6). The results are consistent with our main
findings, suggesting response stability – that the phrasing of questions had lit-
tle impact. As in the model for vignette adjusted SWB in Table 3.4, buying IBLI
leads to higher SWB scores. The estimated coefficients on predicted IBLI as well
as lapsed IBLI in the two models are comparable. As expected, the coefficients on
predicted lapsed IBLI are negative and statistically significant. But, the positive
effect of possessing IBLI policies is significantly higher than the negative buyer’s
remorse effect. The number of TLUs owned is positively related to SWB. As be-
fore, greater household size is associated with lower SWB. Non-livestock assets
and gender are, however, statistically insignificant. The results of the regression
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of SWB relative to Borana pastoralists on the volume of TLUs insured are also
consistent with our main results in Table 3.4. The positive effect of active contracts
exceeds the negative buyer’s remorse effect of lapsed coverage. The difference is
statistically significant.
We then estimate our model using raw SWB, which has not been vignette cor-
rected, for IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured (Table B7). The results are
consistent with our main findings – SWB increases with IBLI uptake/ volume
of TLUs insured, and livestock and non-livestock wealth. Lapsed IBLI contracts
cause remorse, hence negatively impact well-being. Male household heads are
more likely to report higher SWB than female household heads. However, the co-
efficients on predicted IBLI and predicted TLUs insured are not statistically differ-
ent from the absolute value of the corresponding coefficients on lapsed predicted
IBLI uptake and predicted TLUs insured.
We also estimate our model for the balanced panel subsample to verify that
the differential weighting of households in the unbalanced panel sample does not
influence our estimates. Results for the balanced panel household sub-sample
are presented in Tables B8. Again, we find that all of the estimated coefficients
are consistent with our main results in Table 3.4. Predicted IBLI coverage and
TLU insured increase vignette adjusted SWB, while lapsed contracts reduce it.
The magnitudes of the positive effects of IBLI remain significantly higher than the
negative estimated buyer’s remorse effects, and comparable to what we find in
Table 3.4. As before, SWB rises with wealth and decreases with household size.
140
Male household heads report higher SWB.
The multiple robustness checks we conduct strongly suggest that the posi-
tive ex ante SWB effects of IBLI coverage, and the negative ex post SWB effects
of buyer’s remorse in response to a lapsed policy that did not pay out, are robust
to both definitions of subjective well-being measures, various specifications, and
variations in the relevant panel sub-sample. The effects of wealth, gender and
household size are also consistent throughout. These results give us more confi-
dence in the robustness of our results.
3.8 Conclusions
Interest in the study of subjective well-being (SWB) has increased in recent years,
as has research on index insurance in rural areas of the developing world. To date,
much of the SWB research in low-income countries has focused on the relation-
ship between SWB and income or assets. There is limited understanding of how
institutional factors, access to services, or policy-related issues influence SWB, if
at all [84]. Furthermore, few studies link policy-related variables, such as uptake
of index based livestock insurance (IBLI), with changes in SWB [122]. This study
addresses that important gap in the literature while simultaneously making an
important contribution to disentangling the ex ante and ex post welfare effects of
insurance by isolating the buyer’s remorse effect that arises from lapsed insurance
policies. Empirically, we demonstrate that index insurance such as IBLI, which re-
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duces the drought-related risk faced by pastoralists in southern Ethiopia has the
potential to impact not only material well-being – e.g., by replacing lost assets
and reducing adverse coping behaviors – but also to improve non-material well-
being, by providing valuable peace of mind for risk averse buyers even if they
can reasonably anticipate experiencing buyer’s remorse if a policy lapses without
payout.
We use three rounds of annual household panel data collected between 2012
and 2014, bracketing the introduction of IBLI in southern Ethiopia, and random-
ized encouragements to buy the product to identify the causal effect of IBLI on
SWB. We separate out the ex ante SWB effects of current coverage from the ex post
buyer’s remorse effect, exploiting the fact that some households had purchased
IBLI in the second survey round and those policies had lapsed by the third survey
round. We also show that if buyer’s remorse effects exist and there is any persis-
tence in insurance purchases, such that current and lapsed coverage are positively
correlated, then ignoring lapsed policies results in downwardly biased estimates
of the well-being effects of insurance.
We find that current IBLI coverage has a strongly positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on SWB. We also find statistically significant evidence of a buyer’s
remorse effect. The negative buyer’s remorse effect is considerably smaller in
magnitude than the positive effect of IBLI coverage, however, suggesting that the
comfort people derive from insurance coverage more than compensates for any
regret they suffer once they realize they did not need coverage. Therefore, in our
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survey sample, insurance purchase is ex ante optimal, on average.
This could reflect the nature of the sample we study. Pastoralists in southern
Ethiopia’s Borana Zone face decline in informal social insurance institutions at
a time when pastoral livelihoods are becoming more risky. As a result, Borana
pastoralists may experience greater well-being as a result of having access to index
insurance, even if it did not pay out in the short-term. These results suggest that
for people with precarious livelihoods, even an imperfect, commercially priced
insurance policy that does not pay out can leave them feeling better off.
Our findings also show that estimations of the welfare effects of insurance
ought not ignore potential ex post impacts. Prior purchases of insurance may
induce buyer’s remorse once a buyer realizes that, in retrospect, costly insur-
ance proved unnecessary. Survey-based SWB measures can capture all of these
prospective effects without resorting to strong assumptions about the arguments
and functional form of utility functions.
SWB measures seem especially appropriate to establishing the impacts of com-
mercial insurance. Commercial insurance policies, including IBLI, intrinsically
involve a tradeoff between material and non-material well-being if policies are
priced above actuarially fair premium rates so as to cover the costs of and ensure
a profit margin for the underwriter. Theory suggests that actuarially fair insur-
ance is welfare enhancing, regardless of whether it pays out, because most people
are risk averse and insurance mitigates risk. But when insurance is not actuarially
fair, and perhaps especially if it offers incomplete coverage, as is inevitably the
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case with index insurance products subject to basis risk, the ex ante expected mon-
etary loss (because premiums exceed expected indemnity payments over time)
and the ex post buyer’s remorse that might result if no insurable loss occurs, might
negate the oft-assumed benefits of insurance.
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CHAPTER 4
DIVERSIFICATION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURE:
EVIDENCE FROM UGANDA
4.1 Introduction
Climate change related rises in the incidence of adverse weather conditions in-
creased the risk of destructive disruptions to the livelihoods of rural households
who rely on rain-fed agriculture for sustenance. In much of the developing world,
the threat of whether shocks on livelihoods is further compounded by lack of ac-
cess to credit and insurance for protecting consumption and assets. Under these
circumstances, households engage in otherwise inefficient risk management prac-
tices ex ante and risk mitigating strategies ex post. Indeed, in much of Sub-Saharan
Africa, where small holder agriculture is the primary source of livelihood for 80%
of rural households, private risk bearing is commonplace [85].1 Crop diversifi-
cation is one of such private risk management strategies where farmers trade-off
returns for lower output variance.
The productivity of agricultural systems depends on physical factors such as
temperature and precipitation and the micro-climate near the earth’s surface. Ran-
dom variations in limiting physical factors may lead to fluctuations in farm pro-
1There have been increasing recent efforts to avail institutional insurance products to rural
communities. Examples of such efforts include livestock and crop index insurance products in
Ethiopia [72] and Ghana [123], and livestock index insurance in Kenya [117, 121]. However, these
are relatively new insurance instruments and their coverage is limited to small geographic areas.
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ductivity and household income. Likewise, the micro-climate influences plant
processes such as photosynthesis and transpiration and disease resistance [9, 150].
Planting multiple crops that respond differently to different environmental con-
ditions mitigates the effects of random changes in growing conditions. There are
multiple ways in which diversified cropping systems can reduce variability in
yield. First, diversification improves system resilience by increasing the range of
crops that can thrive under varying environmental conditions [160]. Thus, it re-
duces the likelihood of complete crop failures due to unpredictable rainfall and
temperature.
Second, diversification may serve as a biological constraint on the spread of
plant pathogens. Pathogen transmission may be regulated by the plant diversity
and functional composition. Variability in host density associated with increase
in diversity reduces the spread of pathogens, especially if the pathogen attacks a
narrow host range [179, 155]. Diversity may also change the micro-climatic con-
ditions of the host plant and lead to modification of the host plant’s traits [212]
allowing it to develop induced resistance to pathogens [159].
Third, diversity may limit pest infestations and weed invasions. Diversifica-
tion may restrict the range of crops that a herbivore can feed or lay eggs on and
force it to expend greater time and energy in search of acceptable hosts, which lim-
its its reproduction. Further, this also reduces the time it has to cause crop damage
[176, 13]. Companion plants in diversified systems provide beneficial arthropods
with fertile habitats and food sources. This promotes competition and enhanced
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predation of harmful pests by beneficial arthropods and reduces the density of
herbivores, stabilizing productivity.
Increase in crop diversity reduces weed population by slowing weed emer-
gence relative to crop emergence and stunting weed growth and seed production
through resource competition, allelopathy and predation. Shading by tall stature
crops reduces weed leaf nitrogen concentration, photosynthetic surface area, soil
temperature and biomass production [143, 145, 193]. This is especially true for
late emerging weeds. Early emerging crops in a diverse system may form a tight
canopy, intercepting incoming light and shade-out weed emergence [107].
By carefully selecting crop mixes, it is also possible to restrict weed growth
through allelopathy (addition of phytotoxicants into the micro environment). Al-
lelopathic chemicals released by crops may serve as weed growth regulators and
natural herbicides [171, 38, 195]. Weed species may be more susceptible to phyto-
toxic influences of other crops because of differences in seed mass. Large-seeded
crops may have superior advantage over small-seeded weeds [140, 135]. Besides
allelopathic effects, crop diversity creates a rich habitat for insects, rodents and
birds, thereby facilitating weed seed predation before it germinates [112, 197, 168].
In addition to stabilizing output, crop diversification also increases produc-
tivity through spatial, temporal and chemical inter-crop synergies. Diversity
improves biotic and abiotic resource capture, conversion, growth and alloca-
tion, especially if there is greater functional difference among component crops
[165, 142, 150]. Differences in the timing of crop emergence, development and
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maturity increases the efficiency of water, sunlight, nitrogen and other nutrients
use [199]. Early maturing crops may improve the productivity of late maturing
crops through reduced competition for resources, improved soil fertility due to
increase in soil organic matter from enhanced nutrient and carbon rhizodeposi-
tion and crop residue and improved soil water retention [66, 110, 79]. Likewise,
spatial differences in resource use such as nitrogen sourcing (soil vs. atmospheric)
of legumes and cereals, or differences in rooting depth, which determines ex-
traction depth of water and nutrients, increases productivity. Leguminous crops
are known to improve soil nitrogen content through their ability to extract at-
mospheric nitrogen, thereby reducing inter-specific competition for soil nitrogen
[165, 9, 23]. Allelopathic effects of crops on herbivores and weeds may also re-
duce competition for resources and pest attacks and improve the productivity of
component crops [141, 10].
The inter-crop dynamics associated with crop diversification has drawn a great
deal of interest in the economics literature, though the focus has often been on
risk management and mitigation roles of diversity [201, 4, 196, 43, 56]. More re-
cently, however, there is a growing interest in the productivity effects of diversity
[50, 129, 163]. Much of the evidence on productivity gains from crop diversifi-
cation is from studies conducted on experimental plots [106, 68]. Studies on the
relationship between diversification and productivity in observed on-farm prac-
tices are, however, surprisingly limited. To the extent that observed cropping
patterns reflect the social and economic context in which agricultural production
takes place, understanding the key incentives and constraints that shape farmers’
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production decisions is crucial for effective policy prescriptions.
The existing literature on observed crop diversification tends to focus on pro-
duction environment dominated by a few crops [129] or multiple varieties of a
single crop [76]. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa, crop production is often a multi-
crop enterprise in which farmers produce multiple crops on small plots using tra-
ditional methods following natural rainfall cycles. This leads to complex below-
ground and above-ground inter-crop dynamics, which depend on crop type, crop
management practices and environmental factors. A better understanding of on-
farm crop dynamics in this setting would require an approach that covers a broad
range of crops.
In order to devise appropriate policies to effect a desired change in the ru-
ral economy, policy makers would need to have clarity on the prime motives for
farmers’ observed crop diversification. If risk management is the prime driver of
an otherwise inefficient crop mix choice by farmers, interventions through crop
insurance provisions would be relevant. If increasing productivity by exploiting
inter-crop synergy is the main determinant of farmers’ cropping choices, perhaps
relaxing constraints to such ventures through input and output market interven-
tions might be required. All of these point to the need to comprehend farmers
cropping decision processes. This paper studies the contributions of observed
crop diversification practices to productivity and risk management. The linear
moments model in [15] is adapted to examine the relationship between crop di-
versification and crop yield and yield variance. A third moment of yield (skew-
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ness) – a measure of downside risk aversion – is included to distinguish between
random low draws from random high draws.2
This paper has two main objectives. First, it examines the contributions of
mean, variance and skewness in crop choice, with a particular focus on determin-
ing whether yield and/ or risk are the primary considerations in crop decisions.
Second, it studies whether crop complementarity effects (yield and variance) vary
with crop plot area.
To this end, I use three rounds of the Uganda National Panel Survey data,
which track a nationally representative sample of 2,356 households over a five
year period between 2009/10–2013/14. The surveys cover a broad range of topics
encompassing household characteristics, education, health, labor market status,
assets, income and consumption, shocks and food security, infrastructure and ser-
vices, agriculture, and access to various services. Each survey round covers two
farming seasons. Thus, a total of six data rounds are used in the analysis.
The results of the paper, though not causal, provide suggestive evidence that
crop diversification decisions in Uganda are mainly derived by yield consider-
ations. Mixed cropping is associated with increase in the average yield of all
crops except sorghum. I find little evidence that variance reduction is a prime mo-
tive in farmers’ crop diversification decisions. Nor is there strong evidence that
2Output variance is undesirable to the extent it leads to low outcomes. For a constant variance,
a distribution with positive skewness (greater probability of high yield) is preferable. Including
the third moment of yield addresses this qualitative difference in the observations at the tail ends
of yield distribution.
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skewness considerations are important in crop diversification decisions, though
increase in land allocations to some crops appears to be associated with increase
in yield skewness of other crops.
The yield gains associated with crop diversification arise only on small plots.
There are significant yield gains to farms in the bottom farm size quantile. These
gains vanish for farms in the third or higher quantiles. I also find that productiv-
ity decreases with plot size for all major crops in Uganda. This result is consistent
with the inverse farm productivity-size relationship. Larger plots are also associ-
ated with high yield variance. This is, however, mitigated by positive skewness,
hence greater probability of high yield draws, associated with larger plots.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
conceptual framework of the study. Section 3 discusses the data and presents
summary statistics. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses
the main results. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Conceptual Framework
Consider a multi-output farm household making crop production decision to
maximize the expected utility of end of farming season income y. Suppose the
production technology of crop j is given by q j = h(x j, x− j, v j), where q j is output
quantity of crop j, x j is a vector of inputs allocated to crop j, and v j is a random
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error term distributed v j ∼ N(0, σ2v j). The output level q j depends on the quantity
of inputs used in crop j and other crops − j due to synergistic and competitive
relationships between crops. The interdependence of crop yields arises because
of cross-sectional nutrient, disease/ pest, water and sunlight complementary/
rival effects and inter-temporal nitrogen carry-over in multi-crop systems. The
random variable v j reflects crop yield uncertainty. There are two sources of un-
certainty: the production technology, which is known only up to a joint density
F(q1, q2, ..., qk), and factors beyond the farm household’s control, such as rainfall.
The farm household’s utility maximizing problem can be specified as:
max
q1,...,qk
E {u[y(q, p)]} =
∫
u[y(q, p)]dF(q) (4.1)
where u(.) is von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, q = (q1, q2, ..., qk) is a
vector of output quantities and p = (p1, p2, ..., pk) is a vector of exogenous prices.
The function u(y) is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave
(u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0) and marginal utility is convex, u′′′(.) > 0. In the expected-utility
framework, the concavity of the utility function is sufficient for risk aversion. The
general notion of risk aversion involves the spread of the probability weight from
the center irrespective of the “placement” of the risk. Any mean-variance pre-
serving transformation of a distribution obtained by shifting probability weight
from one tail to the other will have the same risk aversion as the original distri-
bution. The notion of “downside risk aversion”3 concerns with the distribution of
probability weight around the tails of a distribution [152]. For the same mean and
3The concept of downside risk aversion is equivalent to the concept of “prudence” defined by
[130].
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variance, a distribution is said to have more downside risk if it has more disper-
sion around the left tail (skewed to the left). This is equivalent to positive third
derivative of the utility function u′′′(.) > 0 [152, 130].
Following [170], the expected utility E[u(y)] can be written as:
E[u(y)] = u[E(y) − pi] (4.2)
where pi > 0 is a risk premium measuring the maximum amount one is will-
ing to forgo to avoid risk exposure. The certainty equivalent φ = E(y) − pi is the
minimum amount one is willing to accept for the risky prospect y, with u′(pi) < 0.
In equation (4.2), the marginal utility effect of producing crop j, ∂E[u(y)]
∂q j
has two
components: marginal expected income effect ∂E(y)
∂q j
and marginal risk effect ∂pi
∂q j
.
Since u′(.) > 0, the farm household makes crop production decisions to maximize
expected income and reduce risk, which depend on crop yield and yield risk, for
given inputs (especially land area) and exogenous prices. In a multi-cropping sys-
tem, this return-risk relationship is complex. Some crops may increase/decrease
the expected yield of other crops or increase/decrease variance. The equilibrium
condition involves equating the utility weighted difference in marginal expected
income effect and marginal risk effect across crops:
q∗j =
{
q j :
∂E(y)
∂q j
− ∂pi
∂q j
=
∂E(y)
∂q− j
− ∂pi
∂q− j
, ∀ j,− j ∈ k
}
. (4.3)
Using Taylor series approximation, the components of (4.2) can be restated as:
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E[u(y)] = u(µ) +
u′′(µ)
2
E[(y − µ)2] + u
′′′(µ)
6
E[(y − µ)3]
u[E(y) − pi] = u(µ) − piu′(µ),
(4.4)
where E(y) = µ is expected income. After simple rearrangement, (4.4) yields
pi = −1
2
u′′(µ)
u′(µ)
E[(y − µ)2] − 1
6
u′′′(µ)
u′(µ)
E[(y − µ)3]
= −1
2
u′′(µ)
u′(µ)
E[(y − µ)2] − 1
6
u′′′(µ)
u′′(µ)
u′′(µ)
u′(µ)
E[(y − µ)3].
(4.5)
Define variance as σ2y = E[(y−µ)2] and skewness as σ3y = E[(y−µ)3]. Thus, (4.5)
can be written more intuitively as:
pi =
1
2
r2σ2y −
1
6
r2r3σ3y (4.6)
where r2 = −u′′(µ)u′(µ) , is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient and
r3 = −u′′′(µ)u′′(µ) is Kimball’s absolute prudence, which measures an individual’s aver-
sion to downside risk [130]. By strict concavity of u(.), r2 > 0 and by convexity of
u′(.), r3 > 0. Equation (4.6) produces interesting insights. First, the relationship
between risk premium and risk aversion depends on the shape of the distribu-
tion of income. For a symmetric or negatively skewed distribution (σ3y ≤ 0), more
risk averse individuals have higher risk premium, ∂pi
∂r2
> 0. If income is positively
skewed (σ3y > 0), however, risk aversion is risk premium increasing only if r3 <
3σ2y
σ3y
.
Second, ∂pi
2
∂r2∂r3
< 0 if σ3y > 0 indicating that prudence, defined as the propensity to
prepare oneself in the face of uncertainty [130], reduces the effect of risk aversion
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on the risk premium one requires to engage in risky prospects if income is posi-
tively skewed. The opposite is true if income has negatively skewed distribution,
σ3y < 0.
Applying the identity φ = µ − pi to (4.6) yields
φ = µ − 1
2
r2σ2y +
1
6
r2r3σ3y (4.7)
which summarizes certainty equivalent as the sum of three terms: expected
income, variance, and skewness. Thus, the farm household’s problem can be ex-
pressed as the maximization of the certainty equivalent.
max
q1,...,qk
φ = µ − 1
2
r2σ2y +
1
6
r2r3σ3y (4.8)
The expected utility effect of the household’s crop production decision ∂E[u(y)]
∂q j
is, therefore, congruent to the effects of crop choice on the certainty equivalence φ,
∂φ
∂q j
. Thus, expected utility is positively related to expected income and skewness,
and negatively related to variance. That is, the production of a particular crop j is
desirable in so far as it increases expected income and the odds of higher random
income, and reduces income variance.
[15] provides a simple moment based approach for analyzing the return-risk
dynamics described in (4.8).4 It allows recursive component-by-component anal-
4The point of departure in the moment based approach is that the probability distribution of
output is fully described by its moments. The production behavior of farm households under
uncertainty can, thus, be summarized by the relationship between inputs and moments of output
[15]. The first three moments are generally thought to sufficiently approximate the distribution of
random variables [78].
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ysis of the effects of mean, variance and skewness on the production decisions
of farm households. This comes in handy when the production system concerns
joint production of multiple crops. The moment based approach starts with a gen-
eral parameterization of the probability distribution of output rather than the pro-
duction function. Since the range of values of crop output is finite, the sufficient
condition for unique characterization of the probability distribution is satisfied
and all moments exist [15].
Suppose q j is output j of a farm household, x j = (x j0, x j1, ..., x jm) is input vector
where x j0 = 1, α j = (α j0, α j1, ..., α jm) and β j = (β j0λ, β j1λ, ..., β jmλ) are vectors of coeffi-
cients, u j and ε jλ are random error terms, and f (.) and gλ(.) are linear functions of
x j. The stochastic mean function is defined as:
q j = f (x j, α j) + u j, E(u j) = 0, i = 1, ..., n. (4.9)
The first moment of output naturally follows as:
E(q j) = µ j1 = f (x j, α j). (4.10)
Higher moments are defined as
µ jλ = E(q j − µ j1)λ = E(uλj ), λ ≥ 2. (4.11)
The probability distribution of output is assumed to be linear in moments with
higher order residual terms of the form
uλj = gλ(x j, β jλ) + ε jλ, E(ε jλ) = 0. (4.12)
156
Under some regularity assumptions, consistent estimates of αˆ j and βˆ jλ can
be obtained using least square estimator [15]. Since variance and skewness are
linear functions of inputs, however, the residuals of the mean function are het-
eroskedastic and standard errors are inefficient. Equations (4.10) and (4.11) can be
estimated separately or as a system of equations using Generalized Least Square
(GLS), which addresses heteroskedasticity problems.
The mean function in (4.10) is concave and increasing in inputs. Thus, its par-
tial derivatives with respect to inputs are all expected to be positive (∂µ j1/∂x j =
α j > 0). On the other hand, the effects of inputs on the variance and skewness
of output are empirical questions. If an input is variance increasing (decreasing),
∂µ j2/∂x j = βi2 > 0(< 0). Likewise, if an input is skewness increasing (decreasing),
∂µ j3/∂x j = β j3 > 0(< 0).
4.3 Data
This paper uses the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS) data, which were col-
lected by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) under the Living Standards
Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) project.5
The UNPS collected four rounds of nationally representative panel data on 2,356
5The LSMS–ISA project implements multi-topic nationally representative panel household data
in eight Sub-Saharan Africa countries: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Tan-
zania, and Uganda. In collaboration with national statistics offices, it collects comprehensive data
on household characteristics, agriculture, non-farm enterprises, and access to various services,
among others.
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households in 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12 and 2013/14. Data from the first three
rounds of the survey are used in this paper. The survey covers a broad range of
topics encompassing household characteristics, education, health, labor market
status, assets, income and consumption, shocks and food security, infrastructure
and services, agriculture, and access to various services.
Uganda is divided into four regions (Central, Western, Eastern and Southern)
and, as of 2009/10, 80 districts and one city (Kampala). All 80 districts and Kam-
pala were covered in UNPS. Selection of survey households follows stratified
re-sampling of households who were part of the Uganda National Household
Survey (UNHS) in 2005/06. Stratification was implemented at the urban/rural
and district level, with strata of representativeness defined at Kampala City, other
Urban Areas, Central Rural, Eastern Rural, Western Rural and Northern Rural.
Within each strata, Enumeration Areas (EAs) were randomly selected from a pool
of EAs covered in UNHS. Households were, then, randomly selected from each
selected EA.
The UNPS 2009/10 round started with 2,975 households distributed over 318
EAs, of which 88% were original UNHS 2005/06 households and the remain-
ing 12% were split–off households.6 In terms of geographic distribution, 74% of
the 2009/10 sample households were rural and 26% urban. In the 2010/11 and
6UNPS set out to track 3,123 households from 322 EAs, from which 643 households (20% of
sample) were selected for split-off tracking. It managed to track 2,607 original and 368 split-off
households, for a total of 2,975 households (UNPS Wave I report 2011, p. 13-14). Split-off house-
holds are UNHS 2005/06 household members who have since moved to different locations and
were tracked in the UNPS.
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2011/12 follow up rounds, 83% of households were tracked and re-interviewed.7
In response to attrition, sampling weights have been adjusted in the later rounds.
The surveys were conducted over a 12 month period in two visits to each sam-
ple household in every round. This design reflects the seasonality associated with
production and consumption due to the two cropping seasons (January to June
and July to December) in Uganda. During each visit, detailed data on household
assets including size and characteristics of parcels and plots, crops planted, farm-
ing practices, input use, and harvest were collected.
Households are tracked between farming seasons and survey periods, whereas
parcels are tracked between farming seasons within a survey year but not between
survey years. Plots change both between farming periods and survey years. Thus,
the plot level data were aggregated to the parcel level for panel tracking purposes.
This aggregation may lead to loss of interesting within and between plot yield dy-
namics. However, there is no such concern for single plot parcels, which account
for the majority of parcels in 2011/12 (57%), or mono crop plots. Moreover, the
fact that average parcel size in Uganda is small (0.4 hectares) indicates the poten-
tial underestimation of inter-crop synergies is minimal. Because of these tracking
limitations of the data, the empirical analysis is done at the parcel level.
The plot level data do not distinguish between intercrops (mixed, row, relay
etc.) and specialized partitioned sub-plots. Thus, mixed stand is defined in this
7The reasons for leaving the sample includes migration to unknown location, household disin-
tegration, death of whole household, and refusal to respond.
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paper as the production of multiple crops on a parcel irrespective of cropping pat-
terns at the plot level. That is, a parcel that consists of two plots, each specialized
in a single crop is considered a mixed stand parcel as is a parcel that consists of
two plots, each planted with multiple crops. A parcel is considered pure stand if
it is planted with a single crop, which may include single plot parcels and parcels
consisting of multiple plots, all planted with the same crop. While this definition
is not precise, it captures some of the below-ground and above-ground dynamics
between crops. In the case of a parcel made up of multiple specialized sub-plots,
for example, this dynamics could result from trapping, repelling and predation.
A crop planted on a plot may attract insects and birds that attack pests and weed
harmful to crops planted on adjacent plots. This same process may enhance cross-
pollination and seed fertilization.
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
In this paper, I focus on the eight most important crops in Uganda: maize,
sorghum, beans, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, cassava and matoke (plantains).
These crops account for roughly 75% of land area planted in the 2011/12 sur-
vey round. As shown in Table 4.1, there is no single dominant crop. Rather, a few
crops, each with significant land share, characterize crop production in Uganda.
The main crops are maize, beans and matoke, with a combined land share of 40%,
while coffee comes out least with about 5% of land area allocation. This combined
with the fact that over 60% of parcels are inter-cropped points to the considerable
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crop diversification in Ugandan agriculture (see Table 4.5). Moreover, these crops
encompass a broad range of crop categories – cereals, legumes and tubers – and
offer rich diversity to capture inter-crop dynamics.
Table 4.1: Land shares allocated to crops (%) in 2011/12
Cropping Cropping
Crops season 1 season 2
Maize 0.13 0.14
Sorghum 0.04 0.04
Beans 0.13 0.14
Groundnuts 0.08 0.04
Sweet potatoes 0.07 0.09
Cassava 0.08 0.09
Matoke 0.13 0.16
Coffee 0.04 0.06
All 0.75 0.76
Note: This table shows the share of cultivated land
allocated to different crops in 2011/12 by cropping
season. Cropping season 1 stands for the January–
June/August farming season and cropping season
2 covers the August/September–December farming
season.
Tables 4.2–4.4 present household and land (parcel) summary statistics for
2011/12. The 2011/12 sample households are predominantly rural, with 83% of
households residing in rural areas. About 92% households are male headed, of
which 98% are married. On average, the household head is 41 years old and has
6.4 years of schooling. The average age of the spouse is 35 and he/she has aver-
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age schooling of 5.3 years. Average household size is 6, while dependency ratio,
defined as the ratio of number of household members younger than 15 or older
than 64 to working age members (15-64), is very high at 124%. In total, 28% of
households report experiencing some shock in 2011/12, the most common being
drought, which 20% households experienced, followed by flooding at 6%.
Table 4.2: Household characteristics in 2011/12
Variables mean std. error obs.
Urban/rural (rural=1) 0.83 0.018 2,850
HH head gender (male=1) 0.92 0.010 2,850
HH head age 40.83 0.569 2,833
HH head marital status (married=1) 0.98 0.003 2,845
HH head schooling 6.41 0.159 2,835
HH size 5.84 0.110 2,850
HH dependency ratio 1.24 0.030 2,850
Spouse age 34.49 0.500 1,918
Spouse schooling 5.27 0.155 2,835
Shocks: drought 0.20 0.019 2,809
Shocks: flood 0.06 0.011 2,809
Shocks: erosion 0.01 0.003 2,809
Shocks: pest 0.02 0.006 2,809
Note: This table presents household summary statistics for the 2011/12
UNPS survey round. For ease of presentation the shorthand HH is
used for ”household”. The marriage dummy treats divorced/separated,
widow/widower and never married as single. It also doesn’t distinguish
between monogamous and polygamous marriage.
Farm parcels display considerable variation in terms of ownership, remote-
ness, soil quality and topography. The majority of land is owner operated and
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within an hour walking distance from homestead. The soil in three-quarters of
parcels is sand loam or sandy clay loam.8 The soil type on a parcel, to a great ex-
tent, determines the suitability of the parcel for growing a variety of crops. Gener-
ally, sandy soils tend to be low in organic matter and native fertility, low in ability
to retain moisture but allow greater movement of water and air. At the other end
of the spectrum, clays are more fertile and have high water retention but poor
aeration and can crack when dry, damaging crop roots.
Soil type is strongly linked to topography. Topography affects the formation of
soils through its influence on micro-climate, vegetation and water runoff.9 In the
UNPS sample, over 85% of parcels have flat or gentle slope orientation allowing
the parent material in the soil to stay in place and develop. This is reflected in
the subjective assessment of soil quality where 99% parcels are reported to have
“good” or “fair” quality soil. Rain-fed agriculture is by far the dominant mode of
crop production.
On average, a household operates 2 parcels, each consisting of 2 plots, on a
total cultivated land area of 0.8 hectares (see Table 4.5). Multiple cropping is the
most common system with 61% of total land area planted, the remaining 39%
being pure-stand. At 0.45 hectares, multi-crop parcels tend to be considerably
larger than pure-stand parcels, which average 0.27 hectares.
8The difference between these soil types is in the composition of sand, silt and clay, which
differ in terms of particle size (sand, >63 micrometer (0.001mm); silt >2 micrometer; and clay <2
micrometer).
9Summary statistics on farm slope and elevation are given in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.3: Land (parcel) characteristics
Variables proportion std. error obs.
Land ownership
Owned 0.77 0.012 4,781
Use rights only 0.23 0.012 4,781
Distance from homestead to parcel
Less than 15 minutes 0.53 0.013 4,781
15 - 30 minutes 0.17 0.011 4,781
30 - 60 minutes 0.17 0.013 4,781
1 - 2 hours 0.09 0.008 4,781
Over 2 hours 0.04 0.008 4,781
Soil type
Sand loam 0.44 0.020 4,781
Sandy clay loam 0.31 0.020 4,781
Black clay 0.18 0.014 4,781
Other 0.07 0.009 4,781
Soil quality
Good 0.63 0.017 4,781
Fair 0.36 0.017 4,781
Poor 0.02 0.003 4,781
Topography
Hilly 0.09 0.014 4,781
Flat 0.49 0.022 4,781
Gentle slope 0.37 0.018 4,781
Steep slope 0.04 0.006 4,781
Valley 0.02 0.003 4,781
Water source
Irrigated 0.01 0.002 4,781
Rain-fed 0.98 0.004 4,781
Swamp/ wetland 0.01 0.003 4,781
Note: This table shows parcel summary statistics for the 2011/12 UNPS round.
All variables are self reported. The distance variable measures time to parcel
by foot (walking).
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Table 4.4: Agro-ecology and “connectedness” of homestead in 2011/12
Variables mean std. error Obs.
Distance to major road (km) 7.26 0.448 2,740
Distance to pop. center +20,000 (km) 21.96 1.001 2,740
Distance to nearest market (km) 28.45 1.039 2,740
Slope (%) 7.35 0.438 2,740
Elevation (m) 1,234.42 15.325 2,740
Annual rainfall (mm) 1,293.70 9.958 2,740
Note: This table presents various measures of proximity of homestead to ser-
vices in kilometers km. It also presents measured land characteristics at home-
stead. m and mm stand for meter and millimeter, respectively.
Table 4.5: Land characteristics in 2011/12 at the parcel level
Variables Mean Std. error Unit Obs.
Parcels per HH (#) 2.06 0.049 Parcel 4,781
Plots per parcel (#) 1.94 0.051 Parcel 4,781
Plots per HH (#) 3.65 0.084 Parcel 4,781
Cropping system
Pure stand (%) 0.39 0.015 Parcel 4,495*
Inter-cropped (%) 0.61 0.015 Parcel 4,495*
Total land area (ha) 0.80 0.022 Household 2,163
Parcel area (ha) 0.39 0.013 Parcel 3,886
Pure stand (ha) 0.27 0.011 Parcel 4,495*
Inter-cropped (ha) 0.45 0.015 Parcel 4,495*
Note: *For 625 parcels, the cropping system has changed from pure stand
to inter-cropped between cropping seasons one and two. These are counted
twice (once fore each cropping system) in computing these statistics.
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Table 4.6 shows average crop yield by cropping system. For each crop, yield
is higher under multi-crop systems. It is particularly high in the case of maize,
beans, and groundnuts with multi-crop parcel yields almost twice as much as
pure-stand. As shown in Table 4.7, some of the yield differential can be explained
by differences in input use. Except for labor (both household and hired), more
inputs are used per hectare on multi-crop parcels than pure-stand parcels.
4.3.2 Yield and cropping patterns
This section describes the yield patterns of major crops in Uganda under differ-
ent cropping systems and crop-mix conditions. For presentation purposes, I focus
on the most important crop – maize. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of maize,
beans, cassava and matoke yield under pure stand and multi-crop (mixed stand)
systems.10 The top left panel presents average maize yield for pure stand (solid
line) and mixed stand (long dash) parcels. The average maize yield under mixed
stand is substantially higher than pure stand yield. Maize yield distribution un-
der mixed stand has less density around the mode and fatter tails, suggesting
higher variance. From simple inspection, it is clear that the higher variance is due
to positive maize yield skewness. Likewise, the beans yield distribution panel
(top right) shows that mixed stand parcels generate greater yield but are riskier.
The relatively higher variance is, however, primarily due to positive skewness of
10A complete set of yield distributions for all seven crops in the analysis sample is shown in
Figures C1 and C2.
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Table 4.6: Crop yield by cropping system
Difference
Crops Pure stand Mixed stand Pure-Mixed
Maize 12.74 25.84 -13.10***
(1.225) (1.469) (1.810)
Sorghum 6.48 8.34 -1.86**
(0.579) (0.840) (0.944)
Beans 5.79 10.92 -5.13***
(0.465) (0.385) (0.582)
Groundnuts 6.20 10.27 -4.07***
(0.703) (0.665) (0.903)
Sweet potatoes 30.21 42.55 -12.34***
(2.018) (2.076) (2.538)
Cassava 24.06 38.45 -14.39***
(2.273) (2.364) (3.140)
Matoke 48.50 53.61 -5.11*
(4.192) (2.826) (3.595)
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table shows output per hectare measured in quin-
tals for each of the seven crops in the analysis sample. It shows
that yield is significantly different between pure stand and mixed
stand cropping systems.
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Table 4.7: Inputs per hectare in 2011/12
Difference
Variables Pure stand Mixed stand Pure-Mixed
Parcel area (ha) 0.273 0.442 -0.169***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012)
Used organic fertilizer (%) 0.037 0.073 -0.036***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Used inorganic fertilizer (%) 0.010 0.028 -0.017**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Used pesticides (%) 0.031 0.059 -0.028***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Organic fertilizer (kg) 52.598 61.356 -8.843
(16.467) (9.070) (16.141)
Inorganic fertilizer (kg) 1.252 0.817 0.432
(0.529) (0.383) (0.646)
Pesticides (kg) 0.157 0.200 -0.043
(0.042) (0.046) (0.056)
Labor days: total 207.589 186.894 20.316**
(9.678) (6.078) (9.295)
Labor days: HH member 196.626 176.623 19.643**
(9.260) (6.035) (8.838)
Labor days: hired 8.665 7.470 1.179
(1.188) (0.631) (1.265)
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table presents input use by cropping systems. The figures shown in rows
5-10 are quantity of input used per hectare.
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Note: For presentation purposes, maize and beans yield are trimmed at 50Q/ha
whereas cassava and matookee yield are trimmed at 100Q/ha.
Note: Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of maize, beans, cassava and matoke yield by cropping
system. The solid line shows yield when each crop is planted as pure stand while the dashed-
line shows yield for mixed stand. The vertical dashed lines are the average yield level for pure
stand (PS mean) and mixed stand (MS mean). The mixed stand doesn’t distinguish between any
specific sets of crop combinations. If two more crops are planted on a parcel, the cropping sys-
tem is considered mixed stand. It also doesn’t distinguish between inter-cropping and multiple
specialized plots on a parcel.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of yield by cropping system
The distribution of cassava and matoke yield in the bottom half of Figure 4.1 do
not display as sharp a contrast between pure stand and mixed stand parcels as the
top half. The mean cassava yield is higher under mixed stand system with fatter
and longer tail compared to pure-stand.11 Bar the slight difference in average
11For presentation purposes, the graph is shown for output less than 100 quintal per hectare. In
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yield, mixed stand matoke yield is practically indistinguishable from pure stand.
Overall, these results show that mixed stand parcels have greater yield but also
involve higher variance, perhaps primarily due to higher skewness.
Figure 4.2 presents maize yield distribution under different crop-mix condi-
tions.12 The top left panel suggests that pure stand stochastically dominates mixed
stand of maize and sorghum. The mass of the distribution shifts to the left while
variance remains about the same. The situation is completely different in the
maize-beans top right panel. Compared to pure stand, the maize yield distri-
bution shifts to the right under maize-beans mixed stand systems: mean yield is
higher and variance lower. With the maize-cassava mixed stand in the bottom left
panel, it is difficult to make a conclusive assessment based on visual inspection.
Based purely on mean and variance, though mixed stand appears superior to pure
stand, the likelihood of very high yields, albeit with greater risk, are reduced with
mixed stand system. For the maize-matoke mix, mixed stand is unambiguously
superior to pure stand, it involves higher yield but similar variance.
The change in maize yield as the diversity of crop-mix changes is summa-
rized in Figure 4.3. It shows that, the maize-beans mix trumps not only pure
stand maize or maize-sorghum mix, but also the maize, sorghum and beans mix.
Though variance appears higher, albeit positively skewed, average yield is much
higher for the maize-beans mix as shown by the fact that its yield distribution lies
the complete graph, the distribution of mixed stand cassava yield is considerably longer than that
of pure stand.
12Figure C3 presents the yield distribution of maize under various crop-mixes for greater num-
ber of the major crops in the analysis sample.
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Note: For presentation purposes, yield is trimmed at 100Q/ha in all panels.
Note: Figure 4.2 shows maize yield under different crop mix conditions. Panel (1) compares the
distribution of pure stand maize yield with with maize-sorghum mixed stand. In panel (2) pure
stand maize yield is compared with maize yield from a maize-beans mixed stand. Panels (3)
and (4) present the pure stand maize yield vs. the two main root crops in Uganda –cassava and
matoke, respectively. Mixed stand includes inter-cropping as well as specialized plots in multi-
crop parcels.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of maize yield under pure stand and various dual-
crop mixed stand
above and to the right of the three-crop mix for much of the range of values of
yield.13
13Appendix Figure C4 expands this to show maize yield under various crop combinations and
diversity intensities.
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Note: The distribution of maize yield under changing of corp mix conditions are presented in
Figure 4.3. It compares the evolution of maize yield as maize parcels are mixed gradually with
sorghum, beans, and finally both sorghum and beans. The definition of mixed stand doesn’t
distinguish between inter-cropping and multi-crop parcels with specialized plots.
Figure 4.3: Maize yield under changing and diverse crop-mixes
4.4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical estimation strategy proceeds in two steps. First the mean equation
is estimated using qi jkt = f (xi jkt, αk) + ui jkt, where i, j, k, and t represent household,
parcel, crop and panel round, respectively, and u is a random error term with
mean zero. The residual from equation uˆi jkt = qi jkt − f (xi jkt, αˆk) is then used to
estimate the parameters of the higher order moments as uˆλi jkt = g(xi jkt, βkλ)+εi jktλ, λ =
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2, 3 and E(εi jktλ) = 0. A good approximation of the mean equation is especially
crucial since the higher order residual terms are correlated with inputs xi jkt [15].
Thus, to estimate the moment functions for each crop k, the production function
is specified as
ln qi jt = α0 +
m∑
m=1
αm ln xi jmt + w′itγ + z
′
jtδ + pit + ηv + ui jt
uˆλi jt = β0λ +
m∑
m=1
βmλ ln xi jmt + w′itθλ + z
′
jtφλ + pitλ + ηvλ + εi jtλ, λ = 2, 3
(4.13)
where q is output per hectare (yield), xm is quantity of input m, w is a vector of
household characteristics, z is a vector of parcel characteristics, pi is time dummy,
η is village fixed effect, and u and ε are random error terms.
The inputs xm include conventional inputs such as land, labor, fertilizer, pesti-
cides, and seeds. Crop yields are measured in grain equivalent quintal per hectare.
Labor is measured in total labor days by household members and hired workers
with no regard to gender and age. Fertilizer is measured in kilograms (kg). It
includes both organic (manure, compost and seaweed) and inorganic/chemical
(nitrogen, phosphate, potash and mixed complex) fertilizers. Pesticides are mea-
sured in kg and include insecticides, fungicides, fumigants, herbicides and roden-
ticides. Seed is measured in Ugandan Shillings, because data on seed quantity are
available only for the 2011/12 round.14
14Using a dummy variable for the type of seeds used (1 if improved seeds, and 0 otherwise)
doesn’t have much effect on the broad findings. Likewise data on draught animals used aren’t
available for all rounds. This, however, doesn’t appear to be a major problem as only 8% of house-
holds report using animals for draught power in 2011/12, and is thus dropped.
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To reflect the interdependence of crop productivity in multi-crop systems,
which characterize agriculture in Uganda, land allocations to other crops are in-
cluded in (4.13). This allows output to be complementary with some crops and
rival with others.15 The set of household level controls included are age, gender,
schooling and marital status of the household head, spouse schooling, household
size, and average age and schooling of the household. The parcel specific vari-
ables in z are elevation, soil type, soil quality, topography, a dummy variable for
water source (1 if the parcel is irrigated, and 0 otherwise), and precipitation. Time
(round × cropping season) dummy is included to control for factors such as gov-
ernment policy, which are common to all parcels within a period but vary over
time. Village dummies are included to control for factors that have a common
effect on productivity within a village but vary across villages, such as access to
inputs, credit, and extension services, and administrative bureaucracy.
By construction, ui j in (4.13) is correlated with higher moments of q, thus, het-
eroskedastic. Estimation of the parameters of the model by ordinary least squares
(OLS) would lead to suspect inference. To address this problem, parameters of the
model are estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) type estimator, which
allows an arbitrary correlation between error terms and non-linear functions of
the regressors. Joint production in multi-output systems further complicates the
estimation challenge since crop production decisions are likely correlated, leading
to violation of the classical assumption E(ui jk, ui jl) = 0. As a result, equation-by-
15For example, legumes such as peas and soybeans are known to have symbiotic nitrogen-fixing
bacteria, whereas potatoes are known to reduce soil productivity. The productivity of cereals may,
thus, vary depending on other jointly produced crops.
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equation estimation of (4.13) would lead to inefficient estimates. I address this
issue by estimating the model by a system estimator that allows contemporane-
ous correlation of errors across equations. Further, for a given crop, errors are
likely to be correlated over time due to observed and unobserved omitted vari-
ables. However, since the unit of analysis in this paper, parcel, cannot be tracked
over time, distributed lag models cannot be employed to account for potential er-
ror correlation. To address this issue, errors are allowed to be correlated arbitrarily
over time. The model is estimated using system generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator. Standard errors are clustered at the EA level.
The production function in (4.13) is specified as a log-linear model, allowing a
straight forward interpretation of estimated coefficients. In the yield function, co-
efficients measure input elasticity of yield. Likewise, in the variance and skewness
equations, estimated coefficients are input elasticities of variance and skewness.
In transforming level variables into logs, I use inverse hyperbolic sine transforma-
tion to circumvent the challenges imposed by the relatively large number of zero
values for inputs in the sample.16
The choice of log-linear production function is due to its relative ease of esti-
mation for a relatively large system such as this, despite its well known limitations
[100]. As a robustness check, I estimate a restricted translog production function
16The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is defined as: log(x) ≈ log(x +
√
(x2 + 1)).
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of the form
ln qi jt = α0 +
m∑
m=1
αm ln xi jmt +
m∑
m=1
m∑
l=1
αml ln xi jmt ln xi jlt + w′itγ + z
′
jtδ + pit + ηv + ui jt
(uˆi jt)λ = β0λ +
m∑
m=1
γmλ ln xi jmt +
m∑
m=1
m∑
l=1
βmlλ ln xi jmt ln xi jlt + w′itλθλ + z
′
jtφλ + pitλ + ηvλ + εi jtλ,
λ = 2, 3.
(4.14)
Restriction on interaction terms is necessary due to the large number of crops
in the system (seven). Only conventional inputs are allowed to interact to cap-
ture potential complementarity and rivalry between inputs in production, while
land allocations for other crops enter linearly. The results are consistent with the
estimated coefficients of the log-linear model in (4.13) and are reported in the ap-
pendix.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Mean equations
Table 4.8 presents elasticity estimates of the mean function. The estimated system
of equations achieves high goodness of fit for all seven equations with R2 upwards
of 0.65. Average crop yield is positively related to labor input for each of the seven
crops. This may indicate that greater labor input would allow better farm man-
agement at different stages of crop production. During land preparation, it would
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enable repeat tillage to turn deep soils and bring fresh nutrients to the surface as
well as allow better aeration. More labor days for weeding, attending to crops,
and keeping out pest birds and other animals during the vegetative and repro-
ductive cycles of crop growth may increase yield. Later on, greater availability of
labor may enable timely harvesting (cutting), threshing, winnowing and storing
of crop and reduce waste. The estimated elasticities are also large. A one per-
cent increase in labor days is associated with 0.9% increase in mean maize yield
and 0.8% increase in mean sorghum, beans and groundnuts yield. Likewise, a
one percent increase in labor days is associated with over one percent increases
in average cassava and matoke yield. These results point to the potential for pro-
ductivity gains through conventional input intensification.
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Table 4.8: GMM estimates of mean yield elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Sweet
log crop yield Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
Log labor (days) 0.941∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Log fertilizer (kg) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.011 0.062∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.024) (0.020) (0.015) (0.006)
Log seed value (USh) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.001 0.030∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015)
Log pesticides (kg) -0.196∗∗∗ -1.023∗∗∗ -0.061 -0.560∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.056) (0.255) (0.077) (0.127) (0.105) (0.087) (0.075)
Log maize plot (ht) -1.983∗∗∗ -0.023 0.385∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.018) (0.046) (0.028) (0.047) (0.044) (0.052)
Log sorghum plot (ht) -0.079 -2.278∗∗∗ 0.046 0.126∗∗ 0.146 0.018 0.036
(0.108) (0.058) (0.095) (0.056) (0.095) (0.088) (0.105)
Log beans plot (ht) 0.452∗∗∗ 0.001 -2.639∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.022) (0.074) (0.034) (0.058) (0.054) (0.064)
Log groundnuts plot (ht) 0.504∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ -1.358∗∗∗ 0.069 0.169∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.029) (0.075) (0.060) (0.075) (0.070) (0.083)
Log sweet potatoes plot (ht) 0.711∗∗∗ 0.031 0.546∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ -2.575∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.026) (0.068) (0.040) (0.094) (0.064) (0.075)
Log cassava plot (ht) 0.101 0.014 0.218∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ -2.043∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.022) (0.057) (0.034) (0.057) (0.070) (0.063)
Log matoke plot (ht) 0.371∗∗∗ -0.011 0.578∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ -1.418∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.017) (0.043) (0.025) (0.043) (0.040) (0.058)
Log total land area (ht) -0.073∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.023∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 4.8 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable: Sweet
squared residual (u2) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
(0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Parcel slope (%) -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parcel elevation (m) -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.00001 -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.00005 -0.0001∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00005)
Rainfall (’000 mm) -0.042 0.070∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.019) (0.048) (0.028) (0.048) (0.045) (0.053)
Constant 0.332*** -0.064 -0.016 -0.025 -0.215** 0.075 -0.389***
(0.121) (0.041) (0.106) (0.063) (0.107) (0.099) (0.117)
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parcel characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774
R2 0.675 0.771 0.646 0.702 0.743 0.740 0.778
Clustered standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table presents the elasticity estimates of yield (mean) equation. The dependent variables are log crop
yields in quintals. All regressors listed above are in logs and the units in which each regressor is measured is given in
parenthesis. The amount of fertilizer used includes both organic and inorganic fertilizer. kg, ht, m and mm stand for
kilogram, hectare, meter and millimeter, respectively. Household characteristics include household (hh) head gender,
age, marital status, years of schooling, household size, hh average years of schooling, spouse years of schooling, hh
average age, distance to major road, population center of 20,000, and nearest market. Parcel characteristics include
agro-ecology, soil type, soil quality, water source (irrigation=1) and topography.
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Fertilizer use is positively correlated with the average yield of all crops except
sweet potatoes, whose coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. Elasticity
estimates for fertilizer range between 0.04 for matoke and 0.13 for groundnuts.
Similarly, improved seed use is positively correlated with crop yield. A one per-
cent increase in expenditure on seed is associated with between 0.03% and 0.06%
increase in yield for all crops except cassava. The coefficient for seed in the cas-
sava equation is positive but statistically insignificant. Admittedly, it is difficult to
distinguish the effects of increase in quantity from the effects of quality (improved
vs. traditional seeds) using seed value data. However, estimates using dummy
variables for improved seed application show positive correlation between im-
proved seed use and yield for all crops (results could be obtained upon request).
Surprisingly, it appears that pesticide use is negatively correlated with average
yield for most crops. This might be due to selection in pesticide use. That is, if a
significant fraction of pesticide application takes place on plots that have already
been infested with pests, the average yield on these plots could be lower, despite
pesticide use.
The elasticity estimates of crop plot size are negative and statistically signif-
icant for all crops. The coefficients are also large – a one percent increase in
land area is associated with over one percent fall in crop yield. These results
are consistent with the large evidence on inverse productivity-size relationship
[186, 42, 20, 136]. This point is further supported by the negative and statistically
significant coefficients of total parcel area in five of the seven crops. The only
exception is sorghum, whose coefficient is positive and significant. The cross-
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equation land allocations in each equation also show that there is considerable
complementarity among crops.
Maize yield is positively and statistically significantly correlated with the
amount of land allocated to beans, groundnuts, sweet potatoes and matoke. The
correlations with sorghum and cassava are statistically insignificant. The positive
correlation between maize yield and land allocated to beans and groundnuts re-
flects the well known symbiotic relationship between cereals and legumes. The
potential mechanisms include differences in the growth cycles of these crops and
the ability of legumes to fix soil nitrogen. Beans and groundnuts emerge more
quickly than maize, promoting a more efficient use of nutrients and sunlight dur-
ing the sensitive early growth stages. Legumes benefit from N-fixing rhizobia bac-
teria to transform atmospheric nitrogen into a biologically useful form (NH3) for
plant growth. Limited amount of surplus nitrogen is released into the environ-
ment during nitrogen fixation and more when the bacteria die, improving soil
nutrition while also reducing competition with non-legumes (maize) for inorganic
fertilizer [189, 139]. Increase in land allocation to sweet potatoes is associated with
increase in maize yield, potentially because sweet potato vines provide mulch for
maize, preserving moisture and reducing weed infestation [11, 115].
Sorghum does not appear to have strong complementary or rival relationship
with other crops. The only exception is groundnut. The gains in sorghum yield in
a sorghum-groundnut mix could be attributed to improved radiation interception
in a sorghum-groundnut mixed stand than in sole-cropped sorghum [103, 194],
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strong nitrogen fixation by groundnuts [202] and weed suppression (eg. Striga
hermonthica) [41]. The average yield of beans is positively correlated with land
allocation for maize, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, cassava and matoke. Similarly,
groundnuts, sweet potatoes, cassava and matoke display strong complementar-
ity with other constituent crops. The average yield for each crop is positively
correlated with land allocations of other crops, except sorghum.17 The potential
mechanisms include increase in efficiency of resource use (e.g. light), nitrogen fix-
ation and the associated lower competition for nutrients, and weed suppression
([39]; and references therein).
These results reflect the positive productivity gains from mixed cropping of
cereals and legumes established in the literature [118, 211]. In addition to the ni-
trogen fixing ability of legumes, morphological differences between cereals and
legumes allows different spatial and temporal use of environmental resources by
the cereals-legume mix components and greater nutrient intake [205]. Legumes
have shorter formative phase, lower canopy structure and shallow root systems
compared to cereals. Cereals have higher canopy structure and their root system
grows to a greater depth than those of legumes. As a result, competition for nutri-
ents, radiation, and water between component crops during pick growth phases
is limited.
There is mixed evidence on productivity gains from cereals-tubers mix. There
are no cereal or cassava yield gains from mixed cropping of maize or sorghum
17Several previous studies find negative or no relationship between sorghum and legumes (see
[175, 138]).
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with cassava. This is perhaps due to the nutrient (nitrogen and potassium) inten-
sive nature of cassava and lack of nutrient complementarity between cereals and
cassava. The legumes-cassava mix, on the other hand, increases the productivity
of both legumes and cassava. Legumes are compatible with cassava in terms of
growth pattern, canopy structure and nutrient demand. Legumes can largely sat-
isfy their nitrogen needs but require phosphorous, while cassava requires potas-
sium and nitrogen [172]. The evidence from previous studies on the yield effects
of cereals-tubers and legumes-tubers intercrops is largely consistent with these
findings [11, 36].
4.5.2 Variance equations
Table 4.9 presents estimates of the variance system of equations. Yield variance
is positively correlated with labor inputs for all crops. This could be the case if
labor inputs are greater on farms that are infested with weeds, pests and other
pathogens. In Uganda, where the use of herbicides and pesticides is very low,
farmers rely on traditional labor intensive methods. Weed and pests are known
to cause yield variability. While greater labor inputs may mean greater resources
for weed and pest management, labor inputs would be positively correlated with
crop yield if observed increases in labor are associated more with mitigating the
effects of infestation rather than prevention. [20] argues that food security con-
cerns may induce small holders into using more labor as a risk mitigation strategy.
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Table 4.9: GMM estimates of yield variance elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Sweet
squared residual (u2) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
Log labor (days) 0.289∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020)
Log fertilizer (kg) 0.015 -0.082∗∗∗ 0.019 0.119∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.023) (0.020) (0.057) (0.061) (0.044) (0.018)
Log seed value (USh) 0.093∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.019 0.035∗ 0.031
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019) (0.045)
Log pesticides (kg) -0.303∗ -0.850 -0.333∗ -0.629∗∗ -0.368 -0.372 1.225∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.565) (0.187) (0.302) (0.315) (0.249) (0.230)
Log maize plot (ht) 0.205 0.001 0.753∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.228 -0.026 0.773∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.040) (0.111) (0.066) (0.139) (0.124) (0.159)
Log sorghum plot (ht) 0.083 -0.387∗∗∗ 0.031 -0.014 -0.312 -0.346 -0.077
(0.299) (0.129) (0.227) (0.134) (0.282) (0.252) (0.322)
Log beans plot (ht) 0.239 -0.014 -0.040 0.248∗∗∗ 0.242 -0.014 0.208
(0.182) (0.050) (0.177) (0.082) (0.172) (0.153) (0.197)
Log groundnuts plot (ht) 0.805∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ -0.340 -0.084 0.057
(0.236) (0.065) (0.179) (0.143) (0.223) (0.198) (0.255)
Log sweet potatoes plot (ht) 0.804∗∗∗ -0.023 0.470∗∗∗ 0.097 1.517∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.059) (0.162) (0.096) (0.282) (0.180) (0.231)
Log cassava plot (ht) -0.328∗ 0.006 0.021 0.010 0.202 1.938∗∗∗ 0.027
(0.180) (0.049) (0.136) (0.080) (0.170) (0.200) (0.193)
Log matoke plot (ht) 0.695∗∗∗ -0.065∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.090 0.323∗∗ 0.129 1.465∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.037) (0.104) (0.061) (0.129) (0.114) (0.178)
Log total land area (ht) -0.194∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.165∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 4.9 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable: Sweet
squared residual (u2) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
(0.031) (0.008) (0.023) (0.014) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033)
Parcel slope (%) 0.203∗∗∗ -0.006 0.172∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.051 0.242∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.012) (0.033) (0.020) (0.041) (0.037) (0.047)
Parcel elevation (m) -1.078∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.292∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗ -0.288∗ -0.669∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.057) (0.156) (0.093) (0.195) (0.174) (0.222)
Rainfall (’000 mm) 0.723∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.047) (0.128) (0.075) (0.159) (0.142) (0.182)
Constant 7.722∗∗∗ 0.116 1.846∗ 2.501∗∗∗ 4.311∗∗∗ 3.152∗∗∗ 4.837∗∗∗
(1.430) (0.394) (1.084) (0.642) (1.353) (1.204) (1.541)
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parcel characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774
R2 0.073 0.115 0.062 0.145 0.082 0.100 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table presents the elasticity estimates of yield (mean) equation. The dependent variables are squared
residuals from the mean equation. All regressors listed above are in logs and the units in which each regressor is
measured is given in parenthesis. The amount of fertilizer used includes both organic and inorganic fertilizer. kg,
ht, m and mm stand for kilogram, hectare, meter and millimeter, respectively. Household characteristics include
household (hh) head gender, age, marital status, years of schooling, household size, hh average years of schooling,
spouse years of schooling, hh average age, distance to major road, population center of 20,000, and nearest market.
Parcel characteristics include agro-ecology, soil type, soil quality, water source (irrigation=1) and topography.
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Fertilizer use is associated with rise in yield variance for sorghum and matoke
but increase in the variance of groundnuts, sweet potatoes and cassava yield. Vari-
ous studies show that fertilizer is variability increasing input [17, 190]. In the pres-
ence of uncertainty about soil quality, risk averse farmers are likely to over-apply
fertilizers as insurance against crop loss [16, 126]. Generally, sorghum and matoke
are planted on marginal land. Perhaps, as opposed to the other crops, fertilizer
under-application due to farmers’ subjective distribution of marginal product of
fertilizer may explain the negative relationship between fertilizer and sorghum
and matoke yield variance [16]. Likewise, farmers’ erroneous perceptions of the
distribution of marginal product of seeds relative to experimental distributions
and consequent over-application may explain the positive correlation between
crop yield variance and the value of seeds used [190]. Pesticides, as expected,
appear to be crop yield variance reducing.
For the majority of the crops, increase in land area is associated with increase
in yield variance. The elasticity estimates are especially large for sweet potatoes,
cassava and matoke. A one percent increase in plot area is associated with over
1.5% increase in yield variance. The potential explanations for the high variances
includes high transaction costs [32, 31] and supervision costs [86, 192] as farm size
increases. Yield variance for sorghum, on the contrary, appears to be negatively
correlated with plot area. Estimates for maize and beans are statistically insignifi-
cant.
The cross-equation elasticity estimates show that there is little gain in terms
186
of reduced yield variance from mixed cropping. For the majority of crops, crop
mixes that include sweet potatoes and matoke are associated with increase in yield
variance. Similarly, groundnut mix with maize, sorghum or beans tends to have
higher yield variance. The maize mix with beans, groundnuts or matoke also has
high yield variance. The only crop mixes that appear to have lower yield variance
are the maize-cassava and the sorghum-matoke mixes.
4.5.3 Skewness equations
Table 4.10 presents elasticity estimates of the skewness system of equations. The
coefficients on own plot size are positive and statistically significant for all crops
in the system, except sorghum. The large skewness associated with larger plots
points to the potential trade-off that farmers face in land allocation decisions given
the positive (negative) correlation between land area and yield skewness (average
yield), respectively. The aversion to yield variance by risk averse farmers relates to
the potential for low yield draws from distributions with wide spread. For a con-
stant variance, positively skewed distributions are rather preferred. The results in
Table 4.10, suggest that increase in land area may increase the likelihood of high
yield levels, which speaks to the importance of including a third moment of yield
in estimating risk parameters. The potential explanations include economies of
scale [129] and lumpy nature of some agricultural technologies which limits their
economic feasibility on small plots [87, 161].
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Table 4.10: GMM estimates of yield skewness elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Sweet
cubic residual (u3) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
Log labor (days) -0.707∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.467∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ -0.882∗∗∗ -1.321∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.040) (0.056) (0.054) (0.090) (0.081) (0.097)
Log fertilizer (kg) -0.062 -0.039 -0.009 -0.269 -0.380 -0.101 0.010
(0.200) (0.090) (0.086) (0.226) (0.278) (0.194) (0.090)
Log seed value (USh) 0.183∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.084 -0.087 -0.562∗∗
(0.035) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.080) (0.085) (0.224)
Log pesticides (kg) -1.256 -0.147 -0.916 0.183 1.718 0.131 -0.878
(0.766) (2.192) (0.801) (1.197) (1.443) (1.102) (1.135)
Log maize plot (ht) 2.922∗∗∗ 0.0003 2.031∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗ 0.935 -0.270 2.658∗∗∗
(0.867) (0.157) (0.474) (0.261) (0.636) (0.547) (0.789)
Log sorghum plot (ht) 0.265 -0.194 -0.281 0.458 -1.212 -1.375 -1.334
(1.451) (0.499) (0.969) (0.532) (1.293) (1.113) (1.603)
Log beans plot (ht) 0.789 -0.060 2.823∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗ 0.272 -0.340 0.471
(0.882) (0.195) (0.757) (0.326) (0.790) (0.678) (0.981)
Log groundnuts plot (ht) 2.134∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.800 1.210∗∗ -1.642 -0.589 -0.767
(1.145) (0.252) (0.766) (0.568) (1.021) (0.877) (1.266)
Log sweet potatoes plot (ht) 2.230∗∗ -0.209 1.140 0.393 3.981∗∗∗ 1.052 1.848
(1.041) (0.229) (0.693) (0.381) (1.290) (0.797) (1.150)
Log cassava plot (ht) -1.503∗ -0.024 -0.329 0.064 -0.215 7.602∗∗∗ 0.163
(0.873) (0.191) (0.579) (0.319) (0.780) (0.885) (0.960)
Log matoke plot (ht) 1.658∗∗ -0.204 1.327∗∗∗ 0.393 0.762 0.430 7.548∗∗∗
(0.661) (0.145) (0.443) (0.243) (0.589) (0.506) (0.881)
Log total land area (ht) -0.758∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ -0.767∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ 0.256∗ -0.006 -0.839∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 4.10 – Continued from previous page
Dependent variable: Sweet
squared residual (u2) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
(0.149) (0.033) (0.099) (0.055) (0.133) (0.114) (0.165)
Parcel slope (%) 1.267∗∗∗ -0.003 0.756∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.180 -0.164 0.804∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.047) (0.142) (0.078) (0.190) (0.163) (0.235)
Parcel elevation (m) -5.060∗∗∗ 0.116 -0.210 -1.339∗∗∗ -1.252 -1.425∗ 0.438
(1.002) (0.221) (0.668) (0.368) (0.895) (0.768) (1.106)
Rainfall (’000 mm) 3.863∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 3.513∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗ 2.619∗∗∗ 1.661∗∗∗ 5.329∗∗∗
(0.816) (0.181) (0.545) (0.300) (0.729) (0.626) (0.904)
Constant 33.655∗∗∗ -0.570 -0.380 9.191∗∗∗ 10.512∗ 13.439∗∗ -2.572
(6.946) (1.534) (4.627) (2.550) (6.200) (5.323) (7.661)
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parcel characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774
R2 0.019 0.010 0.019 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.019
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table presents the elasticity estimates of yield (mean) equation. The dependent variables are cubed residu-
als from the mean equation. All regressors listed above are in logs and the units in which each regressor is measured
is given in parenthesis. The amount of fertilizer used includes both organic and inorganic fertilizer. kg, ht, m and
mm stand for kilogram, hectare, meter and millimeter, respectively. Household characteristics include household
(hh) head gender, age, marital status, years of schooling, household size, hh average years of schooling, spouse
years of schooling, hh average age, distance to major road, population center of 20,000, and nearest market. Parcel
characteristics include agro-ecology, soil type, soil quality, water source (irrigation=1) and topography.
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The inter-crop dynamics in the skewness system of equations is very limited,
with maize at the center of much of it. Groundnuts, sweet potatoes and matoke
land allocations are positively correlated with maize yield skewness, whereas cas-
sava land allocation is negatively correlated with maize yield skewness. Likewise,
increase in maize land allocation is associated with rise in beans, groundnuts and
matoke yield skewness. The results show that yield skewness explains some of
the variation in yield variance shown in Table 4.9. Failure to recognize the quali-
tative difference between positively and negatively skewed yield distributions in
the analysis of crop choice may lead to overestimating the role of yield variance
on farmers’ decisions and unwarranted emphasis on policies focused at reducing
risk.
4.5.4 Robustness checks
To confirm that the results in sections 5.1–5.3 are not outcomes of the log-linear
functional form chosen for the analysis, I conduct robustness checks using the
more flexible translog functional form. The choice of the log-linear function in the
main text as opposed to the translog function is due to the relatively large number
of crops in the system, with each individual equation containing a large number
of variables. Thus, the robustness checks are conducted using a restricted translog
function that allows interaction only among conventional inputs: labor, fertilizer,
seed, pesticides and land allocations to maize, sorghum, beans, groundnuts, sweet
potatoes, cassava and matoke.
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Tables C1-C3 present the mean, variance and skewness system of equations
estimates using translog production function. The reported figures are marginal
effects – elasticity estimates evaluated at the average values of interacting vari-
ables. That is, the estimate on labor xm in Table C1 of 1.303 is γm+
∑
m γml× x¯l, where
x¯l the average value of labor (for the quadratic term) and other conventional in-
puts (for the interaction terms). In the mean system of equations, the results of
translog functional form are broadly similar to that of the log-linear model. There
are, however, some key differences. The coefficients on land allocations for maize,
sorghum and beans are negative and statistically significant in their correspond-
ing equations, whereas the coefficients for groundnuts, sweet potatoes, cassava
and matoke are positive. Moreover, land allocations to other crops are statistically
insignificant for groundnuts, sweet potatoes and matoke.
The pattern is similar for the variance and skewness systems of equations. In
the variance system of equations in Table C2, the own land allocations for all crops
except sorghum are positive and statistically significant. Compared to the log-
linear model, there is even less inter-crop dynamics under the translog functional
form. Similarly, the results of the skewness system of equations for the translog
model presented in Table C3 mirror the results of the log-linear model. Along
the diagonal of the land allocation matrix, the coefficients on own land alloca-
tion are all positive and statistically significant, but the off-diagonal elements are,
for the most part, statistically insignificant. Overall, the results for the translog
model show that there is synergistic relationship between the different crops in the
maize, beans and cassava equations but very little complementarity elsewhere. As
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with the log-linear model, the results point to the need to include yield skewness
in estimating risk parameters as some of the yield variance is explained by upside
risk, which is not necessarily undesirable.
4.5.5 Plot heterogeneous effects
Figures 4.4-4.7 present estimates of the land area elasticity of yield by quantiles
(Q) of plot size of the four major crops in Uganda: maize, beans, cassava and ma-
toke.18 The results for maize are summarized in Figure 4.4. It shows that there
is considerable variation in maize yield response to mixed-cropping on plots of
different sizes. Yield gains are largest for small plots. Indeed, mixed-cropping
with the other three major crops is associated with maize yield gain for the small-
est maize plots of about 0.03 hectares. Maize yield gains dramatically fall for the
maize-sorghum mix and completely disappear for the maize-matoke mix as maize
plot area increases. The maize yield gains associated with the maize-sorghum mix
are negative for Q2-Q5, which suggests that the negative elasticity estimates of
sorghum area in the maize equation in Tables 4.8 is perhaps due to negative corre-
lations for relatively larger maize plots (0.06-0.6 hectares). The elasticity estimates
for the maize-beans mix are rather positive and large for median or smaller maize
plots (< 0.2 hectares). As plot area increases, the maize yield response gradually
18These estimates are based on parcels with non-zero output levels. In Figure 4.4, for example,
the maize plot size quantiles are created conditional on positive quantities of maize on the parcel
for the cropping season. If maize output on a parcel is zero because maize was not planted on it,
it was left fallow or there was complete crop loss, the parcel is dropped from the analysis.
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declines and settles around zero for Q4 and Q5, which explains the positive and
statistically significant results found in the maize equation in Table (4.8). There is
no appreciable variation in maize yield for the maize-cassava mix as maize plot
area increases. Likewise, there is little variation in maize yield for the maize-
matoke mix as maize plot area increases aside, from Q1. For Q2-Q5, the maize
yield elasticity estimates are stable at around zero throughout.
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This figure shows average maize yield on plots with maize and sorghum, maize and beans, maize
and cassava, and maize and matoke mix by quantiles of maize plot. Q1 is the lowest quantile and
Q5 the highest quantile.
Figure 4.4: Average maize yield under mixed-cropping by quantiles of
maize plot
The plot area elasticity of beans yield is shown in Figure 4.5. As in the case
with maize, there are large gains associated with mixed-cropping beans with other
crops on small beans plots. The elasticity estimates on plot allocations for maize,
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cassava and matoke range between 1.5 and 2. With the exception of matoke, there
is little mixed-cropping associated beans yield gain for larger beans plots (> 0.07
hectares). The beans-sorghum mix, rather, seems to have low beans yield at all
levels of beans plot area. The beans yield elasticities are estimated with large vari-
ance, thus not statistically different from zero, which may explain the statistically
insignificant coefficient on sorghum plot area in the beans equation in Table 4.8.
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This figure shows average beans yield on plots with beans and maize, beans and sorghum, beans
and cassava, and beans and matoke mix by quantiles of beans plot. Q1 is the lowest quantile and
Q5 the highest quantile.
Figure 4.5: Average beans yield under mixed-cropping by quantiles of
beans plot
Figure 4.6 shows the average cassava yield levels on diversified plots by cas-
sava plot quantiles. The cassava yield follows a fairly similar pattern to that of
maize and beans. The average cassava yield associated with the cassava-maize,
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cassava-sorghum and cassava-beans mix is greater on small cassava plots (Q1),
gradually decreasing as the cassava plot area increases (Q2-Q5). For the cassava-
matoke mix, however, there is no appreciable variation in cassava yield for the
full range of cassava plot area size.
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This figure shows average cassava yield on plots with cassava and maize, cassava and sorghum,
cassava and beans, and cassava and matoke mix by quantiles of cassava plot. Q1 is the lowest
quantile and Q5 the highest quantile.
Figure 4.6: Average cassava yield under mixed-cropping by quantiles of
cassava plot
With the exception of the matoke-maize mix, there are no clear non-linear re-
lationships between mixed-cropping associated matoke yield gains and matoke
plot area (Figure 4.7). In the maize-matoke mix, the average matoke yield de-
creases as matoke plot area rises (Q1-Q3) and picks up afterwards (Q4-Q5). While
there is some matoke yield variability in the other crop mixes containing matoke,
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the estimated elasticities are for the most part statistically insignificant.
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This figure shows average matoke yield on plots with matoke and maize, matoke and sorghum,
matoke and beans, and matoke and cassava mix by quantiles of matoke plot. Q1 is the lowest
quantile and Q5 the highest quantile.
Figure 4.7: Average matoke yield under mixed-cropping by quantiles of
matoke plot
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper I find results that suggest the determinants of crop diversification in
Uganda are not uniform across crops. It rather appears that both yield and vari-
ance considerations come into play to various degrees for different crops. Yield
(return) seems to be the key deriver of inter-cropping of beans and sweet potatoes
with other cereals and tubers, while variance seems to be the main factor behind
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maize inter-cropping with other crops. I do not find strong evidence that skew-
ness considerations figure prominently in farmers crop diversification decisions.
I find strong evidence that productivity decreases with plot size for all major
crops in Uganda. This result is consistent with the much discussed inverse farm
productivity-size relationship. Larger plots are also associated with high yield
variance. Yet, this undesirable feature masks the greater opportunities presented
by high variance—high skewness yield distributions. This is precisely the case
in Ugandan agriculture—large plots are associated with positive skewness, and
hence greater probability of high yield draws.
In terms of best crop mixes, maize, beans and sweet potatoes are most suitable
for inter-cropping. The main benefit from inter-cropping maize with other crops
is reduced yield variance. For beans and sweet potatoes, gains accrue in terms
of increase in yield. The maize-beans combination is the best mix both in yield
and variance terms. On the contrary, sorghum and matoke appear to be ill-fit
for different reasons. When inter-cropped with other crops, sorghum seems to
reduce yield of other crops across the board. While there is benefit in the form of
reduced variance, this is subsumed by skewness reduction. In the case of matoke,
on the other, its yield level suffers with no apparent gain in variance reduction or
increase in skewness.
The fact that both yield and variance considerations appear to be important
in crop diversification choices of farmers in rural Uganda calls for an appropriate
mix of input and insurance market interventions. Improving access to modern
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agricultural inputs would enhance yield. The results in Table 4.8 show that there
is substantial gain to be had from fertilizer use and suggestive evidence that im-
proved seeds increase crop yield. Further studies on the yield and variance effects
of crop diversification at different levels of improved inputs use would shed bet-
ter light on this dynamics. Due to limited modern inputs use, this paper doesn’t
attempt such an analysis. Provision of formal crop insurance would reduce in-
centives for inefficient self-insurance such as when farmer inter-crop other cereals
and tubers with sorghum to take advantage of the considerable variance reduc-
tion in brings about.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1 OF APPENDIX
A.1 Derivation of the effects of parents’ early childhood shock on children’s human
capital
The effect of parental shocks early in childhood on their offspring’s human capital
can be written as:
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Substituting (A1) in (2.16), we find a decomposable impact of parental child-
hood shocks on child outcomes as:
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Figure A1: Patterns of Meher rains 1980-1990
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Figure A2: Patterns of August rains 1980-1990
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Figure A3: Patterns of Belg rains 1980-1990
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Figure A4: Patterns of April rains 1980-1990
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Table A1: Effects of maternal famine exposure on test scores
PPVT score Math score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hausman- Hausman-
Dep. var.: PPVT & Math test scores POLS RE Mundlak Taylor POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) 0.731 0.735 0.784 0.709 -0.280 -0.211 -0.288 -0.066
(2.959) (1.226) (1.253) (0.910) (0.383) (0.385) (0.337) (0.282)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.606 -0.608 -0.530 -0.693 0.010 -0.026 0.041 -0.059
(0.729) (0.580) (0.519) (0.756) (0.224) (0.211) (0.188) (0.244)
Famine months (#) 0.428 0.434 0.444 0.551 -0.376 -0.305 -0.426 -0.051
(1.845) (1.458) (1.655) (0.586) (0.276) (0.570) (0.490) (0.190)
Famine months × famine cohort 0.323 0.322 0.344 0.241 0.065 0.047 0.045 -0.020
(0.493) (0.629) (0.611) (0.360) (0.105) (0.138) (0.138) (0.116)
Famine cohort (famine=1) -1.239 -1.235 -1.086 -1.199 -0.602** -0.525 -0.554 -0.369
(1.309) (1.430) (1.501) (1.355) (0.305) (0.425) (0.418) (0.433)
Household size 0.118** 0.118 0.566 0.502 0.126 0.127** 0.125 0.201**
(0.399) (0.317) (0.484) (0.445) (0.077) (0.063) (0.120) (0.101)
Age of household head 0.078 0.078 0.008 0.052 0.007 0.007 0.015 0.002
(0.063) (0.059) (0.147) (0.061) (0.014) (0.012) (0.023) (0.017)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.102 0.102 0.255 1.896 0.594* 0.391 0.400 0.615
(1.370) (1.179) (1.103) (1.844) (0.323) (0.327) (0.333) (0.500)
Household head schooling 0.753*** 0.753*** 0.575*** 0.412 0.220*** 0.200*** 0.143*** -0.020
(0.190) (0.108) (0.106) (0.333) (0.039) (0.046) (0.043) (0.119)
Urban/rural (urban=1) 3.516 3.513 0.487 8.103*** 3.023*** 3.294*** 2.006** 4.859***
(4.015) (4.840) (4.916) (2.487) (0.718) (1.064) (0.851) (0.728)
Shock index -31.914*** -31.900*** -31.557*** -33.739*** -4.959*** -2.739*** -0.770 1.030
(11.405) (9.245) (10.437) (8.383) (1.571) (1.009) (1.053) (1.705)
Wealth index 19.869*** 19.859*** -4.944 1.563 5.978*** 5.292*** 0.585 2.252
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Hausman- Hausman-
Dep. var.: PPVT & Math test scores POLS RE Mundlak Taylor POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
(5.071) (4.714) (6.978) (6.910) (0.891) (0.946) (1.277) (1.535)
Gender of child (male=1) -1.044 -1.039 -1.061 -0.972 -0.080 -0.088 -0.112 0.016
(0.914) (0.705) (0.712) (0.980) (0.238) (0.252) (0.245) (0.302)
Age of child (months) 1.146*** 1.146*** 1.388*** 1.300*** 0.172*** 0.167*** 0.223** 0.369***
(0.200) (0.089) (0.202) (0.225) (0.029) (0.029) (0.095) (0.092)
Child birth order -1.313** -1.315*** -0.961*** -1.355*** -0.249** -0.191** -0.118 -0.143
[-0.2cm] (0.612) (0.408) (0.356) (0.466) (0.119) (0.090) (0.079) (0.117)
Number of siblings of child -0.269 -0.270 -1.244 -0.540 -0.240** -0.242** -0.191 -0.279*
(0.616) (0.433) (0.873) (0.505) (0.111) (0.112) (0.242) (0.144)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,394 2,394 2,394 2,394 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541
R-squared 0.589 0.489
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in (1)-(3), (5)-(7) and bootstrap standard errors in (4) & (8) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” stand for negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother
was exposed to the famine, respectively. POLS and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects, respectively. PPVT is a short-form for Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test. Columns (3) and (7) present results using Mundlak (1978) estimator, while columns (4) and (8) presents results of the
Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in these
results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three years after the famine).
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Table A2: Effects of maternal famine exposure on mothers’ educational aspira-
tions for children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: mothers’ educational Hausman-
aspirations for children POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) -0.163 -0.150 -0.153 -0.171
(0.237) (0.182) (0.160) (0.112)
Rain shortage × famine cohort 0.044 0.046 0.055 0.034
(0.069) (0.055) (0.051) (0.088)
Famine months (#) -0.017 -0.012 -0.015 -0.008
(0.146) (0.187) (0.146) (0.075)
Famine months × famine cohort 0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.005
(0.046) (0.037) (0.044) (0.039)
Famine cohort (famine=1) -0.028 -0.012 -0.033 -0.013
(0.169) (0.122) (0.157) (0.223)
Household size 0.021 0.028 0.098* 0.068*
(0.038) (0.031) (0.053) (0.039)
Age of mother -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 0.002
(0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.035)
Age of household head -0.009* -0.008 -0.009 -0.013*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.093 0.029 0.052 0.261
(0.097) (0.084) (0.096) (0.173)
Urban/rural (urban=1) 0.325 0.314 0.123 0.740***
(0.337) (0.538) (0.532) (0.244)
Shock index 0.275 0.329 0.468 0.278
(0.986) (0.505) (0.533) (0.822)
Wealth index 2.183*** 1.911*** 0.740 0.838
(0.444) (0.352) (0.609) (0.684)
Household expenditure (real) 4.26e-06 -7.20e-06 -0.00001 7.94e-06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.143 -0.142 -0.145 -0.131
(0.104) (0.105) (0.101) (0.099)
Age of child (months) -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.022)
Continued on next page
206
Table A2 – Continued from previous page
Dep. var.: mothers’ educational Hausman-
aspirations for children POLS RE Mundlak Taylor
Child birth order 0.028 0.039 0.107** 0.056
(0.055) (0.042) (0.054) (0.061)
Number of children -0.014 -0.016 -0.024 -0.059
(0.043) (0.031) (0.085) (0.056)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,461 2,461 2,461 2,461
R-squared 0.177 0.178 0.183
Number of mothers 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in (1)-(3) and bootstrap standard errors in (4) in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” stand for negative rainfall deviation
during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of months a mother was exposed to
the famine, respectively. POLS and RE stand for pooled OLS and random effects,
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) present results using Mundlak (1978) estimator
and Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator, respectively. Controls included in all four
models are household characteristics (household size, household head age, gender
and schooling, wealth, income, shocks), child characteristics (age, gender, age order,
number of siblings, language, ethnicity, religion), mother famine cohort dummies,
urban-rural dummy, and survey round dummies. The sample included in these
results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988
(three years after the famine).
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Table A3: Heterogeneous effects of maternal famine exposure duration on
children’s human capital
Panel (a): Cognitive human capital
Dependent variables child schooling PPVT Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) 0.206 0.189 0.274*** 0.834 0.884 1.158 -0.351 -0.429 -0.102
(0.183) (0.141) (0.084) (1.700) (1.468) (0.945) (0.450) (0.357) (0.298)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.069* -0.044 -0.089 -0.231 -0.164 -0.222 0.108 0.203 0.084
(0.040) (0.035) (0.068) (0.631) (0.688) (0.876) (0.269) (0.269) (0.279)
Famine months (#) 0.287 0.247 0.350*** 0.402 0.374 0.710 -0.342 -0.482 -0.058
(0.187) (0.159) (0.056) (1.746) (1.531) (0.598) (0.440) (0.351) (0.191)
1 Famine month × famine cohort 0.079 0.130 0.102 -2.490** -2.027 -2.917* -0.141 -0.041 -0.154
(0.124) (0.113) (0.129) (1.250) (1.459) (1.674) (0.670) (0.692) (0.510)
2 Famine months × famine cohort -0.074 -0.106 -0.081 1.406 1.293 1.367 -0.699 -0.819** -0.779
(0.117) (0.108) (0.162) (1.038) (1.028) (2.027) (0.430) (0.403) (0.648)
3 Famine months × famine cohort -0.051 -0.065 -0.037 2.375 1.932 3.017 0.960 0.844 1.124
(0.143) (0.165) (0.172) (2.408) (3.123) (2.277) (0.701) (0.786) (0.705)
4 Famine months × famine cohort -0.371** -0.375** -0.356 0.506 0.256 1.641 1.865*** 1.845** 2.144**
(0.183) (0.171) (0.222) (3.594) (3.539) (3.394) (0.718) (0.846) (0.932)
5 Famine months × famine cohort -0.501*** -0.465*** -0.584*** 6.053 5.339 5.566 -0.034 -0.064 -0.516
(0.168) (0.134) (0.222) (3.825) (3.361) (3.622) (1.000) (1.219) (1.026)
6 Famine months × famine cohort -0.164 -0.176 -0.261 4.770 4.705 4.923 0.597 0.754 0.222
(0.171) (0.133) (0.286) (3.040) (2.965) (3.631) (0.677) (0.690) (0.991)
7 Famine months × famine cohort -0.318 -0.359 -0.403* 0.649 1.336 -0.997 -0.273 -0.254 -0.960
(0.200) (0.229) (0.225) (4.711) (5.065) (3.234) (0.762) (0.799) (0.989)
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Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Famine cohort (famine=1) -0.046 -0.037 -0.021 -1.857 -1.540 -1.733 -0.678 -0.673* -0.493
(0.055) (0.055) (0.106) (1.420) (1.411) (1.425) (0.421) (0.406) (0.434)
Household size 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.159 0.585 0.587 0.145** 0.129 0.210**
(0.025) (0.033) (0.028) (0.322) (0.457) (0.442) (0.059) (0.109) (0.099)
Age of household head -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 0.027 -0.027 0.024 -0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.059) (0.142) (0.057) (0.010) (0.022) (0.015)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.364*** 0.340*** 0.336*** 2.024* 1.631 3.043* 0.809*** 0.684** 0.693
(0.097) (0.087) (0.096) (1.118) (1.090) (1.584) (0.264) (0.299) (0.468)
Urban/rural (urban=1) 0.196 -0.109 0.373** 4.558 0.494 9.377*** 3.675*** 2.010*** 4.758***
(0.411) (0.463) (0.154) (4.921) (5.280) (2.343) (0.812) (0.679) (0.601)
Shock index 0.782 1.322** 2.080*** -34.256*** -31.898*** -33.990*** -2.874** -0.573 1.008
(0.554) (0.584) (0.517) (10.246) (11.961) (8.348) (1.166) (1.211) (1.709)
Wealth index 1.331*** -0.037 0.933** 26.610*** -5.481 2.150 6.523*** 0.395 2.325
(0.312) (0.485) (0.450) (4.895) (6.900) (6.930) (0.981) (1.359) (1.529)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.176** -0.184** -0.168** -0.944 -1.030 -0.837 0.005 -0.042 0.083
(0.069) (0.081) (0.069) (0.675) (0.788) (0.991) (0.239) (0.245) (0.295)
Age of child (months) 0.054*** 0.032 0.079*** 1.167*** 1.411*** 1.326*** 0.180*** 0.230*** 0.369***
(0.009) (0.024) (0.020) (0.102) (0.223) (0.208) (0.027) (0.073) (0.088)
Child birth order 0.018 0.005 0.012 -1.444*** -0.996*** -1.423*** -0.206** -0.125 -0.155
(0.015) (0.023) (0.033) (0.367) (0.356) (0.465) (0.090) (0.079) (0.117)
Number of siblings of child -0.113*** -0.151*** -0.115*** -0.475 -1.297 -0.711 -0.270** -0.157 -0.275**
(0.038) (0.054) (0.037) (0.445) (0.904) (0.501) (0.115) (0.239) (0.138)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Observations 1,501 1,501 1,501 2,394 2,394 2,394 1,541 1,541 1,541
Number of children 829 829 829 838 838 838 824 824 824
Panel (b): Health and non-cognitive human capital
Dependent variables zhfa locus of control self-esteem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) -0.006 -0.007 0.011 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.019
(0.121) (0.118) (0.066) (0.034) (0.029) (0.024) (0.043) (0.049) (0.023)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.094* -0.092* -0.096* 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.021 0.022 0.021
(0.052) (0.047) (0.058) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020)
Famine months (#) 0.045 0.042 0.055 0.008 0.012 0.010 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023
(0.103) (0.096) (0.040) (0.035) (0.030) (0.017) (0.036) (0.040) (0.015)
1 Famine month × famine cohort 0.023 0.049 0.011 0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.032 -0.035 -0.035
(0.163) (0.149) (0.131) (0.037) (0.034) (0.045) (0.031) (0.033) (0.037)
2 Famine months × famine cohort -0.129 -0.118 -0.128 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.023 -0.027 -0.023
(0.127) (0.122) (0.136) (0.033) (0.031) (0.043) (0.040) (0.037) (0.036)
3 Famine months × famine cohort -0.057 -0.059 -0.040 -0.057* -0.061 -0.051 -0.001 -0.007 0.004
(0.102) (0.102) (0.143) (0.033) (0.040) (0.054) (0.033) (0.045) (0.057)
4 Famine months × famine cohort -0.223 -0.244 -0.211 -0.068 -0.069 -0.059 -0.098 -0.101 -0.089
(0.217) (0.235) (0.183) (0.066) (0.064) (0.062) (0.085) (0.078) (0.065)
5 Famine months × famine cohort -0.027 -0.010 -0.038 -0.087 -0.070 -0.097 0.019 0.008 0.017
(0.226) (0.210) (0.219) (0.058) (0.058) (0.082) (0.046) (0.039) (0.095)
6 Famine months × famine cohort -0.245 -0.246 -0.245 0.015 0.020 0.012 0.061 0.066 0.064
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Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
(0.211) (0.215) (0.259) (0.058) (0.051) (0.092) (0.054) (0.051) (0.072)
7 Famine months × famine cohort -0.361*** -0.309** -0.396** -0.115* -0.104 -0.129** -0.078 -0.071 -0.089
(0.133) (0.125) (0.197) (0.063) (0.071) (0.063) (0.056) (0.062) (0.064)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 0.016 0.048 0.021 0.047* 0.038 0.050 0.033 0.032 0.034
(0.093) (0.089) (0.091) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Household size 0.007 -0.000 0.011 -0.010 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 -0.007
(0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009)
Age of household head -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.111*** 0.103** 0.127** 0.025 0.023 0.036 0.067*** 0.057** 0.079***
(0.043) (0.048) (0.064) (0.022) (0.023) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.148 -0.359* -0.052 -0.032 -0.077 0.014 0.088 0.047 0.129***
(0.209) (0.210) (0.106) (0.092) (0.093) (0.047) (0.067) (0.081) (0.048)
Shock index -0.139 -0.109 -0.125 -0.168 -0.162 -0.165 -0.276* -0.246 -0.310
(0.174) (0.213) (0.238) (0.188) (0.196) (0.180) (0.147) (0.181) (0.194)
Wealth index 0.692*** 0.245 0.317 0.064 -0.220 -0.161 0.384*** 0.066 0.168
(0.266) (0.306) (0.218) (0.090) (0.135) (0.137) (0.108) (0.148) (0.137)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.218*** -0.227*** -0.207*** -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.043**
(0.054) (0.058) (0.065) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Age of child (months) -0.026*** -0.026** -0.023*** -0.001 0.006** 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.002
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Child birth order -0.034 -0.015 -0.032* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.011 0.012
(0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of siblings of child -0.032 -0.059 -0.034 0.015* 0.049** 0.014 -0.005 0.001 -0.006
(0.021) (0.039) (0.022) (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.009) (0.021) (0.012)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,259 3,259 3,259 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
Number of children 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Table A3 presents the heterogeneous effects of maternal famine exposure duration on children’s human capital using random effects, Mundlak’s pseudo
fixed effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators. “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” are total monthly negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-1985 famine
and the number of months a mother was exposed to the famine, respectively. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are vectors of dummy variables. The
sample included in these results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three years after the famine).
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Table A4: Life-cycle effects of maternal famine exposure duration on chil-
dren’s human capital
Panel (a): Cognitive human capital
Dependent variables child schooling PPVT Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) 0.199 0.187 0.265*** 0.384 0.526 0.512 -0.289 -0.341 -0.061
(0.185) (0.152) (0.082) (1.629) (1.516) (0.909) (0.487) (0.375) (0.279)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.027 -0.000 -0.039 -0.663 -0.532 -0.697 -0.048 0.037 -0.051
(0.035) (0.029) (0.062) (0.552) (0.554) (0.765) (0.211) (0.198) (0.240)
Famine months (#) 0.286 0.248 0.347 0.325 0.335 0.548 -0.322 -0.443 -0.050
(0.199) (0.174) (0.056) (1.984) (1.963) (0.588) (0.631) (0.509) (0.186)
Famine months × famine cohort× round 1 - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
Famine months × famine cohort× round 2 - - - 0.004 - -0.068 - - -
- - - (0.541) - (0.183) - - -
Famine months × famine cohort× round 3 -0.023 -0.029 -0.009 1.029 1.008 0.284 - - -0.003
(0.026) (0.030) (0.009) (1.112) (1.145) (0.237) - - (0.038)
Famine months × famine cohort× round 4 -0.061** -0.061** -0.018** -0.140 -0.063 -0.058 0.035 0.046 -0.005
(0.028) (0.029) (0.008) (0.482) (0.549) (0.089) (0.131) (0.141) (0.032)
Famine cohort (famine=1) -0.053 -0.045 -0.022 -1.652 -1.396 -1.076 -0.622 -0.624 -0.390
(0.052) (0.055) (0.104) (1.461) (1.516) (1.359) (0.444) (0.435) (0.422)
Household size 0.009 0.004 0.013 0.116 0.607 0.468 0.133** 0.125 0.206**
(0.026) (0.036) (0.028) (0.330) (0.462) (0.449) (0.058) (0.113) (0.100)
Age of household head -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.028 -0.032 0.027 -0.005 0.005 0.003
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.060) (0.147) (0.059) (0.011) (0.021) (0.015)
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Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.367*** 0.343*** 0.337*** 2.031* 1.636 2.816* 0.797*** 0.671** 0.620
(0.097) (0.088) (0.100) (1.193) (1.149) (1.654) (0.272) (0.297) (0.503)
Urban/rural (urban=1) 0.190 -0.109 0.364** 4.286 0.281 8.779*** 3.626*** 1.943** 4.813***
(0.448) (0.467) (0.157) (5.446) (5.339) (2.345) (0.932) (0.840) (0.608)
Shock index 0.834 1.372** 2.103*** -33.366*** -31.546** -33.108*** -2.829** -0.672 1.034
(0.581) (0.632) (0.593) (10.550) (12.461) (8.307) (1.168) (1.180) (1.701)
Wealth index 1.338*** 0.004 0.947** 27.243*** -5.243 4.404 6.787*** 0.524 2.228
(0.316) (0.514) (0.454) (5.152) (6.655) (6.985) (0.985) (1.321) (1.541)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.166** -0.175** -0.163** -0.982 -1.036 -0.993 -0.052 -0.093 0.021
(0.075) (0.084) (0.068) (0.676) (0.785) (0.990) (0.247) (0.249) (0.293)
Age of child (months) 0.054*** 0.032 0.081*** 1.174*** 1.422*** 1.297*** 0.173*** 0.229*** 0.374***
(0.009) (0.026) (0.022) (0.104) (0.216) (0.220) (0.028) (0.085) (0.081)
Child birth order 0.015 0.002 0.008 -1.460*** -1.025** -1.398*** -0.206** -0.119 -0.158
(0.017) (0.029) (0.034) (0.405) (0.411) (0.464) (0.085) (0.080) (0.118)
Number of siblings of child -0.115*** -0.146** -0.120*** -0.377 -1.289 -0.568 -0.276*** -0.193 -0.273*
(0.036) (0.058) (0.038) (0.444) (0.936) (0.510) (0.105) (0.244) (0.142)
Observations 1,501 1,501 1,504 2,394 2,394 2,398 1,541 1,541 1,545
Number of children 829 829 829 838 838 838 824 824 824
Panel (b): Health and non-cognitive human capital
Dependent variables zhfa locus of control self-esteem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage (SD) -0.007 -0.003 0.001 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.011
(0.106) (0.100) (0.061) (0.035) (0.032) (0.022) (0.047) (0.052) (0.021)
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Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.088** -0.081** -0.090* 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.043) (0.040) (0.052) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017)
Famine months (#) 0.046 0.046 0.051 0.006 0.011 0.008 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024*
(0.101) (0.088) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.016) (0.041) (0.047) (0.014)
Famine months × famine cohort× round 1 -0.078* -0.074 -0.079** - - - - - -
(0.045) (0.046) (0.034) - - - - - -
Famine months × famine cohort× round 2 -0.017 -0.012 -0.009 - - -0.005* - - 0.000
(0.026) (0.025) (0.013) - - (0.003) - - (0.004)
Famine months × famine cohort× round 3 -0.038 -0.035 -0.013 -0.021*** -0.020** -0.008* -0.026** -0.026** -0.009**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004)
Famine months × famine cohort× round 4 -0.040 -0.034 -0.010* -0.009 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.025) (0.027) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 0.022 0.050 0.023 0.047* 0.038* 0.054* 0.032 0.030 0.036
(0.091) (0.084) (0.087) (0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Household size 0.007 -0.001 0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.015 -0.009
(0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010)
Age of household head -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.114*** 0.105** 0.132** 0.025 0.024 0.036 0.068*** 0.059** 0.082***
(0.043) (0.051) (0.065) (0.023) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.157 -0.362 -0.070 -0.033 -0.077 0.014 0.083 0.042 0.127***
(0.230) (0.224) (0.107) (0.104) (0.094) (0.047) (0.076) (0.089) (0.048)
Shock index -0.170 -0.151 -0.170 -0.163 -0.167 -0.174 -0.265* -0.250 -0.322*
(0.180) (0.226) (0.235) (0.193) (0.204) (0.179) (0.155) (0.186) (0.193)
Wealth index 0.698*** 0.249 0.330 0.063 -0.225 -0.169 0.381*** 0.047 0.153
(0.258) (0.307) (0.217) (0.097) (0.147) (0.136) (0.120) (0.151) (0.137)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.217*** -0.225*** -0.211*** -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.041**
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Hausman- Hausman- Hausman-
RE Mundlak Taylor (RE) RE Mundlak Taylor RE Mundlak Taylor
(0.058) (0.064) (0.064) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Age of child (months) -0.026*** -0.026** -0.024*** -0.001 0.006** 0.001 0.002 0.006* 0.002
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Child birth order -0.034 -0.016 -0.032* 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Number of siblings of child -0.032 -0.059 -0.036 0.015 0.049** 0.014 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004
(0.022) (0.040) (0.022) (0.009) (0.022) (0.012) (0.009) (0.023) (0.013)
Observations 3,259 3,259 3,266 2,484 2,484 2,488 2,484 2,484 2,488
Number of children 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 838
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Table A4 shows the life-cycle effects of maternal famine exposure on children’s human capital using random effects, Mundlak’s pseudo fixed effects and
Hausman-Taylor estimators. “Rain shortage” and “Famine months” are total monthly negative rainfall deviation during the 1983-1985 famine and the number of
months a mother was exposed to the famine, respectively. Ethnicity, religion, region and survey round are vectors of dummy variables. The sample included in
these results excludes mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three years after the famine).
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Table A5: Effects of maternal famine exposure on children’s human capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variables child child locus of self-
zhfa schooling aspirations control esteem
Rain shortage (SD) -0.047 0.154 -0.008 0.005 -0.003
(0.070) (0.199) (0.569) (0.045) (0.049)
Rain shortage × famine cohort -0.066* 0.029 -0.122 -0.012 0.003
(0.039) (0.053) (0.166) (0.018) (0.015)
Famine months (#) 0.046 0.302* -0.339 0.001 -0.030
(0.041) (0.173) (0.514) (0.031) (0.037)
Famine months × famine cohort -0.036*** -0.053** -0.074 -0.008 -0.010
(0.014) (0.026) (0.074) (0.007) (0.009)
Famine cohort (famine=1) 0.019 0.050 0.259 -0.006 0.021
(0.057) (0.069) (0.295) (0.037) (0.031)
Household size 0.019 0.003 0.070 -0.006 -0.011
(0.021) (0.032) (0.071) (0.012) (0.010)
Age of household head -0.001 -0.001 -0.017*** 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
Gender of household head (male=1) 0.051 0.293*** 0.631*** 0.022 0.080***
(0.072) (0.090) (0.234) (0.037) (0.030)
Household head schooling 0.005 0.039*** -0.052*** 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004)
Urban/rural (urban=1) -0.176 -0.069 1.187* -0.051 0.082
(0.132) (0.319) (0.643) (0.073) (0.088)
Shock index -0.237 0.239 -2.476 -0.172 -0.501**
(0.278) (0.678) (2.089) (0.260) (0.244)
Wealth index 1.071*** 1.060*** 1.825** 0.036 0.249*
(0.248) (0.316) (0.736) (0.132) (0.143)
Gender of child (male=1) -0.187*** -0.175* -0.186 -0.015 -0.048*
(0.054) (0.099) (0.199) (0.030) (0.026)
Age of child (months) -0.024*** 0.057*** 0.071*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.008) (0.010) (0.027) (0.003) (0.003)
Child birth order -0.001 0.037 0.090 0.023 0.030**
(0.030) (0.037) (0.088) (0.016) (0.014)
Number of siblings of child -0.023 -0.086** -0.038 0.002 -0.004
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Dependent variables child child locus of self-
zhfa schooling aspirations control esteem
(0.027) (0.037) (0.111) (0.014) (0.012)
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.117*** -5.389*** 5.439 -0.023 0.029
(0.273) (1.100) (4.474) (0.223) (0.214)
Observations 2,280 1,046 569 1,742 1,742
R-squared 0.121 0.673 0.204 0.877 0.861
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Table A5 shows the effects of maternal early childhood famine exposure on their children’s
human capital using pooled OLS. The estimation sample consists of mothers who lived at the
interview site for at least 15 years by the 2002 baseline. Like the rest of the estimation sample,
mothers born before 1978 (three years before famine) and after 1988 (three years after the famine)
have been excluded.
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Table B1: Annual IBLI premium and out of pocket payments
Aug-Sept 2012; Jan-Feb 2013; Aug-Sept 2013 Jan-Feb 2014
Premium (Birr) Out of Premium (Birr) Out of
pocket pocket
Goat/ TLUs pay per Goat/ TLUs pay per
Woreda (%) Cattle Camel Sheep TLU insured TLU (Birr)* (%) Cattle Camel Sheep TLU insured TLU (Birr)*
Dillo 9.8 488 1,463 68 739 1.3 450 8.6 516 860 69 606 0.4 324
Teltele 8.7 436 1,307 61 660 3.1 385 7.7 462 770 62 543 3.3 236
Yabello 7.5 377 1,131 53 571 3.1 289 6.7 402 670 54 472 2.1 240
Dire 9.5 475 1,424 66 719 1.6 413 8.4 504 840 67 592 1.7 296
Arero 8.6 429 1,287 60 650 2.9 333 7.6 456 760 61 536 4.1 300
Dehas 9.4 468 1,404 66 709 3.0 343 8.3 498 830 66 585 4.0 234
Miyo 11.1 553 1,658 77 837 0.9 442 9.8 588 980 78 691 2.5 414
Moyale 11.1 553 1,658 77 837 1.2 566 9.8 588 980 78 691 0.0 -
Overall 461 1,382 65 698 2.3 384 489.4 815.7 65 575 2.4 279
Source: Source: ILRI, 2013 and own calculation
Note:* Average out of pocket payment per TLU by actual buyers.
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Table B2: Variable definitions
General information Description
Round 1 Baseline conducted: March/April, 2012
Round 2 Conducted: March/April, 2013
Round 3 Conducted: March 2014
Sales period 1
August-September 2012; contract active- October
2012-September 2013; Encouragement design- discount coupon,
poet tape, comic book
Sales period 2
January-February 2013; contract active- March 2013-February
2014; Encouragement design- discount coupon, poet tape, comic
book
Sales period 3
August-September 2013; contract active- October
2013-September 2014; Encouragement design- discount coupon
only
Sales period 4
January-February 2014; contract active- March 2014-February
2015; Encouragement design- discount coupon only
Variable Definition
SWB
An ordinal scale of respondents’ stated perception of their
economic condition on a Likert scale ranging from 1=very bad
to 5= very good. It is the answer to the question “On which step
do you place your present economic conditions?”
SWB relative to Borana
pastoralists
Response the question “In general, how do you rate your living
conditions compared to those of other Borana pastoralists?”
1=much worse;...; 5=much better
Continued on next page
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General information Description
Discount coupon
A dummy variable taking value 1 if a household received
discount coupon and 0 otherwise.
Audio tape
A dummy variable taking value 1 if a household received
additional information treatment via audio tape and 0
otherwise.
Comic book
A dummy variable taking value 1 if a household received
additional information via comic book and 0 otherwise.
Value of discount coupon
The amount of discount received, in percentages, which ranges
between 0 and 100%.
Number of TLU owned
A standardized measure of livestock holding. It is obtained by
multiplying number of livestock by the relevant TLU conversion
unit for each livestock type. The conversion units used are
TLU=1 for cattle, TLU=1.4 for camel, and TLU=0.1 for goats and
sheep, collectively called shoats.
Non-Livestock assets
Value of non-livestock assets in Birr. It includes assets such as
bed frame, mattress, chair, table, bicycle, motorcycle, car,
cellphone, computer, television, radio, wheelbarrow, grind mill,
axe, spade, sickle, hoe, watch, jewelry etc.
Continued on next page
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General information Description
Expected TLU loss
Constructed from a set of questions that ask responds how
many of 20 livestock (by type) they expect to die in the coming
year. These figures are converted to common TLUs. Thus,
results should be read against a total of 52 tropical livestock
units. The questions used are “what is the number out of 20 X
do you expect to die over the March 2013 to February 2014
period?” X here stands for livestock types.
Insurance premium
Insurance premium per TLU. Insurance premium vary by
livestock type and Woreda. Some household in the sample also
received discount. To reflect this variation, premium is
calculated as:
(1 −%discount) × (cattlepremium × 1 + camelpremium × 1.4 +
shoatspremium × 0.1)/3.
Cash income
Includes cash income (in 1,000 Birr) from sale of livestock and
livestock products, crop sales, wages and salaries, business and
trading (petty trading, motorcycle services etc), cash for work
(bush clearing, pond digging etc), mining etc.
Net transfers
The value of annual net cash transfers (during the four seasons:
long dry, long rainy, short dry and short rainy). It includes both
cash and in kind transfers. It is the difference between transfers
received and transfers given.
Value of food aid
The value of annual food aid (in 1,000 Birr) received by
households. It is calculated by multiplying the value of monthly
food aid by the number of months food aid is received.
Continued on next page
223
Table B2 – Continued from previous page
General information Description
Non-food assistance
The value of annual non-food assistance (in 1,000 Birr). It
includes value of annual should feeding, supplementary
feeding, income from employment program, and non-food aid.
The value of non-food aid consists of non-food aid from
government, NGOs, and PSNP program e.g., water, fodder,
vaccination, cash transfers via PSNP.
Annual Income
The sum of annual cash income, value of auto-consumption, net
transfers, food aid, and non-food assistance in 1,000 Birr.
Price per TLU
The average price of a TLU equivalent calculated by weighting
prices for shoats, cattle, and camel at Haro Bake livestock
market in Borana zone by each species’ TLU conversion unit.
More specifically, we used Birr 700 for shoats price, Birr 5,000 for
cattle price and Birr 15,000 for camel price. The TLU conversion
unit for shoats is 0.1, for cattle 1 and camel 1.4. Thus, price per
TLU=0.1700 + 15,000 + 1.415,000 = Birr 7,571.4.
Asset Index
An index constructed from the current value of non-livestock
assets using the principal component factor (PCF) method.
Household size
The number of people who live in the same homestead
including people who are away temporarily for less than eight
months.
Number of non-working
age household members
Includes household members 14 years old and under and 65
years and above.
Continued on next page
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General information Description
Iqub membership
Iqub is an informal rotating saving and credit organization
(ROSCA). The variable takes value 1 if a household member is a
member of Iqub, and 0 otherwise.
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Table B3: Joint orthogonality test for selection into treatment
Aug-Sep sales period Jan-Feb sales period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Discount Comic Audio Discount Comic Audio
coupon book tape coupon book tape
Expected TLU loss -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.0003 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of TLUs owned -0.001** 0.001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0004 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Asset index 0.010 -0.033 -0.038** 0.012 -0.030 -0.029
(0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 0.0002 0.0005 -0.00003 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004)
Household head gender (Male=1) -0.077** -0.0004 -0.018 -0.043 -0.009 -0.044
(0.034) (0.048) (0.041) (0.034) (0.049) (0.042)
Household head age -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.00004 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household size 0.018* 0.020 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.019
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
Household head schooling 0.005 0.006 -0.006 0.002 0.014 -0.010
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Number of females in household -0.024** -0.017 -0.010 -0.010 0.003 -0.014
(0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015)
Number of working age household members -0.010 -0.022 0.013 -0.017 0.006 0.004
(0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
Iqub membership 0.056 0.111* -0.039 0.015 -0.010 -0.020
(0.049) (0.065) (0.055) (0.049) (0.066) (0.056)
Constant 0.909*** 0.130 0.078 0.868*** 0.084 0.070
(0.058) (0.083) (0.071) (0.059) (0.084) (0.072)
Observations 968 473 473 968 473 473
Prob > F 0.144 0.463 0.411 0.729 0.840 0.129
R-squared 0.016 0.023 0.024 0.008 0.014 0.035
Continued on next page
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Discount Comic Audio Discount Comic Audio
coupon book tape coupon book tape
Standard errors cluster bootstrapped at the Reera level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Table A3 presents joint tests of orthogonality for the treatment variables. Prior to sales period 1 (Aug-Sep
2012) and sales period 2 (Jan-Feb 2013), discount coupons as well as audio tape and comic book information treat-
ments were distributed to randomly selected sub-sample of survey households. Similarly, prior to sales period 3
(Aug-Sep 2013) and sales period 4 (Jan-Feb 2014) discount coupons were distributed to randomly selected house-
holds. Columns 1-3 and 4-6 show the linear probability model (LPM) regressions of assignment into discount
coupon, comic book and audio tape treatment in the Aug-Sep and Jan-Feb sales periods, respectively, on lagged
household characteristics using a pooled sample from rounds 2 and 3. Note that the sample includes baseline
households who were re-interviewed in R2 and R2 households re-interviewed in R3. The joint orthogonality test
(F-test) is reported in the second bottom row.
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Table B4: Comparison of uncorrected SWB and vignette corrected SWB
a) SWB Vs. vignette corrected SWB
Vignette corrected SWB
SWB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Very bad (1) 27 93 0 0 0 0 0 120
Bad (2) 31 30 115 74 15 0 0 265
Neither good nor bad (3) 65 22 147 224 221 5 5 689
Good (4) 29 7 23 85 183 34 9 370
Very good (5) 0 5 0 8 0 58 17 88
Total 152 157 285 391 419 97 31 1532
b) SWB relative to Borana pastoralists Vs. vignette-corrected SWB relative to
Borana pastoralists
Vignette corrected SWB relative to Borana households
SWB relative to
Borana households 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Much worse (1) 13 51 0 0 0 0 0 64
Worse (2) 28 32 145 88 21 0 1 315
Same (3) 67 19 154 181 194 5 6 626
Better (4) 31 15 27 92 266 59 13 503
Much better (5) 0 2 0 2 0 13 7 24
Total 139 119 326 363 481 77 27 1532
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Table B5: Probit model estimates of IBLI uptake
Dependent variable: IBLI uptake (1) (2)
Discount: SP1 only 1.865*** 1.633***
(0.308) (0.309)
Discount: SP2 only 1.861*** 1.754***
(0.367) (0.350)
Discount: SP1 & SP2 1.661*** 1.445***
(0.393) (0.368)
Value of discount (%) SP1 0.956** 0.955**
(0.390) (0.406)
Value of discount (%) SP2 0.163 0.030
(0.367) (0.350)
Poet tape: SP1 only 0.672 0.827
(0.709) (0.712)
Poet tape: SP2 only 1.381*** 1.336***
(0.337) (0.317)
Poet tape: SP1 & SP2 0.237 0.115
(0.461) (0.429)
Comic book: SP1 only 0.770 0.777*
(0.478) (0.434)
Comic book: SP2 only 0.344 0.121
(0.426) (0.427)
Comic book: SP1 & SP2 0.921* 0.799
(0.508) (0.535)
IBLI premium: SP1 2.725 -0.846
(1.738) (8.931)
IBLI premium: SP2 1.905 4.095
(1.640) (10.080)
IBLI knowledge 0.232***
(0.055)
Expected TLUs loss -0.001
(0.012)
Number of TLUs owned 0.006
(0.004)
Asset index 0.028
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable: IBLI uptake (1) (2)
(0.097)
Annual income (’000 Birr) -0.001
(0.002)
Household head gender (Male=1) -0.216
(0.230)
Household head age -0.022
(0.026)
Household age squared 0.0002
(0.0002)
Household size 0.008
(0.057)
Household head schooling -0.025
(0.048)
Iqub membership -0.362
(0.282)
Household composition No Yes
Round dummy No Yes
Constant -4.647*** -4.191**
(1.684) (1.779)
Observations 1,015 1,015
Number of households 520 520
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B6: Ordered logit regression: Estimates for vignette adjusted SWB
relative to Borana pastoralists using IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs in-
sured
IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: SWB relative
to Borana pastoralists panel (a)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured 0.942*** 0.930*** 1.070*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.188***
(0.269) (0.273) (0.290) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Predicted lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured -0.351* -0.336* -0.364* -0.075** -0.072** -0.080**
(0.200) (0.199) (0.201) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Number of TLUs owned 0.010** 0.009* 0.009* 0.010** 0.009** 0.009**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Asset index 0.044 -0.006 0.103 0.060
(0.141) (0.145) (0.123) (0.120)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household head gender (Male=1) 0.593 0.436
(0.366) (0.337)
Household head age -0.044 -0.037
(0.041) (0.038)
Household head age squared 0.0004 0.000
(0.0003) (0.000)
Household size -0.232** -0.187**
(0.093) (0.088)
Household head schooling 0.071 0.077*
(0.045) (0.046)
panel (b)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=2) -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=3) -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Continued on next page
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IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
prob(SWB=4) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.0004 0.0004 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001)
prob(SWB=5) 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.077*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
prob(SWB=6) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=7) 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Predicted lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) 0.016* 0.016* 0.017* 0.003** 0.003** 0.004**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=2) 0.012* 0.011* 0.012* 0.002** 0.002** 0.003**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=3) 0.014* 0.013* 0.014* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=4) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=5) -0.025* -0.024* -0.026* -0.005** -0.005** -0.006**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=6) -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=7) -0.006* -0.005* -0.006* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of TLUs owned
prob(SWB=1) -0.0004** -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0005** -0.0004* -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
prob(SWB=2) -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0003*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
prob(SWB=3) -0.0004** -0.0004* -0.0003* -0.0004** -0.0004* -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
prob(SWB=4) 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
prob(SWB=5) 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=6) 0.0003** 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003** 0.0003* 0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
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IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
prob(SWB=7) 0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0001*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00008)
Household composition No No Yes No No Yes
Round dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
Number of households 550 550 550 550 550 550
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Panel (a) reports the effects of IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured on vignette adjusted SWB relative
to Borana pastoralists in log-odds units. Panel (b) reports the marginal effects for the main results in panel (a)
– IBLI/ TLUs insured, lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured and number of TLUs owned. The marginal effects estimates
in panel (b) show the effects of these variables on the probability of reporting one of the seven unique scales of
SWB. In column 3 for example, IBLI uptake reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1 by 4.9% and increases
the probability of reporting SWB=7 by 1.7%. A unit increase in TLUs owned reduces the probability of reporting
SWB=1 by 0.4% and increases the probability of reporting SWB=7 by 0.1%
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Table B7: Ordered logit regression: Estimates for SWB using IBLI uptake
and volume of TLUs insured
IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: SWB panel (a)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured 0.759*** 0.597** 0.646** 0.126*** 0.128*** 0.126***
(0.250) (0.238) (0.282) (0.041) (0.041) (0.034)
Predicted lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured -0.724*** -0.734*** -0.730*** -0.136*** -0.133*** -0.135***
(0.223) (0.230) (0.233) (0.033) (0.034) (0.022)
Number of TLUs owned 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Asset index 0.205** 0.187** 0.231*** 0.213***
(0.086) (0.089) (0.080) (0.055)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Household head gender (Male=1) 0.406** 0.346***
(0.191) (0.131)
Household head age 0.023 0.025
(0.021) (0.020)
Household head age squared -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Household size -0.066 -0.051
(0.055) (0.043)
Household head schooling -0.019 -0.017
(0.032) (0.024)
panel (b)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) -0.051*** -0.040** -0.043** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
prob(SWB=2) -0.077*** -0.060** -0.064** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
prob(SWB=3) -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=4) 0.098*** 0.077** 0.083** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
prob(SWB=5) 0.032*** 0.025** 0.027** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
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IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Predicted lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=2) 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
prob(SWB=3) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=4) -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
prob(SWB=5) -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of TLUs owned
prob(SWB=1) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
prob(SWB=2) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=3) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=4) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=5) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Household composition No No Yes No No Yes
Round dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
Number of households 550 550 550 550 550 550
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Panel (a) reports the effects of IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured on raw (unadjusted) SWB in log-
odds units. Panel (b) reports the marginal effects for the main results in panel (a) – IBLI/ TLUs insured, lapsed
IBLI/ TLUs insured and number of TLUs owned. The marginal effects estimates in panel (b) show the effects of
these variables on the probability of reporting one of the five unique scales of SWB. In column 3 for example, IBLI
uptake reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1 by 4.3% and increases the probability of reporting SWB=5 by
2.7%. In column 6, unit increase in the number of TLUs insured reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1 by
0.8% and increases the probability of reporting SWB=5 by 0.5%
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Table B8: Ordered logit regression: Vignette adjusted SWB estimates using
IBLI uptake and TLUs insured – panel households only
IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: SWB panel (a)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured 0.921*** 0.799*** 0.944*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.154***
(0.274) (0.269) (0.300) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042)
Predicted lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured -0.486** -0.449** -0.452** -0.074** -0.066** -0.068**
(0.203) (0.190) (0.190) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Number of TLUs owned 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.014* 0.009 0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Asset index 0.237* 0.186 0.315*** 0.280***
(0.129) (0.135) (0.110) (0.106)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household head gender (Male=1) 0.801** 0.663**
(0.372) (0.335)
Household head age -0.049 -0.047
(0.042) (0.038)
Household head age squared 0.0005 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Household size -0.208** -0.173**
(0.093) (0.086)
Household head schooling 0.034 0.034
(0.059) (0.062)
panel (b)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.046*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=2) -0.038*** -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=3) -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=4) 0.006** 0.005* 0.007** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=5) 0.060*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010***
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IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
prob(SWB=6) 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=7) 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Predicted lapsed IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) 0.024** 0.022** 0.022** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=2) 0.020*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=3) 0.016** 0.014** 0.015** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=4) -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=5) -0.032*** -0.029** -0.029** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=6) -0.016*** -0.014** -0.014** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=7) -0.009*** -0.009** -0.008** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of TLUs owned
prob(SWB=1) -0.001 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.001* -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
prob(SWB=2) -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.001* -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=3) -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=4) 0.00008 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.00007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
prob(SWB=5) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=6) 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=7) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003* 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Household composition No No Yes No No Yes
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IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Round dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,395 1,395 1,395 1,395 1,395 1,395
Number of households 465 465 465 465 465 465
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Panel (a) reports the effects of IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured on vignette adjusted SWB in log-
odds units. Panel (b) reports the marginal effects for the main results in panel (a) – IBLI/ TLUs insured, lapsed
IBLI/ TLUs insured and number of TLUs owned. The marginal effects estimates in panel (b) show the effects of
these variables on the probability of reporting one of the seven unique scales of SWB. In column 3 for example,
IBLI uptake reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1 by 4.6% and increases the probability of reporting SWB=7
by 1.8%. In column 6, a unit increase in the number of TLUs insured reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1
by 0.7% and increases the probability of reporting SWB=7 by 0.3%
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Table B9: Ordered logit regression: Vignette adjusted SWB estimates using
IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured with omitted lapsed IBLI
IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: SWB panel (a)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured 0.641*** 0.552** 0.704** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.115***
(0.245) (0.249) (0.282) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Number of TLUs owned 0.014** 0.012* 0.012* 0.015** 0.011* 0.012*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Asset index 0.286** 0.243** 0.329*** 0.296***
(0.116) (0.123) (0.103) (0.102)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Household head gender (Male=1) 0.747** 0.635*
(0.360) (0.333)
Household head age -0.046 -0.040
(0.040) (0.038)
Household head age squared 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Household size -0.229** -0.197**
(0.090) (0.085)
Household head schooling 0.049 0.051
(0.051) (0.052)
panel (b)
Predicted IBLI/ TLUs insured
prob(SWB=1) -0.033*** -0.029** -0.036** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=2) -0.026** -0.022** -0.029** -0.004** -0.004** -0.005***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
prob(SWB=3) -0.019** -0.016** -0.021** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=4) 0.004* 0.004 0.005* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001)
prob(SWB=5) 0.041** 0.035** 0.045** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
prob(SWB=6) 0.021*** 0.018** 0.023*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
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IBLI uptake TLUs insured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
prob(SWB=7) 0.012** 0.010** 0.013** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of TLUs owned
prob(SWB=1) -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
prob(SWB=2) -0.001** -0.0005* -0.000* -0.001** -0.0005* -0.0005*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
prob(SWB=3) -0.0004** -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004** -0.0003 -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
prob(SWB=4) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
prob(SWB=5) 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
prob(SWB=6) 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
prob(SWB=7) 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Household composition No No Yes No No Yes
Round dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
Number of households 550 550 550 550 550 550
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Panel (a) reports the effects of IBLI uptake and volume of TLUs insured on vignette adjusted SWB when
lagged IBLI/ TLUs insured is omitted, in log-odds units. Panel (b) reports the marginal effects for the main results
in panel (a) – IBLI/ TLUs insured and number of TLUs owned. The marginal effects estimates in panel (b) show
the effects of these variables on the probability of reporting one of the seven unique scales of SWB. In column 3,
IBLI uptake reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1 by 3.6% and increases the probability of reporting SWB=7
by 1.3%. In column 6, a unit increase in the number of TLUs insured reduces the probability of reporting SWB=1
by 0.6% and increases the probability of reporting SWB=7 by 0.2%
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B.2 Attrition Correction
There was attrition of some sample households in the follow up rounds of the
survey used in this paper. If the sample households who dropped out differ sys-
tematically from those who remained in the sample, inference becomes difficult
due to attrition bias. In this section, we test whether households who dropped out
of the sample introduce attrition bias into our estimates. We find that they do not.
Between the baseline and second round survey 40 (about 8% of the sample)
households dropped out, and in round three an additional 10 households (2% of
sample) dropped out. Yet in round three, 10 of the 40 households who dropped
out in round two returned and were re-interviewed. Following [90], we first check
if attrition is random by estimating attrition probit equations for our outcome
variables: IBLI uptake and SWB. Then, if attrition is found to be non-random, we
make attrition bias correction to our estimates in Tables 4 and 5.
We estimate the equations:
pr(Aivt = 1) = τ0 + τ1IBLIivt−1 + τ2Xivt + τ3Zivt + ψi + eivt (B1)
and
pr(Aivt = 1) = τ′0 + τ
′
1SWBivt−1 + τ
′
2Xivt + τ
′
3Zivt + ψ
′
i + e
′
ivt (B2)
where, A is an attrition dummy variable that takes value one if a households
attrites in any survey rounds or zero otherwise; X is a vector of household de-
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mographic characteristics, household composition, household income and wealth
variables, Z is a vector of auxiliary variables that may affect attrition including dis-
count and information treatments, group membership dummies, and exposure to
various shocks. The right hand side variables also include lagged IBLI uptake and
SWB.
Appendix Table A10 presents probit estimates of the probability of attrition
with lagged IBLI and SWB equations. Column 1 shows that all of the coefficients
are individually insignificant, suggesting that attrition is random. Wald joint test
of the group (auxiliary) variables (Chi-squared statistic of 26.08 with 23 degrees of
freedom and p-value of 0.297) indicates that these variables are not jointly statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. Similarly, column two shows that all of the
explanatory variables are statistically insignificant, except for the discount coupon
in sales period one, which is significant only at the 10% level. These results also
suggest attrition is random. The resulting Chi-squared statistic of a joint Wald test
of the group variables and discount coupon in sales period one of 26.37 with 24
degrees of freedom and p-value of 0.335 indicates attrition is random. This leads
us to conclude that our estimates of IBLI participation and the effect of IBLI on
SWB are likely free of attrition bias, and that no attrition correction is required.
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Table B10: Attrition probit estimates
(1) (2)
Attrition on Attrition on
Dependent variable: Attrition dummy IBLI status SWB
IBLIt−1 -0.219
(0.289)
SWBt−1 0.086
(0.126)
Discount: SP1 only -0.868 -0.898*
(0.456) (0.545)
Discount: SP2 only -0.673 -0.670
(0.695) (0.730)
Value of discount (%) SP1 -0.650 -0.692
(0.786) (0.959)
Value of discount (%) SP2 -0.128 -0.220
(0.992) (1.416)
Comic book: SP1 only 0.430 0.482
(0.409) (0.416)
Household head gender (Male=1) -0.317 -0.352
(0.282) (0.325)
Household head age -0.011 -0.014
(0.041) (0.048)
Household age squared 0.00002 0.00005
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Household size -0.306 -0.321
(0.380) (0.472)
Household head highest grade -0.053 -0.055
(0.115) (0.098)
Number of female household members -0.041 -0.050
(0.104) (0.122)
Number of household members under 5 0.266 0.292
(0.389) (0.472)
Number of household members between 5 and 15 0.282 0.297
(0.377) (0.475)
Number of household members between 15 and 64 0.278 0.297
Continued on next page
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Attrition on Attrition on
Dependent variable: Attrition dummy IBLI status SWB
(0.362) (0.442)
Number of TLUs owned 0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
Asset index -0.027 -0.030
(0.217) (0.250)
Annual income (’000 Birr) 0.001 0.0003
(0.007) (0.009)
Net transfers (’000 Birr) -0.041 -0.036
(0.038) (0.036)
If household head is village water point group -0.157 -0.189
(0.464) (0.604)
If household head is village pasture group 0.006 0.016
(0.401) (0.465)
If household head is a member of Iqub 0.726 0.701
(0.534) (0.624)
Animal sickness or death 0.016 0.014
(0.259) (0.274)
Animal loss or theft 0.083 0.077
(0.277) (0.326)
Insecurity/Violence/Fights 0.218 0.223
(0.256) (0.314)
Human sickness -0.068 -0.070
(0.261) (0.304)
Low prices for animals one wishes to sell 0.134 0.119
(0.214) (0.243)
Crop disease -0.137 -0.148
(0.206) (0.258)
Lack of food -0.079 -0.063
(0.417) (0.465)
High food prices 0.050 0.076
(0.392) (0.524)
Land scarcity/disputes 0.063 0.089
(0.283) (0.317)
Lack of employment opportunities -0.442 -0.474
Continued on next page
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Attrition on Attrition on
Dependent variable: Attrition dummy IBLI status SWB
(0.320) (0.407)
Flood damage 0.013 -0.007
(0.285) (0.329)
Constant -0.113 -0.299
(1.051) (1.306)
Observations 1,012 1,012
Number of groups (households) 538 538
Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure C1: Distribution of yield by cropping system
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Figure C2: Distribution of yield by cropping system
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Table C1: GMM estimates of mean elasticities using translog production
technology - marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Sweet
log crop yield Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
Log labor (days) 1.303∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 1.955∗∗∗ 1.992∗∗∗ 1.609∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Log fertilizer (kg) 0.118∗∗∗ -0.019 0.128∗∗∗ 0.165∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.053) (0.020) (0.094) (0.065) (0.054) (0.016)
Log seed value (USh) 0.122∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.016) (0.030)
Log pesticides (kg) -0.292 17.686∗∗ -0.446 -2.779∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗ 1.355∗∗∗ 1.087
(0.231) (7.222) (0.345) (0.777) (0.488) (0.435) (0.756)
Log maize plot (ht) -1.674∗∗∗ 0.014 0.232∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.029 0.093 0.098
(0.149) (0.032) (0.080) (0.048) (0.073) (0.068) (0.094)
Log sorghum plot (ht) -0.478∗∗ -1.538∗∗∗ -0.352∗ -0.083 0.066 0.025 0.185
(0.223) (0.190) (0.196) (0.098) (0.163) (0.140) (0.391)
Log beans plot (ht) 0.621∗∗∗ 0.034 -2.139∗∗∗ 0.004 0.116 0.155∗∗ 0.076
(0.098) (0.038) (0.165) (0.052) (0.080) (0.073) (0.100)
Log groundnuts plot (ht) 0.504∗∗∗ -0.016 0.856∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.090 0.270∗∗ 0.267
(0.154) (0.053) (0.138) (0.162) (0.123) (0.116) (0.163)
Log sweet potatoes plot (ht) 0.565∗∗∗ -0.027 0.467∗∗∗ 0.017 1.997∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗ -0.019
(0.111) (0.038) (0.102) (0.058) (0.198) (0.082) (0.113)
Log cassava plot (ht) 0.031 -0.066∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.077 -0.109 1.040∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.111) (0.038) (0.101) (0.058) (0.087) (0.150) (0.115)
Log matoke plot (ht) 0.444∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.046 0.016 0.111∗ 0.510∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable: Sweet
squared residual (u2) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
(0.084) (0.030) (0.073) (0.044) (0.066) (0.062) (0.130)
Log total land area (ht) -0.068∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.068∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.067∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Parcel slope (%) -0.0005 -0.00001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parcel elevation (m) -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.000005 -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.00005∗∗ -0.00002 -0.00002 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00004)
Rainfall (’000 mm) 0.048 -0.002 0.121∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.002 0.182∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.016) (0.040) (0.024) (0.036) (0.034) (0.045)
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parcel characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774
R2 0.783 0.846 0.758 0.790 0.858 0.854 0.845
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table presents the elasticity estimates of yield (mean) equation. Due to interaction terms in the translog
specification, marginal effects evaluated at the mean value of covariates are reported. The dependent variables are
log crop yields in quintals. All regressors listed above are in logs and the units in which each regressor is measured
is given in parenthesis. The amount of fertilizer used includes both organic and inorganic fertilizer. kg, ht, m and
mm stand for kilogram, hectare, meter and millimeter, respectively. Household characteristics include household
(hh) head gender, age, marital status, years of schooling, household size, hh average years of schooling, spouse
years of schooling, hh average age, distance to major road, population center of 20,000, and nearest market. Parcel
characteristics include agro-ecology, soil type, soil quality, water source (irrigation=1) and topography.
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Table C2: GMM estimates of variance elasticities using translog produc-
tion technology - marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Sweet
squared residual (u2) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
Log labor (days) 0.392∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.031) (0.019) (0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.033)
Log fertilizer (kg) -0.140∗ -0.130 0.120∗∗∗ -1.298∗∗∗ 0.152 0.136 0.189∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.101) (0.044) (0.192) (0.178) (0.139) (0.044)
Log seed value (USh) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.076∗ -0.202∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.035) (0.042) (0.083)
Log pesticides (kg) -1.224∗∗ -13.585 -0.808 1.393 1.106 1.753 -2.233
(0.586) (13.606) (0.753) (1.589) (1.337) (1.120) (2.101)
Log maize plot (ht) 1.664∗∗∗ 0.021 0.477∗∗∗ 0.163 -0.384∗ -0.120 -0.252
(0.379) (0.060) (0.175) (0.099) (0.199) (0.176) (0.263)
Log sorghum plot (ht) -0.282 0.479 -0.914∗∗ -0.350∗ -0.893∗∗ -0.102 -1.185
(0.568) (0.357) (0.428) (0.201) (0.446) (0.360) (1.089)
Log beans plot (ht) 0.269 0.006 2.554∗∗∗ 0.086 0.280 0.047 -0.135
(0.248) (0.071) (0.361) (0.106) (0.220) (0.188) (0.279)
Log groundnuts plot (ht) 0.640 0.192∗ 0.421 1.508∗∗∗ 0.073 0.001 -0.971∗∗
(0.392) (0.101) (0.300) (0.332) (0.338) (0.298) (0.454)
Log sweet potatoes plot (ht) 0.360 -0.106 -0.132 0.108 7.564∗∗∗ 0.258 -0.345
(0.281) (0.071) (0.222) (0.120) (0.543) (0.212) (0.316)
Log cassava plot (ht) -0.599∗∗ -0.051 -0.291 -0.098 -0.329 6.948∗∗∗ -0.420
(0.283) (0.071) (0.220) (0.119) (0.237) (0.387) (0.322)
Log matoke plot (ht) 0.497∗∗ 0.044 0.262 0.009 0.224 0.164 4.923∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable: Sweet
squared residual (u2) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
(0.213) (0.057) (0.160) (0.090) (0.181) (0.159) (0.363)
Log total land area (ht) -0.109∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.135∗∗∗ -0.023 0.003 -0.068∗∗ 0.036
(0.036) (0.009) (0.027) (0.015) (0.031) (0.027) (0.039)
Parcel slope (%) -0.0003 -0.001 0.0004 0.002∗ -0.004∗ -0.005∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Parcel elevation (m) -0.0003∗∗ 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Rainfall (’000 mm) 0.363∗∗∗ 0.036 0.369∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.027 0.609∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.029) (0.087) (0.049) (0.099) (0.087) (0.125)
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parcel characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774
R2 0.086 0.146 0.073 0.168 0.079 0.088 0.082
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table presents the elasticity estimates of yield (mean) equation. Due to interaction terms in the translog
specification, marginal effects evaluated at the mean value of covariates are reported. The dependent variables are
squared residuals from the mean equation. All regressors listed above are in logs and the units in which each regres-
sor is measured is given in parenthesis. The amount of fertilizer used includes both organic and inorganic fertilizer.
kg, ht, m and mm stand for kilogram, hectare, meter and millimeter, respectively. Household characteristics include
household (hh) head gender, age, marital status, years of schooling, household size, hh average years of schooling,
spouse years of schooling, hh average age, distance to major road, population center of 20,000, and nearest market.
Parcel characteristics include agro-ecology, soil type, soil quality, water source (irrigation=1) and topography.
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Table C3: GMM estimates of skewness elasticities using translog produc-
tion technology - marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Sweet
cubic residual (u3) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
Log labor (days) -0.154 -0.174 -0.265∗∗∗ -0.063 -0.494∗∗∗ -0.854∗∗∗ -1.069∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.117) (0.079) (0.110) (0.157) (0.139) (0.161)
Log fertilizer (kg) -0.346 -0.324 0.223 -1.354∗∗ 0.875 0.538 1.055∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.378) (0.186) (0.681) (0.787) (0.612) (0.212)
Log seed value (USh) 0.028 0.338∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ -0.188 -0.111 -0.535
(0.053) (0.041) (0.027) (0.031) (0.153) (0.183) (0.405)
Log pesticides (kg) 1.718 -8.357 -2.642 4.662 -7.992 3.635 -4.221
(2.834) (51.174) (3.177) (5.618) (5.912) (4.923) (10.207)
Log maize plot (ht) 4.387∗∗ 0.051 1.600∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ -0.947 0.362 -0.452
(1.834) (0.225) (0.748) (0.351) (0.885) (0.774) (1.296)
Log sorghum plot (ht) -0.257 3.469∗∗∗ -1.615 -0.212 -2.768 1.251 -4.519
(2.751) (1.345) (1.821) (0.709) (1.982) (1.587) (5.308)
Log beans plot (ht) 1.934 0.099 7.196∗∗∗ 0.183 0.816 0.804 -0.761
(1.205) (0.267) (1.530) (0.376) (0.978) (0.830) (1.374)
Log groundnuts plot (ht) 0.450 1.238∗∗∗ 1.042 0.742 1.268 0.563 -1.585
(1.902) (0.380) (1.282) (1.173) (1.504) (1.311) (2.233)
Log sweet potatoes plot (ht) 1.987 -0.225 0.362 0.212 10.834∗∗∗ 1.390 -0.160
(1.363) (0.269) (0.947) (0.424) (2.404) (0.933) (1.557)
Log cassava plot (ht) -2.117 -0.151 -0.490 -0.010 -0.961 17.848∗∗∗ -0.716
(1.374) (0.269) (0.938) (0.421) (1.055) (1.701) (1.584)
Log matoke plot (ht) 1.719∗ 0.307 0.496 -0.080 0.983 1.494∗∗ 7.505∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Dependent variable: Sweet
squared residual (u2) Maize Sorghum Beans Groundnuts potatoes Cassava Matoke
(1.031) (0.214) (0.684) (0.318) (0.803) (0.702) (1.774)
Log total land area (ht) -0.602∗∗∗ 0.042 -0.401∗∗∗ -0.090∗ 0.029 -0.392∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.175) (0.034) (0.117) (0.054) (0.137) (0.120) (0.193)
Parcel slope (%) 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.010∗∗ -0.015 -0.007 0.011
(0.014) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016)
Parcel elevation (m) -0.002∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Rainfall (’000 mm) 1.765∗∗∗ 0.191∗ 1.799∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗ 0.288 3.435∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.111) (0.372) (0.174) (0.439) (0.384) (0.618)
HH characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parcel characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774 18,774
R2 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.021
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: This table presents the elasticity estimates of yield (mean) equation. Due to interaction terms in the translog
specification, marginal effects evaluated at the mean value of covariates are reported. The dependent variables are
cubed residuals from the mean equation. All regressors listed above are in logs and the units in which each regressor
is measured is given in parenthesis. The amount of fertilizer used includes both organic and inorganic fertilizer.
kg, ht, m and mm stand for kilogram, hectare, meter and millimeter, respectively. Household characteristics include
household (hh) head gender, age, marital status, years of schooling, household size, hh average years of schooling,
spouse years of schooling, hh average age, distance to major road, population center of 20,000, and nearest market.
Parcel characteristics include agro-ecology, soil type, soil quality, water source (irrigation=1) and topography.
256
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Aynalem Adugna. The 1984 drought and settler migration in Ethiopia. In
John I. Clarke, Peter Curson, S. L. Kayastha, and Prithvish Nag, editors,
Population and disaster, pages 114–127. Blackwell Oxford, England, 1989.
[2] Richard Akresh, Sonia Bhalotra, Marinella Leone, and Una Okonkwo Os-
ili. War and stature: Growing up during the Nigerian civil war. American
Economic Review, 102(3):273–277, 2012.
[3] Harold Alderman, John Hoddinott, and Bill Kinsey. Long term conse-
quences of early childhood malnutrition. Oxford Economic Papers, 58(3):450–
474, 2006.
[4] Harold Alderman and Christina Paxson. Do the poor insure? A synthesis of
the literature on risk and consumption in developing countries. Technical
Report 1008, The World Bank, 1992.
[5] Douglas Almond. Is the 1918 influenza pandemic over? Longterm effects
of in utero influenza exposure in the post-1940 U.S. population. Journal of
Political Economy, 114(4):672–712, 2006.
[6] Douglas Almond, Kenneth Y. Chay, and David S. Lee. The costs of low birth
weight. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(August):1031–1083, 2005.
[7] Douglas Almond, Lena Edlund, Hongbin Li, and Junsen Zhang. Long-term
effects of early-life development: Evidence from the 1959 to 1961 China
famine. In The Economic Consequences of Demographic Change in East Asia,
NBER-EASE Volume 19, pages 321–345. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
[8] Douglas Almond and Bhashkar Mazumder. Health capital and the prenatal
environment: The effect of Ramadan observance during pregnancy. Ameri-
can Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(4):56–85, 2011.
[9] Miguel A. Altieri. The ecological role of biodiversity in agroecosystems.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 74(1):19–31, 1999.
257
[10] Miguel A. Altieri, Marcos A. Lana, Henrique V. Bittencourt, Andr S. Kiel-
ing, Jucinei J. Comin, and Paulo E. Lovato. Enhancing crop productivity
via weed suppression in organic no-till cropping systems in Santa Catarina,
Brazil. Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, 35(8):855–869, 2011.
[11] Tilahun Amede and Yitbarek Nigatu. Interaction of components of
sweetpotato-maize intercropping under the semi-arid conditions of the Rift-
Valley, Ethiopia. Tropical Agriculture, 78(1):1–7, 2001.
[12] Samuel K. Ampaabeng and Chih Ming Tan. The long-term cognitive con-
sequences of early childhood malnutrition: The case of famine in Ghana.
Journal of Health Economics, 32(6):1013–1027, 2013.
[13] David A. Andow. Vegetational diversity and arthropod population re-
sponse. Annual Review of Entomology, 36(34567):561–586, 1991.
[14] Joshua D. Angrist and Jo¨rn-Steffen Pischke. Mostly harmless econometrics: An
empiricist’s companion. Princeton university press, 2008.
[15] John M. Antle. Testing the stochastic structure of production: A flexible
moment-based approach. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 1(3):192–
201, 1983.
[16] Bruce A. Babcock. The effects of uncertainty on optimal nitrogen applica-
tions. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 14(2):271–280, 1992.
[17] Bruce A. Babcock, James A. Chalfant, and Robert N. Collender. Simulta-
neous input demands and land allocation in agricultural production under
uncertainty. Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 12(2):207–215, 1987.
[18] David J. Barker. The fetal and infant origins of adult disease. British Medical
Journal, 301(6761):1111–1111, 1990.
[19] David J. Barker. Fetal origins of coronary heart disease. British Medical Jour-
nal, 311(6998):171–174, 1995.
258
[20] Christopher B. Barrett. On price risk and the inverse farm size-productivity
relationship. Journal of Development Economics, 51(2):193–215, 1996.
[21] Christopher B. Barrett and Michael R. Carter. The economics of poverty
traps and persistent poverty: Empirical and policy implications. Journal of
Development Studies, 49(7):976–990, 2013.
[22] Christopher B. Barrett, Francis Chabari, DeeVon Bailey, Peter D. Little, and
D. Layne Coppock. Livestock pricing in the northern Kenyan rangelands.
Journal of African Economies, 12(2):127–155, 2003.
[23] Laurent Bedoussac, Etienne-Pascal Journet, Henrik Hauggaard-Nielsen,
Christophe Naudin, Guenaelle Corre-Hellou, E. Steen Jensen, Loı¨c Prieur,
and Eric Justes. Ecological principles underlying the increase of productiv-
ity achieved by cereal-grain legume intercrops in organic farming. A review.
Agronomy for Sustainable Development, 35(3):911–935, 2015.
[24] Kathleen Beegle, Rajeev H. Dehejia, and Roberta Gatti. Child labor and
agricultural shocks. Journal of Development Economics, 81(1):80–96, 2006.
[25] Kathleen Beegle, Kristen Himelein, and Martin Ravallion. Frame-of-
reference bias in subjective welfare. Journal of Economic Behavior & Orga-
nization, 81(2):556–570, 2012.
[26] Yoram Ben-Porath. The production of human capital and the life cycle of
earnings. Journal of Political Economy, 75(4, Part 1):352–365, 1967.
[27] Betemariam Berhanu and Michael White. War, famine, and female mi-
gration in Ethiopia, 19601989. Economic Development and Cultural Change,
49(1):91–113, 2000.
[28] Wassie Berhanu. Recurrent shocks, poverty traps and the degradation of
pastoralists’ social capital in southern Ethiopia. African Journal of Agricul-
tural and Resrouce Economics, 6(1):1–15, 2011.
[29] Timothy Besley. Chapter 36: Savings, credit and insurance. In T. N. Srini-
259
vasan and Jere Behrman, editors, Handbook of Development Economics, vol-
ume 3, pages 2123–2207. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1995.
[30] Leah E. M. Bevis and Christopher B. Barrett. Decomposing intergenera-
tional income elasticity: The gender-differentiated contribution of capital
transmission in rural Philippines. World Development, 74:233–252, 2015.
[31] Hans P. Binswanger and John McIntire. Behavioral and material determi-
nants of production relations in land-abundant Tropical agriculture. Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change, 36(1):73–99, 1987.
[32] Hans P. Binswanger and Mark R. Rosenzweig. Behavioural and material
determinants of production relations in agriculture. Journal of Development
Studies, 22(3):503–539, 1986.
[33] Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize. Is there too much hype about index-based
agricultural insurance? Journal of Development Studies, 48(2):187–200, 2012.
[34] Sandra E. Black, Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes. Like father, like
son? A note on the intergenerational transmission of IQ scores. Economics
Letters, 105(1):138–140, 2009.
[35] Sandra E. Black, Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes. Does grief transfer
across generations? Bereavements during pregnancy and child outcomes.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8(1):193–223, 2016.
[36] H. Bouws and M. R. Finckh. Effects of strip intercropping of potatoes with
non-hosts on late blight severity and tuber yield in organic production. Plant
Pathology, 57(5):916–927, 2008.
[37] J. Boyden. Young lives: an international study of childhood poverty:
Rounds 1-4 constructed files, 2002-2014. [data collection]. 2nd edition., 2016.
[38] Rick A. Boydston and Ann Hang. Rapeseed (brassica napus) green manure
crop suppresses weeds in potato (solanum tuberosum). Weed Technology,
9(4):669–675, 1995.
260
[39] Rob W. Brooker, Alison E. Bennett, Wen-Feng Cong, Tim J. Daniell, Tim-
othy S. George, Paul D. Hallett, Cathy Hawes, Pietro P. M. Iannetta, Ham-
lyn G. Jones, Alison J. Karley, Long Li, Blair M. McKenzie, Robin J. Pakeman,
Eric Paterson, Christian Schb, Jianbo Shen, Geoff Squire, Christine A. Wat-
son, Chaochun Zhang, Fusuo Zhang, Junling Zhang, and Philip J. White.
Improving intercropping: A synthesis of research in agronomy, plant phys-
iology and ecology. New Phytologist, 206(1):107–117, 2015.
[40] Colin A. Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. Bootstrap-
based improvements for inference with clustered errors. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 90(3):414–427, 2008.
[41] A. G. Carson. Effect of intercropping sorghum and groundnuts on density
of striga hermonthica in The Gambia. Tropical Pest Management, 35(2):130–
132, 1989.
[42] Michael R. Carter. Identification of the inverse relationship between farm
size and productivity: An empirical analysis of peasant agricultural pro-
duction. Oxford Economic Papers, 36(1):131–145, 1984.
[43] Michael R. Carter. Environment, technology, and the social articulation of
risk in West African agriculture. Economic Development and Cultural Change,
45(3):557–590, 1997.
[44] Michael R. Carter and Christopher B. Barrett. The economics of poverty
traps and persistent poverty: An asset-based approach. Journal of Develop-
ment Studies, 42(2):178–199, 2006.
[45] Germn Daniel Caruso. The legacy of natural disasters: The intergenera-
tional impact of 100 years of disasters in Latin America. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 127:209–233, 2017.
[46] Germn Daniel Caruso and Sebastian Miller. Long run effects and intergen-
erational transmission of natural disasters: A case study on the 1970 Ancash
earthquake. Journal of Development Economics, 117:134–150, 2015.
261
[47] Anne Case and Christina Paxson. Height, health, and cognitive function at
older ages. American Economic Review, 98(2):463–67, 2008.
[48] Anne Case and Christina Paxson. Stature and status: Height, ability, and
labor market outcomes. Journal of Political Economy, 116(3):499–532, 2008.
[49] Sommarat Chantarat, Andrew G. Mude, Christopher B. Barrett, and
Michael R. Carter. Designing index-based livestock insurance for manag-
ing asset risk in northern Kenya. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 80(1):205–237,
2013.
[50] Jean-Paul Chavas and Salvatore Di Falco. On the role of risk versus
economies of scope in farm diversification with an application to Ethiopian
farms. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63(1):25–55, 2012.
[51] Yuyu Chen and Li-An Zhou. The long-term health and economic con-
sequences of the 1959-1961 famine in China. Journal of Health Economics,
26(4):659–681, 2007.
[52] Susan Chinn. A simple method for converting an odds ratio to effect size
for use in meta-analysis. Statistics in medicine, 19(22):31273131, November
2000.
[53] Bruce F. Chorpita and David H. Barlow. The development of anxiety: The
role of control in the early environment. Psychological Bulletin, 124(1):3–21,
1998.
[54] Christopher Clapham. Transformation and continuity in revolutionary Ethiopia,
volume 61 of African Studies Series. Cambridge University Press, New York,
1988.
[55] AndrewE. Clark. Unemployment as a social norm: Psychological evidence
from panel data. Journal of Labor Economics, 21(2):323–351, 2003.
[56] Tim J. Coelli and Euan Fleming. Diversification economies and specialisa-
tion efficiencies in a mixed food and coffee smallholder farming system in
Papua New Guinea. Agricultural Economics, 31(23):229–239, 2004.
262
[57] Shawn Cole, Xavier Gine´, Jeremy Tobacman, Petia Topalova, Robert
Townsend, and James Vickery. Barriers to household risk management: Ev-
idence from India. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(1):104–
135, January 2013.
[58] D. Layne Coppock. The Borana plateau of southern Ethiopia: Synthesis of pas-
toral research, development and change, 1980-91. Number 5. ILRI, 1994.
[59] Flavio Cunha and James J. Heckman. The technology of skill formation.
American Economic Review, 97(2):31–47, 2007.
[60] Flavio Cunha, James J. Heckman, Lance Lochner, and Dimitriy V. Masterov.
Interpreting the evidence on life cycle skill formation. In E. Hanushek and
F. Welch, editors, Handbook of the Economics of Education, volume 1, chap-
ter 12, pages 697–812. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2006.
[61] Flavio Cunha, James J. Heckman, and Susanne M. Schennach. Estimating
the technology of cognitive and non-cognitive skill formation. Econometrica,
78(3):883–931, 2010.
[62] Janet Currie. Inequality at birth: Some causes and consequences. American
Economic Review, 101(3):1–22, 2011.
[63] Janet Currie and Douglas Almond. Human capital development before age
five. In David Card and Orley Ashenfelter, editors, Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, volume 4, Part B, chapter 15, pages 1315–1486. Elsevier, 2011.
[64] Janet Currie and Maya Rossin-Slater. Weathering the storm: Hurricanes and
birth outcomes. Journal of Health Economics, 32(3):487–503, 2013.
[65] Ronald E. Dahl. Adolescent brain development: A period of vulnerabili-
ties and opportunities. Keynote address. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1021(1):1–22, 2004.
[66] Felix D. Dakora and Donald A. Phillips. Root exudates as mediators of
mineral acquisition in low-nutrient environments. Plant and Soil, 245(1):35–
47, 2002.
263
[67] Alan de Brauw and Valerie Mueller. Do limitations in land rights transfer-
ability influence mobility rates in Ethiopia? Journal of African Economies,
21(4):548, 2012.
[68] Hugo De Groote, Bernard Vanlauwe, Esther Rutto, George D. Odhiambo,
Fred Kanampiu, and Zeyaur R. Khan. Economic analysis of different op-
tions in integrated pest and soil fertility management in maize systems of
western Kenya. Agricultural Economics, 41(5):471–482, 2010.
[69] A. de Janvry, V. Dequiedt, and E. Sadoulet. The demand for insurance
against common shocks. Journal of Development Economics, 106:227–238,
2014.
[70] Alexander de Waal. Evil days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia,
volume 3169, No 69. Human Rights Watch, 1991.
[71] Stefan Dercon and Luc Christiaensen. Consumption risk, technology adop-
tion and poverty traps: Evidence from Ethiopia. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 96(2):159–173, 2011.
[72] Stefan Dercon and Catherine Porter. Live Aid revisited: Long-term impacts
of the 1984 Ethiopian famine on children. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 12(4):927–948, 2014.
[73] Solomon Desta and D. Layne Coppock. Cattle population dynamics in
the southern Ethiopian rangelands, 1980-97. Journal of Range Management,
55(5):439–451, 2002.
[74] Stephen Devereux. Famine in the twentieth century. Working Paper 105,
Institute of Development Studies, 2000.
[75] Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, William Pariente´, and Vin-
cent Pons. Happiness on tap: Piped water adoption in urban Morocco.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(4):68–99, May 2012.
[76] Salvatore Di Falco and Jean-Paul Chavas. On crop biodiversity, risk expo-
264
sure, and food security in the highlands of Ethiopia. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 91(3):599–611, 2009.
[77] Salvatore Di Falco and Marcella Veronesi. How can African agriculture
adapt to climate change? A counterfactual analysis from Ethiopia. Land
Economics, 89(4):743–766, 2013.
[78] John L. Dillon and Jamie G. Anderson. The analysis of response in crop and
livestock production. Elsevier, 3 edition, 2012.
[79] Olivier Duchene, Jean-Franois Vian, and Florian Celette. Intercropping with
legume for agroecological cropping systems: Complementarity and facilita-
tion processes and the importance of soil microorganisms. A review. Agri-
culture, Ecosystems & Environment, 240:148–161, 2017.
[80] Lloyd M. Dunn and Leota M. Dunn. Manual for the peabody picture vo-
cabulary test-revised. Circle Pines, MN: American Guidance Service, 1981.
[81] Joshua Elliott, David Kelly, James Chryssanthacopoulos, Michael Glotter,
Kanika Jhunjhnuwala, Neil Best, Michael Wilde, and Ian Foster. The parallel
system for integrating impact models and sectors (pSIMS). Environmental
Modelling & Software, 62:509–516, 2014.
[82] Markos Ezra. Demographic responses to environmental stress in the
drought - and famine-prone areas of northern Ethiopia. International Journal
of Population Geography, 7(4):259–279, 2001.
[83] Markos Ezra and Gebre-Egziabher Kiros. Rural out-migration in the
drought prone areas of Ethiopia: A multilevel analysis. The International
Migration Review, 35(3):749–771, 2001.
[84] Marcel Fafchamps and Forhad Shilpi. Subjective welfare, isolation, and rel-
ative consumption. Journal of Development Economics, 86(1):43–60, 2008.
[85] FAO. Smallholders and family farmers, December 2012.
[86] Gershon Feder. The relation between farm size and farm productivity: The
265
role of family labor, supervision and credit constraints. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 18(2):297–313, 1985.
[87] Gershon Feder and Dina L. Umali. The adoption of agricultural innovations:
A review. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 43(3):215–239, 1993.
[88] Roger Feldman and Bryan Dowd. A new estimate of the welfare loss of
excess health insurance. American Economic Review, 81(1):297–301, 1991.
[89] Amy Finkelstein, Sarah Taubman, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan
Gruber, Joseph P. Newhouse, Heidi Allen, Katherine Baicker, and The Ore-
gon Health Study Group. The Oregon health insurance experiment: Evi-
dence from the first year. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3):1057–1106,
2012.
[90] John Fitzgerald, Peter Gottschalk, and Robert Moffitt. An analysis of sample
attrition in panel data: The Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The
Journal of Human Resources, 33(2):251–299, 1998.
[91] Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer. Happiness and economics: How the economy
and institutions affect human well-being. Princeton University Press, 2010.
[92] Yntiso Deko Gebre. Population displacement and food insecurity in Ethiopia:
Resettlement, settlers, and hosts. PhD thesis, University of Florida, 2001.
[93] Bryan Gharad. Ambiguity aversion decreases demand for partial insurance:
Evidence from African farmers. Unpublished, 2013.
[94] Peter Gill. Famine and foreigners: Ethiopia since Live Aid. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2010.
[95] Xavier Gine´, Robert Townsend, and James Vickery. Patterns of rainfall insur-
ance participation in rural India. World Bank Economic Review, 22(3):539–566,
2008.
[96] Peter D. Gluckman and Mark A. Hanson. Living with the past: Evolution,
development, and patterns of disease. Science, 305(5691):1733–1736, 2004.
266
[97] Carol Graham. Happiness around the world: The paradox of happy peasants and
miserable millionaires. Oxford University Press, 2012.
[98] Clark Gray and Richard Bilsborrow. Environmental influences on human
migration in rural Ecuador. Demography, 50(4):1217–1241, 2013.
[99] Clark Gray and Valerie Mueller. Drought and population mobility in rural
Ethiopia. World Development, 40(1):134–145, 2012.
[100] Ronald C. Griffin, John M. Montgomery, and M. Edward Rister. Selecting
functional form in production function analysis. Western Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics, 12(2):216–227, 1987.
[101] Cahit Guven and Wang Sheng Lee. Height and cognitive function at older
ages: Is height a useful summary measure of early childhood experiences?
Health Economics, 22(2):224–233, 2013.
[102] Martin Halek and Joseph G. Eisenhauer. Demography of risk aversion. Jour-
nal of Risk and Insurance, 68(1):1–24, 2001.
[103] D. Harris, M. Natarajan, and R. W. Willey. Physiological basis for yield
advantage in a sorghum/groundnut intercrop exposed to drought. 1. Dry-
matter production, yield, and light interception. Field Crops Research,
17(3):259–272, 1987.
[104] Vic Hasselblad and Larry V. Hedges. Meta-analysis of screening and diag-
nostic tests. Psychological bulletin, 117(1):167–178, 1995.
[105] Jerry A. Hausman and William E. Taylor. Panel data and unobservable in-
dividual effects. Econometrica, 49(6):1377–1398, 1981.
[106] J. L. Havlin, D. E. Kissel, L. D. Maddux, M. M. Claassen, and J. H. Long.
Crop rotation and tillage effects on soil organic carbon and nitrogen. Soil
Science Society of America Journal, 54(2):448–452, 1990.
[107] R. Haymes and H. C. Lee. Competition between autumn and spring planted
267
grain intercrops of wheat (triticum aestivum) and field bean (vicia faba).
Field Crops Research, 62(2):167–176, 1999.
[108] James J. Heckman. The economics, technology, and neuroscience of hu-
man capability formation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
104(33):13250–13255, 2007.
[109] Sabine Henry, Bruno Schoumaker, and Cris Beauchemin. The impact of
rainfall on the first out-migration: A multi-level event-history analysis in
Burkina Faso. Population and Environment, 25(5):423–460, 2004.
[110] Philippe Hinsinger, Elodie Betencourt, Laetitia Bernard, Alain Brauman,
Claude Plassard, Jianbo Shen, Xiaoyan Tang, and Fusuo Zhang. P for two,
sharing a scarce resource: Soil phosphorus acquisition in the rhizosphere of
intercropped species. Plant Physiology, 156(3):1078–1086, 2011.
[111] John Hoddinott, John A. Maluccio, Jere R. Behrman, Rafael Flores, and Rey-
naldo Martorell. Effect of a nutrition intervention during early childhood
on economic productivity in Guatemalan adults. Lancet, 371(9610):411–416,
2008.
[112] G. J. House and G. E. Brust. Ecology of low-input, no-tillage agroecosys-
tems. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 27(1):331–345, 1989.
[113] ILRI. IBLI Borena Household Survey Codebook April 2014 Draft. International
Livestock Research Institution (ILRI), 2014.
[114] ILRI-IBLI. Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) Trainers Manual. Interna-
tional Livestock Research Institution (ILRI) - Index-Based Livestock Insur-
ance (IBLI), 2013.
[115] M. N. Islam, M. Akhteruzzaman, M. S. Alom, and M. Salim. Hybrid maize
and sweet potato intercropping: A technology to increase productivity and
profitability for poor hill farmers in Bangladesh. SAARC Journal of Agricul-
ture, 12(2):101–111, 2014.
268
[116] Hanan G. Jacoby. Borrowing constraints and progress through school: Evi-
dence from Peru. Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(1):151–160, 1994.
[117] Sarah A. Janzen and Michael R. Carter. After the drought: The impact of
microinsurance on consumption smoothing and asset protection. Working
Paper 19702, National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2013.
[118] E. Steen Jensen. Grain yield, symbiotic N2 fixation and interspecific compe-
tition for inorganic N in pea-barley intercrops. Plant and Soil, 182(1):25–38,
1996.
[119] Nathaniel D. Jensen and Christopher B. Barrett. Agricultural index insur-
ance for development. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 39(2):199–
219, 2017.
[120] Nathaniel D. Jensen, Christopher B. Barrett, and Andrew G. Mude. Index
insurance quality and basis risk: Evidence from northern Kenya. American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 98(5):1450–1469, 2016.
[121] Nathaniel D. Jensen, Christopher B. Barrett, and Andrew G. Mude. Cash
transfers and index insurance: A comparative impact analysis from north-
ern Kenya. Journal of Development Economics, 129(Supplement C):14–28,
2017.
[122] Jonathan Kaminski. Subjective wealth and satisfaction with policy reform:
Evidence from the cotton reform experience in Burkina Faso. Journal of
African Economies, 23(4):528–581, 2014.
[123] Dean Karlan, Robert Osei, Isaac Osei-Akoto, and Christopher Udry. Agri-
cultural decisions after relaxing credit and risk constraints. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 129(2):597–652, 2014.
[124] Bereket Kebede. Land tenure and common pool resources in rural Ethiopia:
A study based on fifteen sites. African Development Review, 14(1):113–149,
2002.
[125] Elaine Kelly. The scourge of Asian flu: In utero exposure to pandemic in-
269
fluenza and the development of a cohort of British children. Journal of Hu-
man Resources, 46(4):669–694, 2011.
[126] Madhu Khanna. Sequential adoption of site-specific technologies and its
implications for Nitrogen productivity: A double selectivity model. Ameri-
can Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(1):35–51, 2001.
[127] Asmerom Kidane. Demographic consequences of the 1984-1985 Ethiopian
famine. Demography, 26(3):515–522, 1989.
[128] Asmerom Kidane. Mortality estimates of the 1984-85 Ethiopian famine.
Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 18(4):281–286, 1990.
[129] Kwansoo Kim, Jean-Paul Chavas, Bradford Barham, and Jeremy Foltz. Spe-
cialization, diversification, and productivity: A panel data analysis of rice
farms in Korea. Agricultural Economics, 43(6):687–700, 2012.
[130] Miles S. Kimball. Precautionary saving in the small and in the large. Econo-
metrica, 58(1):53–73, 1990.
[131] Gary King, Christopher J. L. Murray, Joshua A. Salomon, and Ajay Tandon.
Enhancing the validity and cross-cultural comparability of measurement in
survey research. American political science review, 98(1):191–207, 2004.
[132] Gary King and Jonathan Wand. Comparing incomparable survey responses:
Evaluating and selecting anchoring vignettes. Political Analysis, 15(1):46–66,
2007.
[133] Alan B. Krueger and David A. Schkade. The reliability of subjective well-
being measures. Journal of Public Economics, 92(89):1833–1845, 2008.
[134] Alan B. Krueger and Arthur A. Stone. Progress in measuring subjective
well-being. Science, 346(6205):42–43, 2014.
[135] H. M. Kruidhof, Eric R. Gallandt, E. R. Haramoto, and L. Bastiaans. Selective
weed suppression by cover crop residues: Effects of seed mass and timing
of species sensitivity. Weed Research, 51(2):177–186, 2011.
270
[136] Donald F. Larson, Keijiro Otsuka, Tomoya Matsumoto, and Talip Kilic.
Should African rural development strategies depend on smallholder farms?
An exploration of the inverse-productivity hypothesis. Agricultural Eco-
nomics, 45(3):355–367, 2014.
[137] Lars Lefgren, Matthew J. Lindquist, and David Sims. Rich dad, smart dad:
Decomposing the intergenerational transmission of income. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 120(2):268–303, 2012.
[138] M. Gabatshele Legwaila, K. Teko Marokane, and Witness Mojeremane.
Effects of intercropping on the performance of maize and cowpeas in
Botswana. International Journal of Agriculture and Forestry, 2(6):307–310, 2012.
[139] Yuefeng Li, Wei Ran, Ruiping Zhang, Shubin Sun, and Guohua Xu. Facili-
tated legume nodulation, phosphate uptake and nitrogen transfer by arbus-
cular inoculation in an upland rice and mung bean intercropping system.
Plant and Soil, 315(1):285–296, 2009.
[140] Matt Liebman and C. R. Davis. Integration of soil, crop and weed man-
agement in low-external-input farming systems. Weed Research, 40(1):27–47,
2000.
[141] Matt Liebman and Elizabeth Dyck. Crop rotation and intercropping strate-
gies for weed management. Ecological Applications, 3(1):92–122, 1993.
[142] Matt Liebman and Tsutomu Ohno. Crop rotation and legume residue effects
on weed emergence and growth: Applications for weed management. In
J. L. Hatfield, D. D. Buhler, and B. A. Stewart, editors, Integrated Weed and
Soil Managemen, pages 181–221. Ann Arbor Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1998.
[143] Matt Liebman and Robert H. Robichaux. Competition by barley and pea
against mustard: Effects on resource acquisition, photosynthesis and yield.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 31(2):155–172, 1990.
[144] David P. Lindstrom and Betemariam Berhanu. The impact of war,
famine, and economic decline on marital fertility in Ethiopia. Demography,
36(2):247–261, 1999.
271
[145] L. A. P. Lotz, R. M. W. Groeneveld, B. Habekotte´, and H. van Oene. Reduc-
tion of growth and reproduction of cyperus esculentus by specific crops.
Weed Research, 31(3):153–160, 1991.
[146] Jens Ludwig, Greg J. Duncan, Lisa A. Gennetian, Lawrence F. Katz,
Ronald C. Kessler, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Lisa Sanbonmatsu. Long-term
neighborhood effects on low-income families: Evidence from moving to op-
portunity. American Economic Review, 103(3):226–231, May 2013.
[147] Travis J. Lybbert, Christopher B. Barrett, Solomon Desta, and D. Layne Cop-
pock. Stochastic wealth dynamics and risk management among a poor pop-
ulation. Economic Journal, 114(498):750–777, 2004.
[148] Sharon Maccini and Dean Yang. Under the weather: Health, schooling,
and economic consequences of early-life rainfall. American Economic Review,
99(3):1006–1026, 2009.
[149] Paul Ma¨der, Andreas Fliessbach, David Dubois, Lucie Gunst, Padruot Fried,
and Urs Niggli. Soil fertility and biodiversity in organic farming. Science,
296(5573):1694–1697, 2002.
[150] E. Male`zieux, Y. Crozat, C. Dupraz, M. Laurans, D. Makowski, H. Ozier-
Lafontaine, B. Rapidel, S. de Tourdonnet, and M. Valantin-Morison. Mix-
ing plant species in cropping systems: Concepts, tools and models: A re-
view. In Eric Lichtfouse, Mireille Navarrete, Philippe Debaeke, Souchere
Vronique, and Caroline Alberola, editors, Sustainable Agriculture, pages 329–
353. Springer Netherlands, 2009.
[151] John A. Maluccio, John Hoddinott, Jere R. Behrman, Reynaldo Martorell,
Agnes R. Quisumbing, and Aryeh D. Stein. The impact of improving nutri-
tion during early childhood on education among Guatemalan adults. Eco-
nomic Journal, 119(537):734–763, 2009.
[152] C. Menezes, C. Geiss, and J Tressler. Increasing downside risk. American
Economic Review, 70(5):921–932, 1980.
[153] Xin Meng and Nancy Qian. The long term consequences of famine on sur-
272
vivors: Evidence from a unique natural experiment using China’s great
famine. Working Paper 14917, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.
[154] Mario J. Miranda and Katie Farrin. Index insurance for developing coun-
tries. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 34(3):391–427, 2012.
[155] Charles E. Mitchell, David Tilman, and James V. Groth. Effects of grass-
land plant species diversity, abundance, and composition on foliar fungal
disease. Ecology, 83(6):1713–1726, 2002.
[156] Jonathan Morduch. Poverty and vulnerability. American Economic Review,
84(2):221–225, 1994.
[157] Todd L. Morton. The relationship between parental locus of control and
children’s perceptions of control. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 158(2):216–
225, 1997.
[158] Yair Mundlak. On the pooling of time series and cross section data. Econo-
metrica, 46(1):69–85, 1978.
[159] Christopher C. Mundt. Use of multiline cultivars and cultivar mixtures for
disease management. Annual Review of Phytopathology, 40:381–410, 2002.
[160] Shahid Naeem, Lindsey J. Thompson, Sharon P. Lawler, John H. Lawton,
and Richard M. Woodfin. Declining biodiversity can alter the performance
of ecosystems. Nature, 368(6473):734–737, April 1994.
[161] Sean P. Neill and David R. Lee. Explaining the adoption and disadoption
of sustainable agriculture: The case of cover crops in northern Honduras.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(4):793–820, 2001.
[162] Elissa L. Newport. Maturational constraints on language learning. Cognitive
Science, 14(1):11–28, 1990.
[163] Huy Quynh Nguyen. Analyzing the economies of crop diversification in ru-
ral Vietnam using an input distance function. Agricultural Systems, 153:148–
156, 2017.
273
[164] Cormac O´ Gra´da. Making famine history. Journal of Economic Literature,
45(1):5–38, 2007.
[165] Francis Ofori and W. R. Stern. Cereallegume intercropping systems. Ad-
vances in Agronomy, 41:41–90, 1987.
[166] Siddiq Osmani and Amartya Sen. The hidden penalties of gender inequal-
ity: Fetal origins of ill-health. Economics & Human Biology, 1(1):105–121,
2003.
[167] Alula Pankhurst. Resettlement and Famine in Ethiopia: The villagers’ experience.
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992.
[168] Sandrine Petit, Aude Trichard, Luc Biju-Duval, O´. B. McLaughlin, and D. A.
Bohan. Interactions between conservation agricultural practice and land-
scape composition promote weed seed predation by invertebrates. Agricul-
ture, Ecosystems & Environment, 240:45–53, 2017.
[169] Arturas Petronis. Epigenetics as a unifying principle in the aetiology of
complex traits and diseases. Nature, 465(7299):721–727, 2010.
[170] John W. Pratt. Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica,
32(1-2):122–136, 1964.
[171] Alan R. Putnam, Joseph DeFrank, and Jane P. Barnes. Exploitation of al-
lelopathy for weed control in annual and perennial cropping systems. Jour-
nal of Chemical Ecology, 9(8):1001–1010, 1983.
[172] Pieter Pypers, Jean-Marie Sanginga, Bishikwabo Kasereka, Masamba
Walangululu, and Bernard Vanlauwe. Increased productivity through in-
tegrated soil fertility management in cassavalegume intercropping systems
in the highlands of sud-kivu, DR Congo. Field Crops Research, 120(1):76–85,
2011.
[173] Martin Ravallion. Poor, or just feeling poor? On using subjective data in
measuring poverty. Policy Research Working Paper 5968, The World Bank,
2012.
274
[174] Martin Ravallion, Kristen Himelein, and Kathleen Beegle. Can subjective
questions on economic welfare be trusted? Evidence for three developing
countries. Policy Research Working Paper 6726, The World Bank, 2013.
[175] D. J. Rees. Crop growth, development and yield in semi-arid conditions in
Botswana. II. the effects of intercropping sorghum bicolor with vigna un-
guiculata. Experimental Agriculture, 22:169–177, April 1986.
[176] Stephen J. Risch, David A. Andow, and Miguel A. Altieri. Agroecosystem
diversity and pest control: Data, tentative conclusions, and new research
directions. Environmental Entomology, 12(3):625–629, 1983.
[177] Marı´a Fernanda Rosales. Impact of early life shocks on human capital for-
mation: El Nı˜no floods in ecuador. Unpublished Manuscript, 2014.
[178] Mark R. Rosenzweig and Hans P. Binswanger. Wealth, weather risk and the
composition and profitability of agricultural investments. Economic Journal,
103(416):56–78, 1993.
[179] Tanja Rottstock, Jasmin Joshi, Volker Kummer, and Markus Fischer. Higher
plant diversity promotes higher diversity of fungal pathogens, while it de-
creases pathogen infection per plant. Ecology, 95(7):1907–1917, 2014.
[180] Alex C. Ruane and Richard Goldberg. AgMIP hybrid baseline climate
datasets: Shifted reanalyses for gap-filling and historical climate series esti-
mation. Unpublished, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washing-
ton, DC, 2014.
[181] Alex C. Ruane, Richard Goldberg, and James Chryssanthacopoulos. Cli-
mate forcing datasets for agricultural modeling: Merged products for gap-
filling and historical climate series estimation. Agricultural and Forest Meteo-
rology, 200:233–248, 2015.
[182] Paulo Santos and Christopher B. Barrett. Persistent poverty and informal
credit. Journal of Development Economics, 96(2):337–347, 2011.
[183] Paulo Santos and Christopher B. Barrett. Heterogeneous wealth dynamics:
275
On the roles of risk and ability. Working Paper 22626, National Bureau of
Economic Research, September 2016.
[184] James M. Schuerger and Anita C. Witt. The temporal stability of individu-
ally tested intelligence. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 45(2):294–302, 1989.
[185] Zewdu T. Segele and Peter J. Lamb. Characterization and variability of
Kiremt rainy season over Ethiopia. Meteorology and Atmospheric Physics,
89(1-4):153–180, 2005.
[186] Amartya Sen. An aspect of Indian agriculture. Economic Weekly, 14, 1962.
[187] Manisha Shah and Bryce Millett Steinberg. Drought of opportunities: Con-
temporaneous and long-term impacts of rainfall shocks on human capital.
Journal of Political Economy, 125(2):527–561, 2017.
[188] Vincent H Smith. Producer insurance and risk management options for
smallholder farmers. World Bank Research Observer, 31(2):271–289, 2016.
[189] Jan Sørensen and Angela Sessitsch. Plant-associated bacteria-lifestyle and
molecular interactions. In Dirk Jan van Elsas, Jack T. Trevors, Janet K. Jans-
son, and Paola Nannipieri, editors, Modern soil microbiology, pages 211–236.
CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL, second edition, 2007.
[190] S. SriRamaratnam, David A. Bessler, M. Edward Rister, John E. Matocha,
and James Novak. Fertilization under uncertainty: An analysis based on
producer yield expectations. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
69(2):349–357, 1987.
[191] Chih Ming Tan, Tan Zhibo, and Xiaobo Zhang. Sins of the fathers: The
intergenerational legacy of the 1959-1961 great Chinese famine on childrens
cognitive development. Discussion Paper 01351, IFPRI, 2014.
[192] M. A. Taslim. Supervision problems and the size-productivity relation in
Bangladesh agriculture. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 51(1):55–
71, 1989.
276
[193] J. R. Teasdale and C. L. Mohler. Light transmittance, soil temperature,
and soil moisture under residue of hairy vetch and rye. Agronomy Journal,
85(3):673–680, 1993.
[194] T. Tefera and T. Tana. Agronomic performance of sorghum and groundnut
cultivars in sole and intercrop cultivation under semiarid conditions. Journal
of Agronomy and Crop Science, 188(3):212–218, 2002.
[195] Franco Tesio and Aldo Ferrero. Allelopathy, a chance for sustainable weed
management. International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecol-
ogy, 17(5):377–389, 2010.
[196] C. Peter Timmer. Agricultural diversification in Asia: Lessons from the
1980s and issues for the 1990s. In Shawki Barghouti, Lisa Garbus, and
Dina Umali, editors, Trends in agricultural diversification: Regional perspectives,
World Bank Tachnical Paper, volume 180 of World Bank Tachnical Paper, pages
27–38. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1992.
[197] Aude Trichard, Audrey Alignier, Luc Biju-Duval, and Sandrine Petit.
The relative effects of local management and landscape context on weed
seed predation and carabid functional groups. Basic and Applied Ecology,
14(3):235–245, 2013.
[198] Arthur van Soest, Liam Delaney, Colm Harmon, Arie Kapteyn, and James P.
Smith. Validating the use of anchoring vignettes for the correction of re-
sponse scale differences in subjective questions. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 174(3):575–595, 2011.
[199] John Vandermeer, Meine van Noordwijk, Jo Anderson, Chin Ong, and Ivette
Perfecto. Global change and multi-species agroecosystems: Concepts and
issues. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 67(1):1–22, 1998.
[200] Ellen Viste, Diriba Korecha, and Asgeir Sorteberg. Recent drought and pre-
cipitation tendencies in Ethiopia. Theoretical and Applied Climatology, 112(3-
4):535–551, 2013.
[201] Thomas S. Walker and James G. Ryan. Village and household economics in
277
India’s semi-arid tropics. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD,
1990.
[202] Frances L. Walley, Gilberto O. Tomm, Alejandro Matus, Alfred E. Slinkard,
and Chris van Kessel. Allocation and cycling of nitrogen in an alfalfa-
bromegrass sward. Agronomy Journal, 88(5):834–843, 1996.
[203] Patrick Webb and Joachim von Braun. Famine and food security in Ethiopia:
Lessons for Africa. John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, UK, 1994.
[204] Patrick Webb, Joachim Von Braun, and Yisehac Yohannes. Famine in Ethiopia:
Policy implications of coping failure at national and household levels, volume 92.
International Food Policy Research Institution, 1992.
[205] R. W. Willey. Irrigation of sugarcane and associated crops resource use in
intercropping systems. Agricultural Water Management, 17(1):215–231, 1990.
[206] Jeffery R. Williams. A stochastic dominance analysis of tillage and crop
insurance practices in a semiarid region. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 70(1):112–120, 1988.
[207] WMO. Atlas of mortality and economic losses from weather, climate and
water extremes (1970-2012), 2014.
[208] Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2010.
[209] World Bank. Agriculture & rural development in Ethiopia, 2016.
[210] World Bank. Average monthly temprature and rainfall for Ethiopia from
1900-2012, 2016. Accessed: 11-13-2016.
[211] Fusuo Zhang and Long Li. Using competitive and facilitative interactions
in intercropping systems enhances crop productivity and nutrient-use effi-
ciency. Plant and Soil, 248(1):305–312, 2003.
278
[212] You-Yong Zhu, Hui Fang, Yun-Yue Wang, Jin Xiang Fan, Shi-Sheng Yang,
Twng Wah Mew, and Christopher C. Mundt. Panicle blast and canopy mois-
ture in rice cultivar mixtures. Phytopathology, 95(4):433–438, 2005.
279
